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Executive Summary
This research report arises from a three-year 
research programme, which the African Centre 
for Biosafety (ACB) is conducting, to investigate 
the impacts of Green Revolution (GR) 
technologies in Africa on small-scale farmers 
(SSFs). The focus is on seed and soil fertility, and 
we aim to track the work of the Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in particular.
The research has two objectives: first, 
to understand better the impacts of GR 
interventions on the livelihoods of SSF 
households and on the ecology; secondly, to 
build a regional, multi-disciplinary research 
network with a critical orientation, which will 
cooperate with activist networks, organisations 
and movements in support of food sovereignty 
and democratic producer-owned and controlled 
systems.
The GR can be seen as a puzzle made up 
of interlocking pieces that form a complex 
picture. Pieces of the puzzle include policies, 
laws and institutions, infrastructure, input 
supply, production and value chain financing, 
production practices and markets. Significant 
donor and planning coordination are evident 
in the strategies being deployed to realise the 
GR in Africa, with central roles being played 
by the Comprehensive African Agricultural 
Development Programme (CAADP), the United 
States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), AGRA and the G8’s New Alliance for 
Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN). The 
vision of the completed puzzle is coherent 
and the logic is clear: a production system in 
which farmers large and small have access to 
the latest technologies, financed through the 
profitable production and sale of commodities 
that meet the requirements of global, regional 
and domestic markets.
But the model is based on an ahistorical, 
linear view of development that assumes 
Africa will follow the path of development 
of Western societies. In this model, 
agricultural modernisation is the precursor 
to industrialisation and hence prosperity. 
But Africa occupies a subordinate position 
in an already existing global structure of 
accumulation. At best, many farmers who will 
inevitably be displaced by forces of competition 
and concentration will find poorly paid and 
insecure wage work in mines or factories. 
At worst, they will be left destitute, their 
historical connection to the land severed by 
commodification and commercialisation—
without any alternative livelihoods to replace 
what they have lost. Some local producers and 
businesses certainly stand to benefit from the 
GR, but the costs will be borne by other, less 
visible, people.
While the GR is presented in terms of 
‘sustainable intensification’ of agriculture, 
there is nothing sustainable about it in the 
long term. The end result will be not only 
social dislocation and marginalisation, but also 
long-term ecological damage to soil, water and 
biodiversity. The negative impacts of this harm 
will not arise all at once and impoverished 
farmers, desperate for some improvement 
in their conditions, may be convinced by the 
short-term gains that appear to be on offer. 
New technologies are not automatically and 
necessarily negative. But in order for farmers 
to have meaningful choices they must receive 
a range of information that highlights both 
the pros and cons of different technologies. 
Few resources from the public and private 
sectors are being dedicated to supporting 
agro-ecological methods of production as 
options available to farmers, options which 
may be more suitable for their context than 
expensive inputs with questionable output 
markets and which will enable them not only 
to recover their expenditure, but also to realise 
improvements, together with those around 
them. Although AGRA speaks of integrated 
approaches, in practice it orients the bulk 
of its resources towards the commercial, 
private side of the equation. Likewise, CAADP 
gives rhetorical support to ecologically and 
socially sustainable production. But in practice 
agricultural programmes and budgets support 
only the GR.
This report on the GR in Tanzania indicates 
a well-coordinated effort by selected 
states, philanthropic institutions like 
AGRA, multilateral institutions, donors 
and multinational corporations (MNCs) to 
construct a GR that aims to produce a layer 
of commercial surplus producers. This effort 
fails to consider the impacts on those who are 
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not able to integrate into this system but who 
currently rely on agriculture for their survival. 
It is still early days for the GR in Tanzania. But it 
is necessary to raise a red flag of warning: that 
the inevitable negative social and ecological 
after-effects of these interventions have yet to 
be felt, but they will come.
The African Centre for Biosafety (ACB) formed 
a partnership with Mtandao wa Vikundi vya 
Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA) and Sustainable 
Agriculture Tanzania (SAT) to conduct 
research in Tanzania. The research is framed 
by a survey of 60 farmers in Mvomero and 
Morogoro districts in Morogoro Region. Survey 
respondents comprised women (61%) and one-
third youth, while female-headed households 
constituted just over one-fifth of the sample. 
Respondents relied on a mix of agricultural 
production, seasonal or temporary wage labour 
(mostly in the agricultural sector), and small 
businesses for their livelihoods.
The sites cover two agro-ecological zones, 
one in the mountains (grouped into the 
Northern Highlands) and one in undulating 
hills with relatively fertile soil (in the Southern 
Highlands). The latter forms part of the 
ecological spine of the Southern Agricultural 
Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SACGOT), a key 
GR initiative. Irrigated rice is an important 
crop in Mvomero and is the target for GR 
interventions in the area.
Focus group discussions (FGDs) with farmers 
on seed, soil fertility and markets, and with 
village-based agricultural advisers (VBAAs) 
complemented the survey. Key informant 
interviews were conducted in Tanzania with 
farmer and other civil society organisations, 
government officials, technical staff at 
universities and institutes, seed companies, 
donors, multilateral organisations and others.
The report is divided into five main content 
sections: land and agricultural production, 
GR interventions in Tanzania, soil fertility, 
seed and markets. AGRA’s interventions are 
specifically considered in each section. The 
report concludes with reflections and ideas for 
the way forward.
Land and agricultural production
Land in Tanzania was historically communal 
and under the authority of the state, with 
most land farmed by SSFs on 3 hectares (ha) 
or less each, and with relative equality in 
land holdings. Although laws and policies 
provide for equality between men and 
women regarding land access, allocation 
and ownership, in practice women are 
discriminated against. As part of structural 
adjustment, from the mid-1980s land laws 
changed to open the door to long-term leases 
and even outright ownership for commercial 
production. Efforts are currently under way 
to survey and demarcate land, including 
village land, to facilitate commodification and 
privatisation. Demarcation and certification of 
land are key commitments by the Tanzanian 
government as part of NAFSN. The explicit goal 
is the “responsible and transparent allocation 
of land to investors in SAGCOT”.
In the research sites, the average size of 
land owned was slightly less than 2 ha per 
responding household. Four households 
were landless (they had rented land in the 
past season) and the maximum land owned 
was 8 ha, signifying some, but not extreme, 
differentiation. Land access was becoming an 
issue in Mvomero, with available land very far 
from homesteads and land holdings mostly 
fragmented into dispersed plots. More than 
half the respondents in Mvomero had rented 
land in the past season, mostly to complement 
their own land holdings. Rents ranged from 
US$12–61/acre/season. Insecure tenure was 
cited as a reason for limiting investments in 
soil health.
There are clearly tensions between pastoralists 
and crop growers, with reports of violence and 
even killings as a result of tensions over land. 
Though efforts are being made by MVIWATA 
and others to mediate in disputes, respondents 
indicated the problem was getting worse over 
time. The concentration of land holdings will 
exacerbate these tensions. 
AGRA recognises the generally small land 
holdings in Africa and therefore orients 
its support towards SSFs. Nevertheless, it 
explicitly supports the concentration of land 
holdings to allow for economies of scale in 
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production. AGRA makes no reference to those 
who will lose their land when ownership is 
concentrated; it also acknowledges the value of 
customary land tenure systems while pointing 
out their limitations. However, it explicitly 
favours private ownership and formal titling for 
commercial production.
Agriculture remains the mainstay of the 
Tanzanian economy, even though services 
(including tourism) make the largest 
contribution to GDP at 48% in 2012. 
Agriculture’s share of gross domestic product 
(GDP) is declining and stood at 28% in 2011, 
although it absorbs 75% of the economically 
active population, most of whom are SSFs. Only 
2.5% of the total land area is currently equipped 
for irrigation, although it is estimated that ten 
times this amount has potential for irrigation. 
There are seven different agro-ecological zones 
with two dominant rainfall patterns (two rainy 
seasons in the north and east, and one in the 
south). Maize, rice, cassava, bananas and sweet 
potatoes are primary food crops, and major 
exports include coffee, cotton, cashew, tobacco 
and sisal. These are all plantation crops. The 
adoption of GR inputs and technologies in 
Tanzania is currently low, with an estimated 
17% of farming households using certified 
seed (mainly maize) and an average 5.5 kg/
ha of synthetic fertilisers being used between 
2002 and 2009. Synthetic fertiliser use has 
expanded relatively rapidly since 2009 with the 
introduction of the National Agricultural Input 
Voucher Scheme (NAIVS), which subsidises 
the cost of certified (including hybrid) seed 
and synthetic fertiliser. Farmers in our survey 
identified the lack of markets (68%) and crop 
damage caused by animals (58%) as their 
major agricultural challenges; high fertiliser 
prices (51%), access to land (47%) and seed 
prices (44%) were also notable.
In our research sites, vegetables, maize, pigeon 
pea and paddy (rice) were the most commonly 
produced crops in Mvomero, while in Morogoro 
maize (especially local varieties), vegetables 
and beans were the most widespread crops. 
Local (or at least uncertified) maize varieties 
were more prevalent than hybrid or improved 
open pollinated varieties (OPVs), with only 
8–12% of respondents harvesting the latter 
two, compared with 70% for local maize. More 
than half (57%) of respondents were growing 
some kind of fruit tree, with banana, citrus 
and mango the most common. This indicates 
a diversity of production that can form a solid 
basis for a sustainable agriculture and nutrition 
strategy, if adequately supported. One of the 
villages in Mvomero is located on a large sugar 
estate (Mtibwa) but very few farmers were 
engaged in sugar production, citing low prices 
as a reason.
When considering the absolute volumes 
produced (rather than per acre yields, because 
we do not have information on the exact 
amount of land under different crops), it is clear 
that those using hybrid maize and improved 
OPVs are producing higher yields than those 
using local varieties. Hybrid maize users 
achieved a two-thirds higher yield than those 
using local maize. The gap is even wider for 
those using improved OPVs; the five farmers 
using improved OPV produced on average 2 
tons more than farmers using local maize. 
This is 210% higher. This finding should be 
qualified: first, the percentage of people using 
improved seed is very low so the result is open 
to distortion; secondly, we do not have an 
accurate picture of the amount of land planted 
using the various seed types. Also, farmers who 
can afford improved seed and the associated 
synthetic fertilisers are likely to be those with 
access to more land. There are various reasons 
why farmers may choose to use local rather 
than improved varieties, including access and 
price, and several of these are discussed in 
some detail in Appendix 5 of the main report. 
SAT demo gardens, Morogoro.
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It is clear that, while yields are important to 
farmers, they are not the only consideration 
when selecting varieties. Rice yields averaged 
just under 2 tons, and rice is sold mainly into 
local markets. Cow pea, bean and pigeon 
pea are not produced at commercial scale, 
with yields from 60 to 175 kg for those who 
harvested these crops in the past season.
Green Revolution interventions in 
Tanzania
After independence in the 1960s the state 
asserted control over agriculture, which was 
the backbone of the Tanzanian economy. 
However, structural adjustment driven by the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), from the mid-1980s and especially after 
1992, led to deregulation, trade liberalisation 
and privatisation of state assets. The main 
effect felt by agriculture was the arrival of 
multinational input companies.
Since 2009 a series of initiatives were launched 
to boost the GR and encourage private 
investment in agriculture. These include 
Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First), which was 
launched in 2009 as a framework for public 
private partnerships (PPPs), and investment in 
the commercialisation of agriculture, including 
through the expansion of GR technologies; 
the launch of SAGCOT in 2010; the Grow Africa 
Forum in 2011; the launch of the Tanzanian 
Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan 
(TAFSIP), Tanzania’s national investment plan 
under CAADP in 2011; the launch of NAFSN in 
Tanzania and elsewhere in 2012, Big Results 
Now (BRN) in 2013, and the operationalisation 
of the SAGCOT Catalytic Fund in 2014. These 
initiatives are all linked to one another and 
are aligned with the embedding of CAADP at 
the national level. They are based on creating 
conditions for private sector investment and 
the commercialisation and modernisation of 
agriculture in Tanzania.
Green Revolution organogram 
CAADP Grow	Africa NAFSN SSTP
World	Bank	and	
other	government	
and	multilateral	
donors
USAID
Feed	the	
Future
TAPP Nafaka
Tanzanian	
government
SAGCOT
Markets
Breadbasket	
strategy
PASS
SHP
ARIs
CGIAR	
institutions
AGRA
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USAID has played a constant role in Tanzanian 
agriculture, focusing on large-scale agricultural 
projects and export production. Currently 
USAID is working through the Feed the Future 
(FtF) initiative, launched in 2010 and described 
as the public sector contribution of the US 
to the NAFSN and Grow Africa partnerships. 
Two major projects under FtF are currently 
underway in Morogoro: the Nafaka food grain 
value chain project, which works with rice 
and maize; and the Tanzanian Agricultural 
Productivity Partnership (TAPP), which 
focuses on horticulture. Nafaka partners and 
subcontractors include Farm Input Promotions 
(FIPS) Africa, MVIWATA, the International 
Fertiliser Development Centre (IFDC) and 
SAGCOT.
It is apparent from these initiatives over the 
past five years that there is a high degree 
of coordination between the Tanzanian 
government and donors, including especially 
G8 governments, and domestic and 
multinational private interests, including 
Diageo, Monsanto, SABMiller, Syngenta, 
Unilever, United Phosphorus (UPL)/Advanta 
and Yara. There is a concerted effort focusing 
on the commercialisation of agriculture and 
the ‘crowding in’ of investment in some key 
geographical areas, of which SAGCOT is a 
current priority.
SAGCOT is “an international PPP aiming to 
catalyse large volumes of private investment to 
increase productivity and develop commercial 
agriculture in the southern corridor”, according 
to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). The corridor covers 
about one third of the land area of Tanzania 
and is structured around the infrastructural 
spine connecting the port at Dar es Salaam 
with Mbeya and the border with Zambia. The 
concept of agricultural corridors fits firmly into 
the GR model of agriculture, structured along 
transport routes to reach markets. SAGCOT, as 
well as the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor 
in neighbouring Mozambique, are being 
managed by the UK consultancy, Prorustica, 
along with its agricultural and infrastructure 
development arms, AgDevCo and InfraCo.
SAGCOT’s investment blueprint envisions 
putting 350,000 ha under production, the 
creation of 420,000 jobs and potential 
farming revenues of US$1.2 billion by 2030. 
The government of Tanzania is expected to 
provide up to US$650 million in funding over 
the project’s first 20 years. It is not clear where 
these resources will come from, and it should 
be noted this is only the investment plan—it 
does not reflect the real possibility of the 
Tanzanian government being able to raise 
these resources without cannibalising other 
public sector expenditure. As part of NAFSN, 
Monsanto has committed to strengthening 
agro-dealer networks and distributing high-
yielding maize varieties in SAGCOT, including 
making 3–5 new maize varieties available, 
royalty-free, to seed companies. Yara is in 
the process of constructing a US$20 million 
fertiliser terminal at Dar es Salaam’s harbour, 
as well as providing other support in the 
corridor.
AGRA has identified Tanzania as one of four 
priority countries earmarked for its breadbasket 
strategy, with the Southern Highlands and 
Kilombero region as its focus area, linked 
to SAGCOT. According to AGRA the strategy 
focuses on “increasing yields and expanding 
cultivated land in fertile areas already endowed 
with a minimum of essential infrastructure”, 
with over 90% of AGRA’s initial investments 
in Tanzania in the SAGCOT breadbasket area. 
In 2010–2011 the Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
Security and Cooperatives (MAFC) was granted 
US$640,000 to develop the breadbasket 
concept and to create ‘investment grade’ 
proposals.
Terraced plot, Uluguru Mountains, Morogoro
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Total AGRA grants to Tanzania from 2007 to 
2012 amounted to US$54.6m, with 60.2% 
being allocated to the Soil Health Programme 
(SHP). This is somewhat skewed by US$25m 
in grants for the establishment of the African 
Fertiliser and Agribusiness Partnership (AFAP), 
based in Tanzania but with an operational 
area in Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania. The 
Programme for Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS) 
received 22.8% of total grants. About 17% of 
total grants went to markets, policy and the 
development of AGRA’s breadbasket strategy 
in Tanzania. In 2014 a new series of three-year 
projects worth US$4.3m was announced, but 
no details were given and none appeared on 
the AGRA website at the time of writing.
Soil fertility, agro-ecology and synthetic 
fertiliser
Farmers who participated in our research sites 
were engaged in a number of agro-ecological 
practices, with potential for expansion of these 
and other techniques. The most common 
practices being conducted were seed saving 
(80%), leaving crop residues on the land (77%), 
intercropping and planting food trees (both 
72%) and applying animal manure (62%). 
Farmers expressed interest in learning more 
about Conservation Agriculture (CA) which 
they mentioned by name without being 
prompted. When offered a menu of courses 
by Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania (SAT), 
farmers overwhelmingly chose a course on No 
Tillage Agriculture, with 90% of participating 
farmers selecting it as their first choice. CA is 
rooted in three inter-related practices: no till 
or minimum till; cover cropping/permanent 
ground cover; and intercropping, especially 
of maize and legumes. While these practices 
may be accompanied by the increased use of 
herbicides, this is not a necessary component 
of CA. Farmer interest in CA suggests an 
interest in agro-ecological methods of 
enhancing soil fertility. Herbicides are also 
expensive and not readily available. Monsanto’s 
Roundup is one among a number of herbicides 
being used in the fields.
Limited livestock ownership mitigates against 
higher use of animal manure, and small farm 
sizes pose a challenge for integrated or mixed 
farming systems at the individual farm level. 
While 78% of farmers owned poultry, the 
number of hens owned was an average of only 
16 each. Less than a quarter of households 
owned goats and fewer than 10% owned 
sheep or cattle. A third of the farmers surveyed 
sourced animal manure from neighbours 
or other farmers, including from Masai 
pastoralists in the surrounding areas, usually 
free of charge, with farmers having to cover 
transport costs only. While tensions between 
pastoralists and farmers are evident in places, 
sharing of resources indicates another, 
cooperative, aspect to the relationship between 
villagers and the Masai, suggesting that the 
association is not just a one-way, conflictual 
relationship.
Traditional farming practices such as ‘slash 
and burn’ (in which land is clear cut and any 
remaining vegetation is burned, producing 
nutrient-rich ashes, removing weed seed and 
making soil friable) and fallowing (in which 
land is ploughed but left uncultivated for a 
season or two), are unable to keep up with 
increasing populations and are becoming less 
common but without being replaced by more 
appropriate techniques.
Concepts such as sustainable land and 
water management, used by CAADP, and 
Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM), 
used by AGRA, have emerged in response to 
declining soil fertility across the continent. 
These concepts recognise the importance of 
agro-ecological soil conservation and nutrient 
enhancing practices, but argue that on their 
own these techniques are insufficient to 
replace nutrients exported from farmers’ fields 
following harvest, and that they must be 
used in conjunction with the increased use of 
synthetic fertilisers. Very low fertiliser use in 
Africa, compared with other parts of the world, 
is identified as the major reason why African 
yields are stagnating and even declining, in 
comparison to growth in yields elsewhere.
AGRA maintains that the three primary 
challenges facing farmers in adopting 
integrated soil management practices are: i) a 
lack of physical and economic access to inputs 
(synthetic fertilisers and improved seeds); ii) 
low levels of inputs and crop management 
skills; and iii) poor market linkages that make 
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it difficult for farmers to justify the additional 
expense of synthetic fertiliser purchases. 
AGRA’s SHP is designed to respond to these 
challenges.
Currently use of synthetic fertilisers in 
Tanzania is low, estimated at 12% of farmers, 
with an average of about 10% of farmers in 
Morogoro using synthetic fertiliser. Average 
use nationally from 2002 to 2009 was 5.5 kg/
ha, far below the Abuja Declaration target 
of 50 kg/ha, with some indication of a rise in 
2009 and 2010, following the implementation 
of NAIVS. This voucher scheme provides 
subsidies to farmers for a package of fertilisers 
and improved seed supplied through agro-
dealers, who then redeem the vouchers at the 
National Microfinance Bank (NMB), which in 
turn receives grants from MAFC, World Bank, 
AGRA and other donors. NAIVS accounted 
for about 57% of fertiliser consumption in 
2010. At present the major emphasis is on 
increasing fertiliser use through a combination 
of ramping up domestic production where 
possible, and of increasing imports and 
distribution through agro-dealer networks. 
AGRA plays an important role in supporting 
these efforts.
Despite an apparent balance between 
synthetic fertiliser use and agro-ecological 
techniques for soil health in ISFM, as a concept, 
in practice AGRA emphasises the synthetic 
fertiliser side of the equation. Around 55% of 
the value of grants in the SHP was used to 
increase access to synthetic fertiliser, with the 
greater part being used to support AFAP. AFAP, 
with an initial focus on AGRA’s breadbasket 
countries of Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania, 
aims to double fertiliser consumption in these 
three countries. It intends increasing the 
number of fertiliser users by 15%, by extending 
credit guarantees and grants to actors in 
the fertiliser value chain. The US-based non-
government organisation (NGO) called CNFA 
(formerly the Citizen’s Network for Foreign 
Affairs but now known as just CNFA) was 
granted US$1.5 million to develop an input 
distribution system. This is in addition to a 
grant of US$4.3 million received by CNFA to set 
up agro-dealer networks nationally under PASS, 
the seed programme. By contrast, grants to 
support maize-legume integration came to just 
4% of the total grant value in Tanzania. These 
projects also include provision of synthetic 
fertiliser as part of the intervention, in line with 
ISFM.
In Mvomero farmers in the survey were 
participating in two projects with direct links 
to GR initiatives to increase the use of fertiliser. 
One is a new agricultural credit scheme 
being run in three rice irrigation schemes 
by Opportunity Tanzania (OT) together 
with Nafaka; the other is a project in which 
selected lead farmers run demonstration 
plots organised by FIPS and Nafaka. FIPS had 
previously received a grant under AGRA’s seed 
programme in Tanzania for the dissemination 
of improved crop varieties and ISFM. Morogoro 
and Mvomero were among the sites selected 
for participation in an AGRA-sponsored 
US$424,000 project, led by Sokoine University 
of Agriculture (SUA), to scale up Minjingu 
phosphate utilisation in Tanzania. Minjingu 
is a local company that mines and processes 
phosphate rock found in Tanzania. The project 
found that yields increased dramatically in 
some areas, while in others the response to 
the fertiliser was minimal. This indicates that 
locally specific conditions must be considered 
when applying fertiliser. Research areas are 
also targeted for other AGRA interventions, 
especially building agro-dealer networks to 
distribute GR inputs to farmers.
As a result of these interventions the use 
of synthetic fertiliser in the study areas 
Rice paddies, Dihombo irrigation scheme, Mvomero
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was relatively high compared with national 
averages—37% of respondents had used 
some kind of synthetic fertiliser in 2014. Those 
applying urea to their fields were using 60.7 
kg on average; again, this is much higher 
than national averages. There is a noticeable 
difference in fertiliser use between the two 
research sites in Morogoro and Mvomero, with 
only one farmer in the Morogoro site using 
synthetic fertiliser. This is not surprising, given 
that the Morogoro farmers work with SAT 
on organic agriculture. Since farmers in the 
Morogoro sites are performing at least as well 
as those in Mvomero, this suggests that more 
resources and attention might fruitfully be 
deployed towards supporting and expanding 
these ecologically sound farming practices.
The average spent on synthetic fertilisers 
ranged from US$20–118, with an average US$37 
spent on urea, the most commonly applied 
fertiliser. Around half the respondents cited 
high fertiliser prices as a serious problem, 
though it would be premature to conclude 
that high prices are the cause of low adoption. 
In our Malawi study, 89 out of 90 farmers 
surveyed said high fertiliser price was a serious 
problem, yet 81% also reported applying urea 
in the previous season, and 68% reported using 
NPK (nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium). Most 
fertiliser was purchased from agro-dealers.
We looked at FIPS and its role in supporting 
VBAAs as a case study of an AGRA-supported 
intervention in Mvomero. FIPS is a Kenyan 
not-for-profit organisation that provides small 
quantities of fertiliser and seed with which 
farmers can experiment and select for further 
use if they choose. FIPS received a US$1.9 
million grant from AGRA to work in Tanzania 
and Mozambique over the period 2012 to 
2015. Partners include the UK’s Department 
for International Development (DFID), USAID, 
Norad, Monsanto, Yara, Dow, Pioneer and 
CNFA. FIPS is also a local subcontractor of FtF’s 
Nafaka programme, in its fourth year, and is 
the implementing agent for the Small Input 
Package Demonstration component of the 
Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP). The 
other two TAP components are the AGRA-
sponsored CNFA agro-dealer programme, 
and the input finance pilot implemented by 
the NMB. Small quantities of improved seed 
and synthetic fertiliser are provided free to 
demonstration plots.
In Mvomero FIPS trained farmers as VBAAs 
to provide outreach and extension to farmer 
networks and to disseminate seed, fertiliser 
and sometimes pesticides. The VBAAs organise 
demonstration plots in their respective villages. 
The land is owned by the VBAAs as farmers and 
the produce is owned by the VBAA. Essentially 
the aim is to show farmers the results and 
encourage them to purchase inputs if they 
see something they like. It does build a market 
for the fertiliser companies, but it also offers 
farmers a choice of technologies. Nevertheless, 
it is not clear what kind of environmental 
monitoring takes place. Some farmers said that 
initial soil tests were done to tailor the type 
of fertiliser, but others indicated that no soil 
tests were done. In irrigated schemes, negative 
environmental impacts from synthetic fertiliser 
use may be felt downstream and there is no 
evidence this is being monitored. Since the 
better-off farmers tend to occupy the upstream 
plots, this could have longer-term implications 
for less well-off farmers downstream.
The overall goal of the FIPS programme is to 
create a class of full-time, profitable agro-
dealers, complementing other GR initiatives 
under way in the area. According to the VBAAs, 
farmers have responded favourably to the 
technologies and practices on show. However, 
some practices, such as new planting and 
spacing techniques, have been taken up more 
rapidly than others. Fertiliser and pesticide 
adoption is currently being held in check by 
high prices; hence the linkages between FIPS’ 
demonstration plots and the micro-finance 
being offered by OT, with MVIWATA and Nafaka 
acting as intermediaries.
Farmers we spoke to reacted positively to 
these GR interventions. While a number of 
farmers indicated they did not need to use 
synthetic fertilisers because the soils are fertile, 
others—especially farmers who are oriented 
towards producing surpluses for markets—do 
want increased access to synthetic fertilisers. 
Participating farmers indicated that while they 
were able to apply some of the techniques, 
they lack resources to apply others, in particular 
fertiliser and pesticides. This is why the GR 
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emphasises reducing the price of synthetic 
fertiliser especially—which primarily means 
improving supply chain efficiencies—and 
boosting demand through input subsidies.
We can acknowledge a participatory element 
in these interventions. Nowhere did we get 
the sense that farmers were being compelled 
to adopt the technologies on offer. At the 
same time, however, it is not clear that the 
longer-term impacts of the increased use of GR 
inputs, on biodiversity, soil life, water systems 
and social equality, are well understood, since 
they are longer-term and it is quite possible to 
overlook the links between the technologies 
and their socio-ecological consequences. These 
aspects of the GR must be monitored closely, 
together with farmers, so that the connection 
between growing landlessness, the necessity 
of precarious labour, ecological damage and 
the adoption of these technologies is made 
apparent. This requires ongoing longitudinal 
studies, especially since the introduction of 
these inputs is still at an early stage.
Proponents of agro-ecology face a number of 
challenging questions, especially regarding 
access to sufficient animal manure and crop 
residues for effective nutrient replenishment. 
Agro-ecological approaches to soil health are 
knowledge intensive and it will be necessary 
to work with research institutes and other 
experts, to develop contextually appropriate 
means of improving soils over time, together 
with farmers and their organisations.
Seed
This section starts with an overview of 
Tanzania’s seed sector structure and its legal 
and policy framework, including the role of 
seed research and development (R&D) and in 
particular the changing roles of the public and 
private sectors. It then looks at AGRA’s seed 
interventions in Tanzania and in the research 
area, including the links between AGRA and 
other GR seed interventions in the research 
area, particularly USAID/FtF/Nafaka. We then 
turn to a consideration of the seed being used 
by farmers in the survey, including quality, price 
and access. We include a case study of Tanseed 
International, a domestic commercial seed 
company privatised from the state monopoly 
company that operated before liberalisation, 
and an AGRA grantee and partner.
Tanzania did not have a commercial seed 
sector until the 1970s when USAID provided 
support to establish a project for commercial 
seed production. This included research into 
new varieties, the establishment of seed 
farms, the formation of the Tanzania National 
Seed Company (Tanseed) as a state-owned 
enterprise, and the launch of the Tanzania 
Official Seed Certification Agency (TOSCA). Up 
to the 1990s a number of improved OPV and 
hybrid maize and rice varieties were released.
Deregulation and the liberalisation of seed 
production and distribution in Tanzania 
consisted of policy and legislative change, 
especially in plant variety protection (PVP). This 
created a role for private sector involvement, 
the privatisation of state-owned enterprises 
and the establishment of new quasi-
government agencies, facilitating private 
sector entry, public sector input subsidies to 
support the development of a commercial seed 
market, and a role for SSFs through the Quality 
Declared Seed (QDS) system.
Following liberalisation and structural 
adjustment in the early 1990s, seed MNCs 
entered the market, targeting profitable seed 
(mainly maize hybrid and some rice), based 
mostly on imported seed and germplasm. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred, Monsanto and Syngenta are 
currently the largest of these MNCs. Tanseed 
was privatised in 2002 as part of structural 
adjustment that led to a collapse of the seed 
sector for most crops. The private sector focus 
on maize hybrids is a typical story in Africa, 
where MNCs concentrate their resources and 
attention on a few crops with high potential 
for profit. Smaller markets for indigenous and 
locally adapted seed typically are not served. 
According to MAFC, certified maize seed 
availability has almost reached government 
targets, but other crops are far behind (e.g. 
rice at 8% and beans at 3% of target). Most 
commercial seed is imported.
The Agricultural Seed Agency (ASA) was 
established as a semi-autonomous entity 
under MAFC in 2006, to produce and sell high 
quality basic seed to private companies to 
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multiply and sell on to farmers. ASA assumed 
the responsibilities previously performed by the 
Ministry’s Seed Unit. ASA’s main objectives are 
to support the development of a commercial 
seed sector in Tanzania, and to facilitate 
investment in seed beyond hybrid maize, with 
a mandate to work through PPPs. This includes 
providing seed for bulking up and leasing land 
and facilities for certified seed production. ASA 
may also produce seed on contract for private 
companies.
After 2012 the government started a 
programme to license basic or foundation 
seed to private seed companies to produce 
basic and certified seed. This was in an effort 
to commercialise varieties developed by 
the research institutes. Eighty per cent of 
government-released varieties were made 
available to private sector seed companies but 
the associated conditions and requirements 
were stringent and, according to NAFSN, to 
date very few companies have taken up the 
offer. The law is also now opening up for private 
companies to produce basic seed from their 
own foundation seed, and the main interest is 
in maize, sunflower and legumes.
Private companies may brand the seed they 
have multiplied and sell it for a profit. The 
essence of this arrangement is that the private 
sector provides bulking up capacity that is in 
short supply, and their brand offers a quality 
guarantee. In theory, if they do not produce 
good quality seed, farmers as consumers will 
reject their brand and acquire seed elsewhere. 
However, this depends crucially on the ready 
availability of alternative seed varieties. This 
may become a problem after many years of 
R&D having focused on only a few uniform 
varieties, thereby limiting farmers’ choice and 
forcing them to use available seed even if it is 
not of good quality. This argument is usually 
used against farmers’ own seed varieties, but 
can apply equally to poor quality certified seed. 
A big difference is that poor quality farmer 
varieties are usually restricted to local areas, 
whereas poor quality certified seed may be 
distributed nationally, thereby threatening 
agro-biodiversity.
Like ASA, liberalisation has also forced 
research stations to orient their work towards 
partnerships with the private sector. Although 
they do receive core funds from the public 
sector, researchers and institutes must 
supplement these funds with private sector 
funding to make ends meet. Public sector 
breeders conduct research on behalf of donors, 
whether public or private, and funds cover all 
or part of the costs of travel, logistics, irrigation 
and fertiliser.
NAIVS was established in 2009 to boost the 
market in certified seed through public sector 
subsidisation. The scheme constituted between 
37% and 44% of the annual MAFC budget 
between 2009 and 2012. The main target 
crops are hybrid and improved OPV maize and 
rice. NAIVS was suspended in 2014 following 
widespread corruption and was replaced with 
soft loans through financial institutions and 
cooperatives.
The certification process involves a number 
of steps including on-station research, multi-
location trials, participatory variety selection 
(PVS) and national performance trials to 
test for ‘distinct, uniform and stable’ (DUS) 
compliance. If successful, the variety can then 
be registered and officially released. There is 
value in rigorous quality controls, especially 
when farmers are actively involved in shaping 
the processes, but there are fundamental 
problems with the DUS criteria in particular. 
Distinctions between varieties are more 
important to those who want to benefit 
from ownership than to farmers. But the 
requirement makes it more difficult for farmers 
to gain recognition through the official system 
for varieties they manage. The emphasis on 
commercialisation of public sector varieties 
places small-scale, resource-poor farmers at a 
disadvantage when seeking access to public 
sector germplasm; they will find it more 
difficult to commercialise if they must go 
through the full certification process first.
In the context of a distinct orientation 
towards the private sector, the QDS system is 
something of an outlier. It actually facilitates 
farmer involvement in the seed sector 
without necessarily forcing farmers into direct 
competition with MNCs. QDS allows local 
production and sales of seed with the focus 
on non-commercial crops and relatively light 
regulation.
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We encountered different opinions on QDS. 
In FGDs, farmers indicated they did not know 
of anyone producing seed through the QDS 
system. Farmers are recycling seed, sometimes 
for local sale, and being involved in certified 
seed production was not top of their agenda. 
However, farmers did express interest in 
learning more about seed production and said 
they were sure they could produce quality seed 
themselves if they could acquire the technical 
knowledge. Proponents of QDS seek to extend 
the boundaries of distribution beyond a single 
ward and favour greater public investment in 
the system, including building farmer capacity 
to produce quality seed of their favoured 
varieties and extending the area under QDS 
production. Private seed companies do not 
favour QDS, arguing rather for investment in 
the commercial sector. Part of their concern is 
that QDS promotes unfair competition in the 
seed market by relaxing standards for some.
Following structural adjustment, the Plant 
Protection Act (1997), the Plant Breeders’ Rights 
Act (2003) and the Seed Act (2003) were passed 
to ‘modernise’ the seed system.  Emphasis 
is placed on the involvement of private 
companies in bulking up and commercialising 
public varieties. Harmonisation of PVP laws 
aims to provide secure rights for private 
investment including and especially through 
the protection of private ownership over 
seed in the form of intellectual property (IP) 
protection, based on the provisions of the 
Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties 
(UPOV) 1991. UPOV 1991 has reduced farmers’ 
rights to save and exchange seed in favour of 
private breeders’ rights. Tanzania’s 2003 laws 
were already compliant with UPOV 1991 in 
many respects, and this is reinforced in recent 
proposals. Tanzania is in the process of joining 
UPOV and already has in place the Plant 
Breeders’ Rights Act 2012, which is UPOV 1991 
compliant for mainland Tanzania. Zanzibar has 
adopted the Plant Breeders’ Rights Bill which 
is awaiting Parliamentary assent. Tanzania 
is in the process of finalising the Instrument 
of Ratification. Once Tanzania ratifies the 
UPOV 1991 convention it will be the only Least 
Developed Country (LDC) in the world to have 
done so. Tanzania has also signed the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Seed 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which 
allows registration of a plant variety released 
by any two SADC member states without 
further testing.
Theoretically, the main purpose of PVP laws 
are to protect private owners from others 
who might seek to benefit from their sunk 
investment in R&D. But approval of blanket PVP 
laws based on UPOV 1991 potentially opens the 
way for the criminalisation of the distribution 
of recycled genetic materials circulating in 
farming systems, by restricting farmers’ use 
of protected varieties. Amendments to the 
Seed Act in 2014 also place restrictions on the 
sale or exchange of non-certified materials. 
These currently are the lifeblood of Tanzania’s 
farming systems, as shown in the survey results 
below. It is necessary to develop alternatives 
that start with protecting and expanding 
contextual diversity, participatory R&D and 
shared ownership. QDS is a good starting point 
and should be supported and expanded with 
farmer involvement.
The current situation (but liable to rapid 
change, given the laws and policies on the 
table) is that the Tanzanian government owns 
and controls the national germplasm supply. 
Final variety ownership is determined by an 
initial agreement between government and 
the private companies.  Research stations 
do not negotiate this aspect directly with 
companies, but follow the instructions of 
national government via MAFC. This can result 
in a process of germplasm ownership transfer 
from the public to the private sector. ACB’s 
position is that all products that derive from a 
shared resource pool should be replaced in that 
resource pool, for further use by anyone who 
SAT training centre, Morogoro
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chooses, on condition that they agree to these 
terms (i.e. a General Public Licence, already 
well-established in the computer sphere 
through the open source movement).
AGRA’s seed programme in Tanzania favours 
the extension of certified seed through private 
sector production and distribution. AGRA 
spent US$12.4 million on 33 grants on seed to 
19 recipients in Tanzania from 2007–2012. The 
Agro-dealer Development Programme (ADP) 
was the major seed sub-programme sponsored 
by AGRA in this period; it comprised 45% of 
the value of grants in the seed programme. 
ADP grants were provided to establish a 
national agro-dealer network (CNFA), provide 
a credit facility (NMB), and develop an official 
agro-dealer strategy (MAFC). The Tanzania 
Agro-dealer Strengthening Programme (TASP), 
managed by CNFA, operated in 13 districts 
including Mvomero and Morogoro, between 
2007 and 2010. According to AGRA, 71% of 
agro-dealers were involved in the supply and 
distribution of agro-inputs, and all certified 
agro-dealers participated in the NAIVS. In our 
research sites we found a sporadic presence 
of agro-dealers—they were not a major 
presence. Nevertheless, the VBAAs play a 
similar role to agro-dealers as a kind of private 
extension network, by providing farmers with 
information and by connecting farmers and 
commercial input suppliers.
The Fund for the Improvement and Adoption 
of African Crops (FIAAC), which focuses on 
R&D and the commercialisation of new seed 
varieties, is the second biggest seed sub-
programme with 32% of the total value of 
seed grants up to 2012. Half the value of FIAAC 
grants went to MAFC and covered a range of 
crops, including maize (hybrid and improved 
OPV), beans, cassava, sweet potato, soybean 
and rice. Mostly the geographical areas of 
operation are not specified in the grant 
summaries, but two MAFC grants, on beans 
and hybrid maize, were specifically located in 
the Southern Highlands. In the first five years 
of operation, four maize hybrid varieties, five 
paddy improved varieties and twelve improved 
varieties of roots and tuber crops were released 
through FIAAC activities in Tanzania.
Seed Production for Africa (SEPA), AGRA’s 
private seed enterprise development 
programme, held one-fifth of the total value 
of seed grants. These were mostly similar-sized 
grants (US$150—230k) to a number of private 
seed companies, including Tanseed.
AGRA has some clear links to other GR 
initiatives on seed in Tanzania, in particular the 
G8 NAFSN. An area of direct partnership is the 
Scaling Seeds and Technologies Partnership 
(SSTP), part of NAFSN in a number of countries 
(including Mozambique and Malawi) with 
funding from USAID channelled via AGRA. The 
SSTP in Tanzania targets improved varieties of 
beans, cassava, Irish potatoes, maize, pigeon 
pea, sorghum, and soybeans in 21 SAGCOT 
districts, including Mvomero and Morogoro, 
and 7 districts in northern Tanzania. A call for 
proposals was issued in mid-2014 which listsed 
the following requirements: the production and 
marketing of breeder, foundation and certified/
QDS seed; the scaling up of blended fertilisers 
for any of the identified crops; rhizobium 
inoculation (beans and soybeans); links to 
commercial suppliers are favoured; scaling up 
of commercial input and output marketing 
systems involving agro-dealers; and the 
integration of information and communication 
technology (ICT) platforms into value chains. 
It also called for the establishment of a seed 
business incubation centre to provide technical 
support and business development services 
to seed entrepreneurs in foundation seed 
production, seed quality control, and seed 
processing and packaging, on a cost recovery 
basis. We aim to track these activities under 
the SSTP.
Interventions aimed at expanding access to 
improved OPV and hybrid seed varieties are still 
in their infancy in the study areas. Our small 
survey found that over 80% of local maize, 
legume and rice seed in use was non-certified, 
and 43–75% of improved OPV and hybrid maize 
in use was non-certified. Eighty per cent of 
respondents indicated they recycled at least 
some seed from one year to the next.
The official advice is to recycle improved OPV 
rice for at least four seasons. Farmers usually 
mix varieties so by the fourth season it is a 
different variety and the recommendation 
is to buy fresh seed. There is no compulsion 
for farmers to acquire new certified seed, 
but it is recommended as a good agricultural 
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practice (GAP). In this context, the distinction 
between a certified seed and an uncertified 
seed is blurred, especially where recycling 
is part of good practice. A similar situation 
applies to maize, especially the improved 
OPVs. These OPVs are closely related to local 
varieties because they are mostly a mixture of 
local varieties with external germplasm from 
institutes within the Consultative Group for 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 
Therefore they already contain within them 
germplasm adapted for local conditions, and 
this produces plasticity, the ability to adapt to 
the ecological context.
It would be a travesty if this beneficial 
process was disrupted by demands for private 
ownership of germplasm, preventing farmers 
from allowing beneficial traits to diffuse into 
the environment. This is not on the agenda 
at present (with regard to varieties based on 
public sector germplasm), but PVP and IP laws 
pose that threat in future. Once a seed enters 
circulation it should be considered part of the 
farmers’ asset base to nurture and grow, with 
support from public sector institutions and 
expertise to maintain and improve on that 
variety, for local use and even commercially, if 
acceptable standards are met. 
Improved OPVs deserve closer attention, 
because they are a potential key point of 
intersection between commercial and 
farmer-managed seed systems, along the 
lines of farmer-based Integrated Seed Sector 
Development (ISSD). ACB is critical of the 
ISSD in that it offers platitudes to farmer-
managed seed systems but its practical work 
is oriented towards building the commercial 
sector—by taking advantage of the positive 
features of farmer-managed systems (e.g. 
diversity, local germplasm, organisational 
capacity). Nevertheless, if we turn the ISSD 
concept around and look at the issue from 
the perspective of the farmer-managed 
seed system, we can see the possibilities of 
connecting the two systems to the benefit 
of farmers—e.g. public sector germplasm 
and R&D, and seed enterprises (which can be 
profitable without being profit maximising).
About a third of respondents in the survey 
indicated poor quality of seed as a serious 
concern; the other respondents were divided 
between not serious and moderately serious. 
Seed price was slightly more of an issue and 
44% of respondents indicated it as a serious 
issue. When looking at specific seed types, 
respondents were generally satisfied with the 
quality of the seed they were using (Table 13). 
The seed for hybrid maize was rated ‘good’ by 
86% of respondents; while beans and local 
maize were mostly highly rated—beans by 
82% and local maize by 76% of respondents. 
According to farmers in a seed FGD, access to 
seed is a big problem. The wrong varieties are 
given, and there is low germination, or the seed 
does germinate but doesn’t produce anything. 
The farmers felt the problem lay with the 
agro-dealers. Seed prices ranged from US$0.78/
kg for improved OPV maize to US$0.07/kg for 
local maize. This forms a baseline to track seed 
prices in these localities. Hybrid maize and 
beans showed the largest average expenditure.
A case study of Tanseed sheds light on AGRA’s 
holistic support to private seed companies 
and also indicates an important role for AGRA 
in cementing different GR interventions by 
other actors, including USAID and NAFSN. It 
highlights the coordinated character of these 
interventions and provides a good example of 
the emphasis on commercial seed enterprises. 
Tanseed produces five maize varieties based 
on three technologies (drought resistance; 
strigaway—a maize seed that is resistant to 
the weed Striga; and quality protein). They are 
also testing other products, including work 
on hybrid rice with the African Agricultural 
Technology Fund (AATF) based in Nairobi and 
funded by the Gates Foundation. Tanseed has 
Rice, Mvomero
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five commercial rice varieties and aims to start 
work on vegetable seed in the future.
According to Isako Mushauri, Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of Tanseed, low productivity is the 
result of a lack of GAP skills, the low adoption 
of improved genetics, low farmer education, 
and poor market prices. He says hybrid seed 
is not suitable for all conditions since the 
genetic potential of the seed will be wasted 
unless conditions are right, and farmers will 
end up paying for something they cannot 
fully use. Tanseed is active in seed promotion 
and dissemination and works with Yara to sell 
products in a package of seed and soil health 
extension, seed and fertiliser, through Tanzania 
Private Extension Services (TANPES). Tanseed 
hosts field days and has mobile demonstration 
plots where they involve farmers and buyers, 
so that farmers can better understand demand 
and buyers can better understand the available 
varieties. Tanseed has sub-stations and are 
geographically located for regional expansion.
Tanseed’s maize varieties are proprietary, 
based on an exclusivity agreement with the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center (CIMMYT). Its rice varieties are public 
but branded by Tanseed. The company buys the 
foundation seed and produces certified seed, 
contracting SSFs to produce. In 2012 Tanseed 
trained about 300 farmers although only 56 
farmers qualified. The company also has an 
MoU with SUA to commercialise rice and bean 
varieties on an exclusive basis.
Tanseed received one direct AGRA grant worth 
US$167,000 for the period 2007–2009, for 
improved maize, pigeon pea and sesame. 
However, Mushauri says AGRA still provides 
grants directly to Tanseed, to increase 
production and facilitate processing, storage, 
promotion and dissemination, in order to 
make seed available. AGRA’s support goes well 
beyond the grants. According to Mushauri, 
“AGRA provides unique support across seed 
production, processing, storage, marketing, 
financing. It is an excellent concept and AGRA 
shares world class consultants who provide 
consulting and training support for different 
needs at different stages.”
Beyond AGRA, Tanseed is linked into a number 
of other GR initiatives. The company has a 
NAFSN commitment to produce nutrition-
rich maize seed, as well as beans and soya as 
low cost sources of protein, currently using 
conventional breeding. It is also working with 
Yara, USAID and others on various projects and 
programmes. The Tanseed case highlights the 
centrality of private seed enterprises within GR 
interventions regarding seed. These companies 
are being supported to play an integrated role 
that comprises production, contracting of SSFs, 
dissemination, extension and training and 
advocacy.
AGRA’s role in Tanzania’s seed systems should 
be seen within the context of a longer-term 
process of liberalisation and deregulation that 
took place in the early 1990s, which opened 
the door for private sector involvement in 
seed production and distribution. Based on 
its investment profile, AGRA has prioritised 
distribution, followed by work on developing 
new seed varieties, mainly with public sector 
institutions. AGRA has a clear position on 
combining improved seed varieties with 
synthetic fertiliser in a package of interventions 
that raise a number of issues for the food 
sovereignty movement. In particular they 
impel us to clarify our positions on public and 
private sector R&D, germplasm improvement, 
and the role of farmers in seed production and 
distribution.
On the issue of improved seed ACB is not 
in favour of hybrids, primarily because they 
reduce farmers’ ability to recycle seed if they 
choose, and hybrids are generally heavily 
reliant on synthetic fertiliser and irrigation. 
Consequently it is the relatively wealthier 
farmers who favour hybrids and this increases 
inequality over time. If improvements are 
based on OPVs, seed can be recycled for a 
number of years without major loss of traits. 
Open pollination can increase biodiversity 
and the germplasm is more adaptable to the 
ecological context than hybrid seed. While it 
is true that even improved OPVs may perform 
closer to their potential with the increased use 
of synthetic fertiliser, they are generally less 
sensitive to a lack of concentrated nutrients 
than hybrids.
Open access to germplasm is essential for the 
democratic control of production. Offering 
the underlying germplasm pool on an open 
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source basis could operate along the lines of 
the General Public Licence (GPL) pioneered by 
the open source computer software movement. 
This would allow open access to germplasm 
on condition that modifications become 
freely available to others on the same terms. 
Open source germplasm does not mean 
that companies are prevented from selling 
the seeds they have developed. ‘First mover 
advantage’ means a company can still profit 
from innovations even if others know what 
they have done. “It takes time and money to 
reverse engineer a product” and “when the 
innovator begins production with a very large 
capacity, the size of the residual competitive 
rent left for even the first imitator becomes 
very small, so small that, in general, it will not 
be profitable to imitate.” (Both quotes are from 
Boldrin and Levine, 2008, and are referenced in 
the main report). Farmers who access the seed 
will be free to recycle it if they wish, but we 
know that commercial farmers will not recycle 
seed unless the quality is maintained. They 
are more likely to purchase fresh seed anew 
every year to ensure quality, so commercial 
seed producers will retain profitable markets 
even if there is some leakage, especially to 
small, resource-poor farmers. In the long run 
this leakage could also produce new markets 
for companies if the seed produces well and 
farmers decide they want to buy fresh seed.
The GPL approach would rule out PPPs based 
on privately-owned germplasm, unless the 
private owner would be willing to share the 
product freely. The logic of PVP law is to secure 
the private rights of owners of germplasm. ACB 
has an in principle opposition to the private 
ownership of germplasm—we consider all 
germplasm to be the product of a combination 
of natural resources that are part of the 
common benefits available to humanity. In 
addition, human innovation and ingenuity 
should be considered a pool of common 
knowledge that is far older than corporate 
and other private owners. To the extent that 
the public sector manages and maintains 
germplasm in the public interest, it might be 
considered the legal ‘owner’ of the germplasm, 
but only to the extent that it secures these 
resources for the common good.
This brings us to the question of farmer 
varieties. Improved varieties are based 
generally on a combination of local and 
external genetic resources. Local resources, 
which root improvements in an ecological 
context and which enable external germplasm 
to be adapted to local conditions, were 
developed over many years, primarily by 
farmers themselves. There was no certified 
seed sector in Tanzania before the 1970s and 
farmers generated and managed all varieties. 
If local germplasm is used in improvements, 
what rights should farmers have over the 
product? In line with an open source approach, 
farmers would contribute their varieties to 
the common pool for use by all. This obviously 
means that private companies could use local 
germplasm freely, but if this use was based on 
GPL it would not result in the privatisation of 
farmer varieties, since the source materials for 
any product would be made available on the 
same terms.
QDS occupies an important niche in the 
Tanzanian seed system. Comments made by 
people we interviewed suggest it is coming 
under pressure from private enterprises—it 
is seen as a potential threat and a diversion 
of public resources away from supporting the 
private sector. ACB believes QDS provides a 
basis for public-farmer partnerships and we 
will look for ways of interacting with these 
processes to strengthen and support them.
Further research may focus on QDS in practice 
and the tracking of ISSD and SSTP projects 
in Tanzania. We will also engage with our 
partners and farmers to identify possible areas 
of cooperation to support farmer involvement 
in seed production and distribution, especially 
of locally valuable farmer varieties. We are also 
interested in exploring the differential impact 
on farmers of private seed company expansion 
into local areas over time.
Markets
Markets are not a focus of this research but 
farmers indicated it as one of their main 
concerns. Market access is a central aspect of 
GR interventions since farmers will be able 
to afford costly inputs, especially fertiliser 
and irrigation, only if they can increase their 
incomes from production sales to pay for the 
inputs and be in a better position after paying 
these costs. Farmers are under pressure to 
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produce and sell surpluses in the context of low 
producer prices, weak storage systems, and the 
challenges of product quality, standardisation 
and physical distance to markets. Production 
generally is split between sales (often distress 
sales to raise some cash) and household use. 
Most sales are to local, informal markets.
In the research sites, improved OPV maize 
and rice were the two crops with the highest 
volumes traded. Some survey participants were 
selling vegetables, with tomatoes being very 
popular, but large seasonal surpluses were 
evident throughout the survey areas, resulting 
in low prices.
Some of the survey participants were involved 
in a new AGRA funded initiative in Mvomero, 
for collective marketing of maize to the 
National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) in 
Dodoma. MVIWATA is contracted to facilitate 
farmer participation. The project involves 
a number of aggregation points managed 
by Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies 
(SACCOS) funded by Nafaka. The initiative 
offers farmers a higher price for maize than 
local markets, at US$0.30/kg after costs 
compared with US$0.15/kg realised in local 
markets and US$0.13/kg offered by middlemen.
However, there are some challenges and 
farmers are distrustful of the scheme. Farmers 
have to transport their produce to Dodoma 
and this is a bureaucratic and time-consuming 
procedure. Unexpected costs were deducted 
and larger business people received payment 
while smaller farmers were not yet paid. 
Vendors tried to insert themselves into the 
process, buying directly from farmers for lower 
prices and then selling to the NFRA. The NFRA 
had initially committed to purchase 7,000 tons 
from SSFs but ended up purchasing only 2,000 
tons.
Although the market linkages programme 
with NFRA has many positive aspects—
working with farmer associations, public 
sector procurement, offering higher prices for 
products—over time it inevitably will become a 
conduit for larger commercial producers at the 
expense of smaller producers, who are unable 
to afford the necessary inputs, or who do not 
have the knowledge or capacity to produce on 
a large scale.
Conclusions
The GR thrust in Tanzania is essentially about 
identifying points of blockage as well as 
areas of potential opportunity for the private 
sector. AGRA is playing an important role 
in these processes. GR interventions in the 
research sites are uneven. There is evidence 
of the uptake of improved seed by farmers, 
especially rice and to a lesser extent legumes. 
In the study sites farmers still mostly use 
local maize varieties. The use of synthetic 
fertiliser is significantly higher than the 
national average, both in terms of average per 
hectare applications and numbers of farmers 
using these technologies. This is evidence 
of the impact of GR interventions, including 
the expansion of agro-dealer networks, 
and programmes such as Nafaka that are 
introducing these inputs into farming systems.
Key issues with regard to seed relate to the 
use of DUS criteria in the formal certification 
process and the impacts on farmer seed 
production and distribution; the role of QDS 
in the seed system; the adoption of UPOV91 
compliant PVP laws and the potential impact 
Street vendors, Dar es Salaam.
Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil  fertility in Tanzania    xxiii
on SSFs in the longer-term; and the channelling 
of public sector resources to advance processes 
of private and corporate gain.
With regard to DUS and seed certification 
we argue that while these criteria may be 
conducive to secure the interests of private 
ownership, they are not appropriate for 
the expansion of SSF involvement in seed 
production beyond a commercial scale. We 
propose that quality criteria be developed 
between farmers as producers and farmers as 
users of seed, in cooperation with public sector 
institutions. In this regard we believe QDS 
has an important role to play in introducing 
farmers to seed production in a systematic 
way, which includes production of their own 
varieties for local use as well as for expanded 
distribution within the agro-ecological zones 
for which the seed is adapted.
In a similar way to the DUS criteria, a blanket 
approach to PVP laws that prevents farmers 
from freely adapting and using whatever 
seed they have at their disposal threatens the 
long term sustainability and diversity of the 
seed system. In principle we are opposed to 
the private ownership of genetic resources as 
these are the product of social and collective 
endeavour that goes well beyond corporations 
and private individuals. Private companies 
should have a right to sell products with their 
own quality guarantee attached if they wish, 
but this should not prevent others from using 
the genetic resources in ways they choose.
The GR emphasis on competitive private 
enterprise, economies of scale and the 
standardisation of cultures, consumption 
patterns and agricultural outputs, runs counter 
to the flourishing of diversity that is crucial for 
the survival of humans and the nurturing of 
our ecological habitat.
A complex set of responses is required in the 
face of the GR thrust. First, the technological 
and methodological aspects of the GR must be 
broken down to see what benefits may accrue 
to farmers if aspects of these are managed 
on the basis of democratic control and 
decision-making, cooperation, collectivity and 
accountability. Technological advances, even in 
the current setup, may have value, but we must 
also have the foresight to consider possible 
implications in the decades ahead, especially if 
these technologies are placed under the control 
of MNCs accountable only to their financial 
backers.
Secondly, lobbying in opposition to these 
interventions is required where they pose 
an immediate and direct threat to the 
construction of a society based on the 
principles of democratic control and decision-
making, cooperation and collectivity. A current 
example is the effort to privatise the gene 
pool and criminalise the fundamental right—
and indeed the fundamental necessity—for 
farmers to save, share and exchange genetic 
materials, as they choose.
Thirdly, it is necessary to develop practical 
alternatives in the present to move us towards 
a future based on these principles. This includes 
lobbying and working with governments 
and donors to create a space for the material 
advancement of agro-ecological practices, 
and the materialisation of the principles of 
democratic control and decision-making, 
cooperation, inclusiveness and collectivity 
in our practices as we move towards our 
envisioned future.
Key recommendations and way forward
The following recommendations are for civil 
society organisations and the food sovereignty 
movement, in conjunction with government 
and public sector R&D institutions:
• Develop methodologies and support 
longitudinal studies that closely monitor the 
long-term social and environmental impacts 
of GR interventions, including land access, 
soil and water health and biodiversity;
• Develop multidisciplinary partnerships and 
methodologies to support these processes, 
cutting across social, organisational and 
technical fields;
• Support farmers and public sector extension 
officers with training in agro-ecological 
techniques, working together with farmers 
and their organisations, public sector 
institutions, universities, and training 
organisations and institutions;
• Support cooperative processes of curriculum 
development for technical training on agro-
ecology;
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• Support the construction of open, inclusive 
and democratic farmer-based extension 
networks linked to research and training;
• Investigate further the practical operation 
of QDS to identify the opportunities 
and limits of the system in supporting 
knowledge for the consolidation and 
expansion of farmer-managed seed systems 
and the incorporation of farmer varieties, 
including building farmer capacity by 
using participatory methods to produce 
quality seed of their favoured varieties and 
extending the area under farmer-managed 
production and distribution;
• Work on alternatives to proprietary plant 
variety ownership, starting from protecting 
and expanding contextual diversity, 
participatory R&D and shared ownership;
• Lobby for the application of General 
Public Licencing as the basis of variety 
improvement, where all products deriving 
from a shared germplasm source pool are 
replaced in that resource pool for further use 
by anyone who chooses, with open access for 
responsible use, on condition that the users 
agree to these terms;
• Monitor and analyse the implementation 
of SSTP and ISSD interventions, and engage 
with participating farmers if the opportunity 
arises;
• Lobby for the removal of proprietary 
ownership on all seed once it enters 
circulation so it becomes part of the farmers’ 
asset base to nurture and grow, with support 
from public sector institutions and expertise 
to maintain and improve genetic resources, 
for local use and commercially, if acceptable 
standards are met;
• Pay close attention to improved OPVs under 
public ownership as a potential key point 
of intersection between commercial and 
farmer-managed seed systems from an R&D 
point of view, with a focus on expanding 
farmer-managed diversity, local germplasm 
and organisational and technical capacity;
• For the food sovereignty movement, clarify 
positions on improved OPVs, QDS and 
its orientation towards genuine farmer-
managed seed systems, public and private 
sector R&D, germplasm improvement, and 
the role of farmers in seed production and 
distribution;
• Exclude any PPPs based on privately owned 
germplasm—unless the private owner is 
willing to share the product freely; and
• Develop seed quality criteria as an 
alternative to DUS, with farmers as 
producers and users of seed, in cooperation 
with their organisations and other public 
and education institutions, building on the 
lessons learned from QDS to date.
SAT demo plots, Morogoro.
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Introduction
This research report arises from a three year 
research programme which the African Centre 
for Biosafety (ACB) is conducting to investigate 
the impacts of Green Revolution (GR) 
technologies in Africa on small-scale farmers 
(SSFs). The focus is on seed and soil fertility, and 
we aim to track the work of the Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in particular. 
We started the research in Malawi early in 
2014, working in partnership with the National 
Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi 
(NASFAM), Kusamala Institute of Agriculture 
and Ecology, and Dr Blessings Chinsinga 
from the University of Malawi, with technical 
support from Chitedze Research Station. The 
Tanzanian research is part of the same process 
and in 2015 the research will expand to include 
Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa.
The first objective of the research is to 
understand better the impacts of Green 
Revolution interventions on the livelihoods 
of SSF households and on the ecology. The 
Green Revolution is presented as a win-win 
situation with farmers, private companies, 
governments, consumers and even the 
environment benefiting. However, we are 
extremely sceptical of these claims and are 
interested in interrogating them in more detail. 
We conducted desktop research on AGRA in 
2012 but wanted to look at the practice behind 
the claims. The picture turns out to be quite 
complex, with some possible opportunities 
but also threats and dangers in the processes 
unfolding on the ground.
The second objective of the research is to 
build a regional, multi-disciplinary research 
network with a critical orientation, cooperating 
with activist networks, organisations and 
movements in support of food sovereignty and 
democratic producer-owned-and-controlled 
systems. We aim to cooperate with farmers 
and their organisations, education and 
training institutions (including universities, 
non-government organisations (NGOs) and 
public sector institutions), activist movements 
and any other institutions and organisations 
including the public sector and multilateral 
institutions, with whom we share common 
interests, to see where points of possible 
intersection lie and to plot a shared path for 
the future. We aim to share the results with 
network partners on a regional level and to 
consider methodological issues and ways 
of more effectively connecting research and 
activism in agriculture and food in Africa.
The GR can be seen as a puzzle, made up 
of interlocking pieces that form a complex 
picture. Pieces of the puzzle include policies, 
laws and institutions, infrastructure, input 
supply, production and value chain financing, 
production practices and markets, not to 
mention the political, cultural and social 
dynamics that can sink the best laid plans. 
Significant donor and planning coordination 
are evident in the strategies being deployed 
to realise the GR in Africa, with central roles 
being played by the Comprehensive African 
Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), 
the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), AGRA and the G8’s 
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
(NAFSN). The vision of the completed puzzle 
is coherent and the logic is clear: a production 
system in which farmers large and small 
have access to the latest technologies, 
financed through the profitable production 
of commodities that meet the requirements 
of global, regional and domestic markets. 
Infrastructure development benefits the 
population as a whole and is built on the basis 
of agreements between public and private 
sectors that allow each segment to play to its 
strengths (accountability and resources for the 
former; business acumen, technical expertise 
and economic efficiency for the latter).
But the model has fatal flaws. The GR is 
based fundamentally on the idea of a linear 
model of development. In this theory of 
change, agricultural modernisation lays 
the groundwork for industrialisation, 
urbanisation, the growth of a middle class, 
higher consumption, a more rapid flow and 
circulation of capital, and plenty for all. But 
this is an ahistorical view of development. 
Africa is already integrated into the world 
economy and the flows of capital. Agricultural 
modernisation in the US, Europe and Asia have 
opened the way for new arenas of economic 
expansion based on industrial manufacture, 
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and thence to computerisation and the 
information economy. These activities have 
allowed the agricultural population to be 
absorbed into other areas of specialised work. 
But today Africa faces modernisation—with 
the inevitable displacement of the agricultural 
population without any outlets to absorb 
the surplus labour thus created. Populations 
historically reliant on land-based livelihoods 
will be displaced with nowhere to turn to 
realise alternative livelihoods. Industry and 
the knowledge economy are dominated by 
the advanced capitalist economies. Large 
scale commercial agriculture, mining and 
energy production, and even manufacturing 
in niche markets offer erstwhile farmers and 
their families little more than low wages and 
insecure labour at best, and destitution at 
worst. Owners of the machinery of industry 
have always had greater power than workers, 
but this has become ever starker in the era 
of neo-liberalism, in which financiers and 
gamblers of other peoples’ money make 
billions, while workers and their families eke 
out a living on starvation wages. The global 
trade regime is skewed towards reinforcing the 
power of large surplus producing incumbents. 
Trade liberalisation forces weaker countries 
to open their economies to a flood of cheap 
goods, making it impossible to compete 
in any meaningful way. Farmers already 
experience this in the low prices they get for 
their products, competing as they do against 
large-scale producers, domestically and even 
globally. The prices of maize and rice are set on 
world markets distorted by large subsidies to 
corporate producers; they are not based on the 
real cost of production in Tanzania. The same 
applies to the production of manufactured 
commodities. Patent rights lock control of 
the knowledge and information required to 
become part of the knowledge economy in the 
hands of a small global elite. Innovations are 
snapped up and brought under private control.
The GR, premised on agricultural 
modernisation, commercialisation and 
increasing economies of scale, is indeed 
revolutionary in its disruptive impacts on long-
standing ways of producing and organising 
economic life. It explicitly endorses the idea 
that not everyone can be an agricultural 
producer and this job is better left to fewer, 
larger actors. Some of these will arise from 
the ranks of the existing farming population 
to join the multinational giants in benefiting. 
Yet the GR offers nothing to the much wider 
population that will be displaced and made 
landless in these processes of social and 
economic change. In exchange for severing 
their ties to the land and social networks, the 
GR can offer no more than insecure, poorly 
paid wage labour on the large estates and 
mines owned by others. This ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003) follows in 
the wake of the GR as night follows day. 
Proponents of the GR will point to the growth 
and expansion of successful commercial 
producers as a result of their interventions. 
Yet the destructive turbulence that follows 
is ignored. We are tasked with making visible 
these after-effects and with working actively 
with farmers and other constituencies, not 
only to counter these effects with whatever 
energies we have, but also to identify 
alternative paths of economic development 
that result in a more secure and prosperous 
future for all, not only for a narrow band of 
beneficiaries whose benefits come at the cost 
of the collective.
This report covers the results of research 
conducted in Tanzania in 2014. It starts with an 
overview of the methodology we used and a 
background to the research sites in Morogoro 
Region, then discusses land and agricultural 
production both in Tanzania as a whole and in 
the research sites in particular. It then considers 
GR interventions in Tanzania with a focus on 
the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of 
Tanzania (SAGCOT) and AGRA. It then looks in 
more detail at soil fertility, seed and markets 
in the research sites, with an emphasis on 
interventions by AGRA. The report concludes 
with some reflections, recommendations and 
considerations for further research.
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Methodology and 
Background to Sites
ACB formed a partnership with Mtandao wa 
Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA) 
and Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania (SAT) to 
conduct the research in Tanzania. MVIWATA 
is a small-scale farmer organisation founded 
in 1993 through a project of the Sokoine 
University of Agriculture (SUA) in Morogoro. 
It consists of an estimated 70,000 farmer 
members organised into networks in 12 
regions in Tanzania. It seeks to represent SSFs 
with lobbying and advocacy and to facilitate 
knowledge and information sharing among 
farmers. MVIWATA has programmes on 
markets, finance, and planning and production, 
and works with a range of actors including 
a current Market Linkages programme with 
USAID and AGRA. MVIWATA is a member of 
the Eastern and Southern African Small Scale 
Farmers’ Forum (ESAFF) and the Agricultural 
Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF) in Tanzania.
SAT is a local organisation which was registered 
in June 2011. The idea of having an organisation 
which deals with sustainable agriculture was 
born during the successful work of Bustani ya 
Tushikamane (ByT), a grassroots project based 
in Morogoro. ByT enabled positive experiences 
by involving farmers in the planning stage of 
working together on challenging agricultural 
issues. SAT’s foundation was thus established 
on the needs of farmers. SAT collaborates 
with other stakeholders such as universities, 
companies and governmental extension 
officers, who are involved in activities 
performed by SAT. This holistic approach has 
established an Innovation Platform comprising 
dissemination, research, application and 
networking as its main pillars. This platform 
is the starting point from which to evolve and 
implement systems by building on existing 
knowledge. SAT applies an abiding principle 
of dealing with famers face to face and 
acknowledging their experiences.
All research team members from Tanzania 
are graduates of SUA in Morogoro and enjoy 
good relations with the university, government 
agricultural research institutes and with units 
within the Consultative Group for International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR). These are 
situated within agricultural research institutes 
(ARIs). The International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Centre (CIMMYT), International 
Rice Research Institute (IRRI), International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics (ICRISAT), International Institute of 
Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and others are active 
in this part of Tanzania.
The research offers a glimpse of some of the 
dynamics we encountered in the different 
study sites. In order to establish a firm 
quantitative baseline, the research is based on 
a survey of 60 farmers in 12 villages1 in the two 
districts of Mvomero and Morogoro (Figure 
1). ACB and MVIWATA conducted the survey 
in Mvomero with 30 farmers, and SAT did the 
same in Morogoro, also with 30 farmers.
The survey is derived from a similar study we 
conducted in Malawi earlier in 2014, which 
in turn was drawn from a longer survey in 
Kusamala, together with some additional 
information from previous NASFAM surveys. 
Following discussion with our partners 
in Tanzania we made minor adaptations 
following which the survey fitted the context 
very well. We added a missing question on 
livestock, since this is important both in 
relation to soil fertility and to the vision of 
integrated, mixed farming that lies at the heart 
of agro-ecology.
We stratified the sample by gender and age, 
aiming for a minimum of 50% women and 
50% youth (35 and under), if possible. The final 
breakdown of participants comprised 61% 
women and 39% men, and one-third (33%) of 
respondents were youth. Both districts had a 
similar sample by gender, and respondents in 
Morogoro were slightly younger overall than 
in Mvomero. Although we targeted youth 
for involvement, youth are less involved in 
agriculture and are not always interested in 
attending meetings. In Morogoro youth are 
mostly employed as motorcycle messengers, 
and are engaged in petty businesses in the 
1.  Mgambazi, Ruvuma and Tulo in Morogoro District; and Kunke, Dihombo, Mkindo, Komtonga, Mbogo, Kigugu, 
Makuyu, Msufini and Kidudwe in Mvomero District.
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informal sector. Most of them have left the 
villages to seek jobs in the towns.
The mean age of respondents was 40.4 years. 
Female-headed households constituted just 
over one-fifth (21.7%) of the sample, and the 
mean age of household heads was 45.3 years. 
The average number of people per household 
was 5.17. Respondents relied on a mix of 
agricultural production, seasonal or temporary 
wage labour (mostly in the agricultural sector), 
and small businesses for their livelihoods.
The sites cover two agro-ecological zones, 
one in the mountains (grouped into the 
Northern Highlands) and one in undulating 
hills with relatively fertile soil (in the Southern 
Highlands) (Table 1). The Southern Highlands 
2.  A region having little rainfall because it is sheltered from prevailing rain-bearing winds by a range of hills (Google).
Figure 1: Map of Tanzania showing Morogoro Region, and the location of Morogoro and 
Mvomero districts in the region
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mvomero_District; http://actmorogoro.com/Map_Pull_Out.html 
Table 1: Agro-ecological zones
Sites Zone Soils and topography Rainfall (mm/yr) Growing 
season
Morogoro Uluguru Mountains 
grouped in Northern 
Highlands (Granite 
Mountains) (VI)
Granite steep 
mountainside to high 
plateaux; soils are deep, 
arable and moderately 
fertile on upper slopes, 
shallow and stony on 
steep slopes
Bimodal and very 
reliable 1,000–
2,000 mm
October–
December
March–June
Mvomero Northern Morogoro 
Region grouped in 
Southern and Eastern 
Highlands (V)
Undulating plains to 
dissected hills and 
mountains. Moderately 
fertile clay soils 
Unimodal, 
reliable, local rain 
shadows,2  
800–1,400 mm
December–
April
Source: Maghema, et al., 2014:1080
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form part of the ecological spine of SAGCOT, a 
key GR initiative.
Ruvuma, Tulo and Mgambazi in Morogoro 
are on the slopes of the Uluguru Mountains. 
During the dry season they experience 
temperate weather conditions and it is difficult 
to cultivate annual crops at this time. However, 
during the rainy season water flows from 
the mountain and farmers can irrigate and 
therefore plant vegetables. Vegetable planting 
in the villages started in the 1980s. Irrigation 
is accomplished independently by the farmers 
who have to invest in getting water to their 
plots as there is no government irrigation 
scheme. Normally water runs through trenches 
and then is tapped into pipes which enter the 
farmers’ plots.
Irrigation is also important on the floodplains 
and in the foothills in the Mvomero sites. 
Mvomero has both government irrigation 
schemes for SSFs (e.g. Mkindo), and private 
schemes set up by farmers on their own with 
little state or other support (e.g. Dihombo). 
The rice association started schemes in the 
area in the 1980s. The Mkindo Training Centre 
was established in 1993 with Indonesian 
sponsorship. The formal schemes require 
payment for communal irrigation. A common 
complaint from farmers at the Dihombo 
irrigation scheme (and from other farmers 
who participated in the survey) is the basic 
state of infrastructure—the mud lined 
irrigation channels frequently leak or collapse. 
Farmers are generally cooperative regarding 
the allocation of water usage within the 
scheme but there appears to be no overall 
organisational structure for its general upkeep. 
Basic infrastructural improvements, such 
as are needed by the Dihombo irrigation 
scheme, would likely have positive impacts 
on productivity without necessitating the 
wholesale indebtedness of the farmers who 
use it. 
Some respondents in the survey came from 
these schemes as well as from a village 
(Kidudwe) on the Mtibwa Sugar Estate, 
a large privatised enterprise with a lot of 
land. Tanzania has four commercial sugar 
producers, two of which are mentioned here: 
Kilombero Sugar Company (KSCL) (also in 
Morogoro Region) and Mtibwa Sugar Estate 
Limited (MSEL) (in the Mvomero Region). MSEL 
is a property of Tanzania Sugar Industries 
Limited (TSIL) which is owned and funded by 
a consortium of Tanzanian business people 
from Turiani, who also own Kagera Sugar. MSEL 
occupies an area of more than 6,000 ha and 
produces sugar cane for sugar, bio-energy, 
animal feeds, fertilisers and ethanol. It also 
contracts SSFs for sugar production.
Morogoro town is the regional centre, with 
many smaller settlements dotted throughout 
the countryside. There is some infrastructure 
in the town although water and electricity 
are under strain. Main roads are of fairly good 
quality while side roads are poorer, but there is 
some investment, (mainly Chinese companies) 
in tarring the road to Mvomero settlement. 
Morogoro town has experienced recent rapid 
growth, with many new buildings under 
construction intended as offices and shops. The 
Irrigation canals, Dihombo irrigation scheme, Mvomero
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town hosts the main agricultural university 
(SUA) and many local and international 
organisations have their field offices there 
due to its closeness to Dar es Salaam and 
the Iringa and Dodoma regions. It is also well 
situated in the growth corridor connecting 
Mbeya and Zambia’s border with Dar es 
Salaam and its port facilities. There is physical 
evidence of recent investments in upgrading 
and expanding Dar’s port facility which is a 
gateway to the whole region.
The survey is a snapshot and the complexity 
of life cannot be reduced to 21 questions. But 
the answers give us some indication of what 
people are doing. The objective is to conduct 
action research, which means the findings form 
the basis for making decisions, together with 
partners,3 about what to do next.
We complemented the survey with focus 
group discussions (FGDs) with 6—8 farmers 
in a group, discussing seed, soil fertility and 
markets; and with village-based agricultural 
advisers (VBAAs). The focus groups were gender 
balanced, with two women-only groups. 
VBAAs are part of a farmer-based extension 
network receiving support from AGRA, Nafaka 
and others. They were established in an AGRA-
sponsored micro-dosing project managed 
by Farm Input Promotions Africa (FIPS) and 
continue to play an extension role today. They 
are currently involved in a number of Nafaka 
projects (USAID/Feed the Future, Opportunity 
Tanzania) and AGRA-sponsored projects 
(Market Linkages programme), of which more 
below.
We conducted key informant interviews at the 
national, Morogoro regional and local levels 
with farmers and their associations; farmer 
support organisations; ESAFF; ANSAF; seed 
companies (Agricultural Seed Agency (ASA) and 
Tanseed); financing organisations (Opportunity 
Tanzania); the Ministry of Agriculture; various 
university staff, especially at SUA; government 
agricultural research institutes (ARIs) at Ilonga 
and Dakawa; training centres (Mkindo); and 
USAID and others.
3.  This research has already produced an activity in the form of farmer training in agro-ecology. Twenty MVIWATA 
farmers from Mvomero were given a menu of courses offered by SAT and they selected a five-day course titled 
Zero Tillage Farming. The course covered topics in conservation agriculture, soil and water conservation practices, 
intercropping, agroforestry, crop rotation, cover crops, contour farming, organic soil fertility management 
(composting, manuring, nutrients, liquid organic fertilisers) and pest and disease management. We will explore 
further the possibilities for facilitating access to training for farmers as well as following up with farmers to see 
whether there was any uptake of the methodologies and hear the farmers’ opinion of the methodologies so far, 
considering the value of training in this form, and looking at constraints and opportunities for practical expansion 
if desired. The content of training should be tailored through our partnerships, not only at national but also at 
regional level. This has arisen from the research process, and we are interested to pursue it as part of the action 
research process.
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Land and Agricultural 
Production
Background to land tenure in Tanzania
Tanzania’s land area is 88.6 million ha, of which 
up to 80% is covered by forests, woodlands, 
open grasslands and bush vegetation (USAID 
2011). Around 15% of the total land is considered 
suitable for agriculture. Land in Tanzania was 
historically divided into two different tenure 
systems: land held by non-African settlers, 
governed by a formal set of laws; and land 
held by Africans, governed by customary law.  
After independence, all land was considered 
public land and chieftainships were abolished. 
Enforced ‘villagisation’ (ujamaa) placed 
elected village councils in charge of village 
land allocation and management. The tenure 
changes gave women more secure tenure 
although there were ongoing problems with 
governance and the system limited investment 
in production. Tanzania has a large pastoralist 
population and there are sporadic but ongoing 
tensions between itinerant pastoralists and 
settled villagers for land access. 
Land law reform in the 1980s and 1990s 
opened the door to foreign and commercial 
interests by providing for broad land 
acquisition rights which, among other things, 
threatened tenure security for women. This was 
a hallmark of land policy under the leadership 
of Julius Nyerere (USAID, 2011:7). The Land Act 
and the Village Land Act categorised all land 
in Tanzania as being ‘general land’, ‘village 
land’ or ‘reserved land’. Village land is land 
within the demarcated areas for each of the 
11,000–12,000 villages in Tanzania. The Village 
Land Act recognises the rights of land held by 
villages collectively, while individual or joint 
customary rights to occupancy are perpetual 
and inheritable. Land can be mortgaged with a 
certificate of approval from the village council. 
Occupancy rights on village land may be leased 
to others with the approval of the village 
council. Land may be transferred to outsiders 
with permission of the village council and the 
village assembly, and the state is granted some 
power to transfer village land to general land ‘if 
it serves the public interest’. Village assemblies 
can only reject or approve such classifications 
if the land area in question is below 250 ha. 
Generally, because of the limitations on 
transferability of customary land, this land is 
considered unsuitable for use as collateral for 
lending (USAID, 2011:10). Although women’s 
rights to land are theoretically equal to those 
of men, the practical situation appears to 
be biased against women, with women in 
Tanzania holding an estimated 20% only of 
registered land, with an even lower figure likely 
on customary lands (USAID, 2011:10–11).
Reserve land includes national and marine 
parks, forest reserves, etc., and falls under the 
authority of relevant state institutions  such as 
Tanzania National Parks or the roads agency. 
Rights to occupancy can be granted on 99 year 
leases under fixed terms, subject to an annual 
rent. Holders of registered granted rights of 
occupancy may lease the land to others. Short 
term leases of less than one year do not need 
to be registered (USAID, 2011:9).
There is a conflict between the Land Act and 
the Village Land Act. Unlike the latter, the 
Land Act definition of general land includes 
‘unoccupied or unused village land’, giving 
ample scope for the appropriation of village 
land (Rosengren, 2013). Foreign investment can 
be made only on ‘general land’, and between 
2004 and 2009 an estimated 50,000 ha of 
agricultural land was transferred to large 
commercial investors, mainly for commercial 
forestry (teak) and rice and livestock 
production (USAID, 2011:6). These rights are 
secured through central or local government. 
Sometimes land is expropriated from villages 
without adequate consultation or the 
participation of villagers and village councils; 
at other times investors bypass government 
and deal directly with village councils (USAID, 
2011:13). The 1997 Tanzania Investment Act 
opened the way for non-citizens to own land 
in Tanzania. Various indices indicate private 
investor dissatisfaction with the security 
of property rights in Tanzania, but at the 
same time show a high level of equality in 
the distribution of land holdings among the 
population (USAID, 2011:8). Recent efforts to 
survey land should be understood as the first 
step in the commodification and alienation of 
land (Craib, 2004).
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Land tenure and access in the research 
sites
There is no production without land, the two 
are interlinked. In our survey we divided land 
into own land, rented and borrowed land, and 
kilimo cha kiangazi (KK) land. In some cases the 
latter is rented or borrowed, so these categories 
should be adjusted.
There is individual ownership of plots of 
land which is subject to local rules, and there 
is a land market where land is traded as a 
commodity for money. An average of 4.34 acres 
(slightly less than 2 ha4) of land is owned by 
respondent households, with a range from 0 
to 20 acres (8 ha) as the largest (Table 2). The 
average amount of land owned is slightly larger 
in Mvomero than in Morogoro, but respondents 
cultivated more of their own land in Morogoro 
than in Mvomero.
Four households (6.7%), all in Mvomero, did 
not own any land at all. Some respondents 
indicated that land is available but far away, 
sometimes up to 50 km away, and that it is 
difficult to get to distant land. The average 
distance to cultivated own land in Mvomero 
(almost 8 km from the homestead) is much 
higher than in Morogoro (2.5 km away, on 
average). Sometimes land far away is rented 
to others. Other respondents indicated that 
land access is limited because of the increasing 
population, or because they were not originally 
from the area. One respondent said their own 
land is a very small garden plot (20 m x 15 m). 
A female respondent indicated that there 
is gender equality in land allocation. Other 
respondents reported having idle land mainly 
because they could not afford to cultivate it 
(paying for labour was mentioned specifically 
by one woman respondent). Significantly more 
men (57%) than women (41%) thought land 
access was a serious challenge (Appendix 1).
There was no rented or borrowed land among 
respondents in Morogoro villages. In Morogoro 
most of the land is inherited by families 
and has been passed on for generations and 
generations. In Mvomero more than half of 
respondents (53%) cultivated on rented land 
while only 3 cultivated on borrowed land. 
The average size of rented land cultivated 
(2.41 acres) was almost as much as own land 
cultivated. Land is fragmented into a number of 
plots, with a number of respondents indicating 
two or more separate plots. Rentals quoted by 
respondents ranged from Sh20,000–Sh100,000 
per acre per season [US$12.20–US$60.98],5 
depending on the local land market and the 
Table 2: Average size of land owned and cultivated in the past season
Area Average 
land owned 
(acres)
(N=60)
Average land cultivated in past season (acres) (N=60)
Own land 
(all)
Rented 
land (those 
who 
cultivated 
rented 
land)
Borrowed 
land (those 
who 
cultivated 
borrowed 
land)
KK 
land 
(all)
KK land 
(those who 
cultivated 
KK land)
Total 
average 
land 
cultivated 
(all)
Mvomero 5.40 2.66 2.41 1.67 0.63 1.17 4.46
Morogoro 3.28 3.19 0 0 0.70 1.17 4.03
Total 4.34 3.00 2.41 1.67 0.66 1.17 4.24
Range 0–20 0–12 0.5–6.00 1–3 0–6 0.25–6 0.75–12
4.  Based on 2.5 acres = 1 hectare (rounding up from 2.471:1).
5.  At a US$:Sh rate of 1:1,640 at the time of the research.
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demand for land. For those cultivating KK land 
in the past season, the average size was just 
over half an acre (Table 9). KK land was also 
rented in the same price range as other rented 
land.
Respondents from Kidudwe on Mtibwa Sugar 
Estate reported having access to KK land on the 
estate with free access and no rent. According 
to Edgar Eidfons (interview, 19/09/2014), one of 
the farmer respondents at Kidudwe, the land 
is available to anyone in the area to farm and 
you don’t have to be working there. He says 
MSEL has a huge amount of land and people 
can farm on unused land. Other respondents 
reported having previously produced sugar 
for the Estate but abandoning it because of 
overdependence on a single buyer. Another 
farmer indicated that he bought 20 acres of 
land to plant sugar cane but no longer grows it.
It seems that land access, rather than the 
quality of land (or water) is currently of more 
concern to farmers: 47% said access to land 
was a serious problem, while only 13% said the 
same for soil fertility and 15% for soil erosion 
(compared with 45% and 58% respectively 
saying they were not serious problems). This 
could be for a number of reasons, from the 
general quality of soil and rainfall patterns 
in the area to the historical use of land. A 
number of farmers said they had no need to 
use fertiliser because they had been farming 
their land for a few seasons only, and were still 
achieving good yields without fertiliser.
However, with the increasing demand for 
land over time, cultivation on new land is 
likely to become continuous. Timely and low 
cost soil fertility interventions (such as crop 
rotation, applying ground cover and organic 
matter to the soil) could maintain the soil 
before it degenerates into a situation where 
the seasonal demands of agriculture require 
the application of large quantities of synthetic 
fertilisers, pesticides and other inputs (a case of 
treating the symptoms rather than the cause).
A number of farmers had moved to the area 
in recent years to start farming and general 
conversations with people in and around 
Morogoro paint a picture of significant internal 
migration in Tanzania. Some FGD participants 
were hiring extra land for the current season 
to grow food for their own consumption. This 
required approaching a farmer in their own 
village and negotiating for access (from a very 
weak position). Farmers know if the land they 
are being offered is productive (tall grass, or 
the productivity of adjacent land being tell-tale 
signs to look for) but they have no bargaining 
power over the land they get.
One of the FGD participants using rented land 
was also using synthetic fertiliser, but the 
group was unanimous that it would not use 
any other soil improving techniques on rented 
land, as the benefits would accrue to the land 
owner over the long term, rather than the 
renter over the short term. This is a problem 
inherent in insecure tenure and has a negative 
impact on sustainable natural resource 
management and socio-ecologically sound 
improvement.
There was no evidence of land grabs in our 
research sites, although the presence of the 
Mtibwa sugar estate indicates that land was 
expropriated for commercial use in the past. 
In the context of fairly evenly distributed land 
holdings of 1–3 ha among many households, 
the presence of a 6,000+ ha estate necessarily 
means that many households were displaced 
to make way for the estate. This is an area for 
potential follow up in future research.
Tensions between pastoralists and crop 
growers are evident, with reports of violence 
and even killings as a result of conflicts over 
land. Reports of animal damage to crops 
(excluding insect pests) included rats, birds and 
Mtimbwa Sugar Estate Mvomero
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monkeys, but by far the most reported was 
damage from cattle owned by pastoralists. 
Though efforts are being made by MVIWATA 
and others to mediate in disputes, respondents 
indicated the problem was getting worse over 
time. Demographic factors, such as population 
growth and internal migration, contribute to 
the problem, and regional and international 
interest in Tanzania as a potential agricultural 
breadbasket implies that even more land 
will be converted to permanent cropland 
in the future. This may exacerbate tensions 
between SSFs and pastoralists, especially 
when considering that the large estates (sugar, 
for example) will have the means to exclude 
pastoralists from the land they operate on, 
even more than poor SSFs. 
AGRA on land
AGRA (2013) recognises that limited access 
to natural resources is a key constraint to 
expanding agricultural production (2013:28). 
It argues that a significant amount of land 
in Africa is uncultivated and needs to be 
brought into productive use (2013:32). AGRA 
surveyed a number of Eastern and Southern 
African countries and found that average land 
holdings were less than three hectares in most 
countries (2013:32). Consequently, AGRA orients 
its support towards small-scale agriculture, 
but to a commercial layer that will have larger 
than average land sizes. This excludes a large 
number of producers who make a major 
contribution to food security on the continent. 
Looking at Southern and Eastern Africa as a 
whole, AGRA has noted an expansion of the 
area under production in the past two decades 
and also reports a decline in average farm sizes 
over the past decade or so (AGRA, 2013:32). 
This finding, however, is not given further 
consideration. AGRA anticipates that higher 
investments in land will “induce land holdings 
to adjust” (AGRA, 2013:37), meaning a greater 
concentration among commercial producers. 
Unlike the World Bank’s disastrous attempts 
in the past to impose a private property model 
onto Africa’s complex and diverse systems of 
land holding, allocation and management, 
AGRA recognises the value of customary land 
tenure systems while also pointing to their 
downsides. Nevertheless, AGRA indicates that 
for commercial production, private ownership 
of land is the best model. It launches an attack 
on state-owned land and argues that the lack 
of a formal certificate or title is one of the 
reasons for the lack of access to credit (AGRA, 
2013:35). It links regularisation (formal titling) 
to increasing productivity (2013:36), and places 
emphasis on the productivity of land with 
investment in input and output markets. The 
logic here is that farmers will invest more, 
land values will rise, and “land holdings will 
be induced to adjust” (2013:37); i.e. there will 
be a concentration of land among those who 
can use the land to generate marketable 
surpluses. When discussing financing, AGRA 
proposes that private ownership should allow 
farmers “to pledge their land as collateral for 
borrowing” (2013:77). Thus AGRA suggests 
it is fine to have collective or communal 
land holding models, but when it comes to 
commercial agriculture individual title and 
ownership is a better option, as land can be 
commoditised and used as collateral.
The Tanzanian government, as part of 
its NAFSN work, has committed itself to 
demarcation of village land to pave the way 
for this legalised expropriation. It aims to 
demarcate all village land in the ‘SAGCOT 
region’, plus it anticipated that 20% of the 
villages in SAGCOT would complete land use 
plans and be issued a certificate of occupancy, 
by June 2014, with another 20% by June 2016 
(Appendix 2). According to NAFSN, the goal is 
the responsible and transparent allocation of 
land to investors in the SAGCOT region (NAFSN, 
n.d.). As mentioned earlier, demarcation is the 
first step towards the commodification and 
expropriation of land (Craib, 2004). A ‘certificate 
of occupancy’ will be allowed to float on the 
market, to be acquired based on no criteria 
set by existing land holders themselves. While 
this sounds like something that might be a 
progressive means to expropriate the large 
corporate farms in South Africa and elsewhere 
for land and enterprise redistribution, to aim 
this at small-scale, resource-poor farmers 
effectively facilitates them to lose their 
land, which will entrench the concentration 
and ownership of economic assets in the 
hands of a relative elite and create greater 
impoverishment for those who have lost their 
land. As indicated above, there is some initial 
evidence of landlessness in the research sites, 
accompanied by growing casual labour when 
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farming households are turned into landless 
worker households, as the processes of land 
concentration expand.
AGRA says that most food for urban areas 
comes from a few large farms and therefore, 
in an urbanising context, “a policy of land 
equality under severe population pressure 
may not provide much food security to 
urban populations” (2013:37). On this basis it 
proposes the coexistence of small and ‘larger 
commercial’ farms (2013:37). Again, there is 
a sense that AGRA is carving out its target 
audience, its niche, among better-off farmers 
who will produce as commercial entities 
for formal markets. Nevertheless, AGRA 
acknowledges that no single land policy or 
strategy can address tenure security across 
the continent, and that these must be context 
specific. AGRA states that secure access is 
the precursor to clear, secure and negotiable 
property rights (2013:36). Despite the nuanced 
rhetoric, it is apparent that AGRA has a defined 
view on the necessity of both the private 
ownership of land and of land consolidation 
into larger units, as the long-term basis for a 
successful GR strategy. This is very clear from its 
insertion into SAGCOT where the explicit plan 
is to alienate tens of thousands of hectares of 
land for exclusive large-scale commercial use.
We will monitor any changes in land access 
patterns over the course of the research, 
including threats of large-scale land grabs, if 
any, together with the less conspicuous and 
slower process of the gradual concentration of 
land holdings among fewer people, as farmers 
separate into those who aim for commercial 
production with expanded land holdings, and 
those who end up selling some or all of their 
labour for money on the farms of others or 
elsewhere.
Overview of agricultural production
Agriculture remains a significant economic 
activity in Tanzania, although value added in 
agriculture as a share of GDP dropped from 
32% in 2002 to 28% in 2011 (services, including 
tourism, stood at 48% of GDP in 2012—OECD, 
2013). Agriculture value added grew at an 
average real annual rate of 4.2% during these 
years,6 and in 2012 agriculture employed 75% 
of the economically active population. Despite 
the presence of large agricultural estates and 
increasing interest in their expansion, 80% 
of people involved in agriculture are SSFs 
(Mbunda, 2013).
Agricultural land comprises roughly 42% of 
total land in Tanzania, of which about 36% 
is arable and permanent crop land.7 Land 
under irrigation is currently around 326,000 
ha (2.5% of arable and permanent crop land) 
although official data show that 29.4 million 
ha are suitable for irrigation (Mbunda, 2013). 
Approximately 85% of arable land is used by 
smallholders cultivating between 0.2 and 2 ha 
and traditional agro-pastoralists who keep 
an average of 50 head of cattle. Tanzania and 
South Africa have the largest cattle herds in 
southern Africa and between them account 
for 57% of the region’s total cattle population 
(Louw & Kapuya, 2012:5–6). By far the majority 
of cattle in Tanzania are indigenous varieties 
(Sarwatt & Mollel, 2000). Livestock production 
(mainly cattle, but also sheep, goats and pigs) 
has grown slowly in Tanzania between 2002 
and 2011.8
Tanzania has seven different agro-ecological 
zones with two dominant rainfall patterns. 
In northern and eastern Tanzania the long 
Improved pigeon pea demo plots, Ilonga ARI
6.  World Bank, African Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/data—accessed 16/01/15.
7.  World Bank, op cit.
8.  World Bank, op cit.
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rainy season (masika) lasts from March to 
May, followed by a short rainy season (vuli) 
from October to December. During the long 
rains planting starts in February/March, to be 
harvested in July/August. During the short 
rainy season planting takes place around 
November, to be harvested in January/February. 
Southern Tanzania has a unimodal rainfall 
regime, from December to April. Planting takes 
place in November to be harvested from June 
to July (Lui et al., 2013). Soil properties vary 
across the country, with volcanic soils of high 
agronomic potential found around Arusha and 
Kilimanjaro in the north, and the south west 
highlands, which form the bulk of the Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania 
(SAGCOT).
Maize and rice are the principal grain crops 
in Tanzania. Maize accounts for 31% of total 
food production and SSFs produce 85% of the 
crop (AGRA, 2010). About 43% of arable and 
permanent crop land is under cereals (25% 
maize and 8.4% rice).9 Between 2005/06 and 
2009/10 the area under maize in Tanzania 
increased from 2.5 to 3 million ha, while 
average maize yields increased from 1.3 tons 
to 1.6 tons per ha over the same period (ESAFF, 
2013). This is in an era of a shift to hybrid 
maize seed. Rice is the nation’s second staple 
after maize and constitutes 17% of cereal 
consumption. Tanzania ranks second (after 
Madagascar) for rice production in Eastern and 
Southern Africa, with all regions growing the 
crop. Small-scale farmers (0.5–2.4 ha) account 
for 94% of national rice output (AGRA, 2010).
More than half of Tanzania’s farmers grow 
legumes: 10% of the area under pulses and 5% 
of the area under oil crops are planted with 
improved seed. Beans are the major grain 
legume in Tanzania, mostly intercropped with 
maize or permanent crops such as banana or 
coffee. Groundnuts are cultivated mainly in 
areas that receive long rains, in intercropped 
systems with maize. From the 1960s to the 
1980s farmers were encouraged to produce 
soya for export, although production declined 
following the collapse of the parastatal 
buying organisations during the process of 
structural adjustment. In 2003/04 the Ministry 
of Agriculture revived the production of soya 
and this was followed by the launch of the 
Tanzanian soybean development strategy 
2010–2020. Cassava, banana and sweet potato 
are other important food crops. Major exports 
are coffee, cotton, cashew nuts, tobacco and 
sisal.
Adoption of GR inputs and technologies in 
Tanzania is currently low. A national panel 
survey from 2010/11 found that, overall, 17% of 
households were using certified seed. However, 
this hides large discrepancies between crops—
up to 27% of the maize area is planted with 
certified seed, compared with just 1% of the rice 
area (World Bank, 2012). Fertiliser consumption 
averaged 5.5 kg/ha between 2002 and 2009, 
with growth in 2009 to 8.7 kg/ha. The value 
of pesticide imports grew rapidly from 2008, 
from an average US$17.7 million in the period 
2002–2007 to an average US$41.6 million in 
the period 2008–2011.10 These sharp increases 
in inputs are attributable to the launch of the 
National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme 
(NAIVS) in 2008, which provides government 
subsidies for inputs (Hepelwa, et al., 2013). 
NAIVS was suspended in 2014 following 
widespread corruption and soft loans through 
financial institutions and the voucher system 
has been replaced with cooperatives (Domasa, 
2014).
Farmer perceptions of agricultural 
challenges
There are numerous challenges facing 
Tanzania’s agricultural sector, ranging from 
climatic factors to issues around marketing 
and insufficient state support. Despite robust 
GDP growth in recent years and discoveries 
of large reserves of natural gas, poverty in 
Tanzania remains pervasive, particularly among 
the country’s SSFs who account for roughly 
70% of people living in ‘income and food 
poverty’. The vulnerability that poverty brings 
is further exacerbated by reliance on rain-fed 
agriculture and the anticipated detrimental 
effects of climate change. Access to and 
ownership of land is another challenge faced 
9.  World Bank, op cit.
10.  World Bank, op cit.
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by SSFs and, in the context of changes to land 
laws and increasing overtures to large-scale 
investors, there is potential for the situation to 
deteriorate even further. Marketing is another 
significant trial for SSFs in Tanzania; markets 
are unpredictable and prices plummet in years 
with good harvests, a situation that merchants 
are known to exploit. Lack of post-harvest 
storage and infrastructure, weak bargaining 
positions and general levels of poverty all give 
farmers little option but to seek quick sales 
after the harvest, usually in full knowledge that 
they are not receiving good prices. 
For our survey farmers were asked to assess 
the extent to which certain factors were a 
challenge to their agricultural practices. The 
two main major challenges identified were lack 
of markets (68%) and crop damage caused by 
animals (58%), with high fertiliser prices (51%), 
access to land (47%) and seed prices (44%) also 
notable (Appendix 2). None of the men in the 
survey thought labour access was a serious 
problem, compared with 19% of women who 
did.
AGRA’s responses to seed, soil fertility and 
markets are covered in greater detail in relevant 
sections of this report. AGRA has no specific 
programme on climate change, although its 
2014 Status of African Agriculture Report is 
dedicated to the subject. The report, which 
draws heavily on the work of the United 
Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), paints a picture of rising 
temperatures, changes in rainfall patterns, 
more extreme weather events and increasing 
pressure from plant pests and diseases (AGRA, 
2014). Survey participants indicated that some 
of these issues had already been experienced.
The main thrust of AGRA’s response to climate 
change is based on climate smart agriculture 
(CSA), a concept proposed by the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) at The 
Hague conference in 2009 on Agriculture, 
Food Security and Climate Change. The FAO 
currently defines the three pillars of CSA as 
sustainably increasing agricultural productivity 
and incomes; adapting and building resilience 
to climate change; and reducing and/or 
removing greenhouse gas emissions, where 
possible. AGRA’s approach to CSA is broad; 
simultaneously it calls for mixed crop and 
livestock farming, the mulching and promotion 
of indigenous crops while also proposing 
increased access to financial products (credit 
and insurance), the efficient use of synthetic 
fertiliser and welcoming the potential for 
carbon sequestration (AGRA, 2014a).
Few would disagree with the importance of 
increasing on-farm biodiversity or making use 
of organic matter for soil health (including 
from animal sources). However, the use 
of agro-chemicals under CSA is implicit 
in Integrated Soil Fertility Management 
(ISFM) and Conservation Agriculture (CA), 
for which “herbicides are a necessary input” 
(AGRA, 2014:92a). Calls for the increased 
financialisation of agriculture under CSA will 
accelerate processes of rural differentiation. 
Insurance products could provide vital safety 
nets for rural communities, but they could 
also encourage production shifts and create 
divisions between those who can access 
insurance and those who cannot.
Agricultural production in the research 
sites
In our research sites vegetables, maize, pigeon 
pea and paddy (rice) were the most commonly 
produced crops in Mvomero, while in Morogoro 
maize (especially local varieties), vegetables 
and beans were the most widespread crops 
(Table 3).
Table 3: Percentage producing main crops on 
any land by district
Mvomero 
% yes
Morogoro 
% yes
Any maize 86.7 100
Any veg 96.7 93.3
Local maize 50 96.7
Beans 10 86.7
Pigeon pea 73.3 16.7
Rice 66.7 6.7
More than half (57%) of respondents were 
growing some kind of fruit tree, with banana, 
citrus and mango the most common (Table 4).
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Table 4: Fruit trees of any land
Tree type N %
Guava 8 13.3
Mango 16 26.7
Banana 18 30
Avocado 9 15
Citrus 18 30
Papaya 11 18.3
Coconut 10 16.7
Any fruit tree 34 56.7
Maize was the most widely produced crop in 
main fields (93% of respondents produced 
maize in their main fields), especially local 
maize (73%), followed by any vegetables (78%) 
of which pumpkin, tomato and cabbage were 
the most popular, then beans (48%), pigeon 
pea (40%) and rice (38%) (Appendix 3, Table 3A). 
Production is dispersed among many crops, 
indicating a lot of production diversity between 
the respondents who are mostly producing a 
few different crops each. Rice and pumpkin are 
more important in the main fields in Mvomero, 
and maize and tomatoes are more important 
in the main fields in Morogoro. In both places 
there is significant vegetable production of 
some kind.
Kilimo cha kiangazi (KK) land is a small 
irrigated plot for dry season production, 
operating under customary rules of allocation 
that are similar to those for main fields. It is 
similar to dimba/dambo land in Malawi. Not 
everyone has access to KK land, and one third 
of respondents in our survey had not planted 
on KK land in the past season. Thirty-nine per 
cent of women-headed households overall did 
not plant on KK, compared to 32% of male-
headed households, so there is some gender 
difference but not of major significance. We 
do not know whether this difference is a 
product of gendered lack of access to KK land, 
difficulties in putting land into production, or 
other causes.
In Mvomero, more than half (53%) of 
respondents did not plant on KK. This may be 
because farmers use the same piece of land as 
their main field and as their KK land. Only 13% 
of respondents in Morogoro had not planted 
on KK land in the past season. This indicates 
a clear distinction between main fields and 
KK land and also widespread access (Table 5). 
Mainly vegetables are produced on KK land, 
with smaller quantities of beans and rice being 
cultivated (Annex 1, Table B).
Table 5: No planting on kilimo cha kiangazi or 
around home in past season by district
No planting 
on kilimo cha 
kiangazi %
No planting 
around home 
%
Mvomero 53.3 3.3
Morogoro 13.3 63.3
Total 33.3 33.3
Two-thirds of respondents had planted around 
their homestead in the past season, with a big 
difference between sites—97% in Mvomero 
but only 37% in Morogoro. In Morogoro 
planting around the home is not undertaken by 
many farmers because water is not accessible 
and most of the farmers keep small livestock 
at home, which spoil the crops. Sixty-three to 
sixty-five per cent of those planting around 
their homesteads cultivated vegetable or fruit 
crops. Lemon grass, sweet potato leaves, mango 
and papaya were the most popular, but were 
all less than one-third of the crops planted, 
which reinforces a sense of the wide diversity 
of production (Annex 1, Table C).
Sugar cane is a major crop in the Mvomero 
district, which is home to a number of large 
estates, such as Mtibwa Sugar Estate. MSEL 
(the company operating the estate) has 
its own large-scale production operations 
but also contracts SSFs who are members 
of a registered NGO, Mtibwa Outgrowers’ 
Association (MOA). Contracts are underpinned 
by the Sugar Industry Act of 2001 and 
incorporate contractual agreements on 
issues such as transportation, prices, credit, 
and organisation of the harvesting, payment 
and transport. MSEL extension officers offer 
training sessions and visit villages to offer 
specific agronomic advice to individual 
farmers on credit. Contracted farmers may 
hire tractors and may receive farm inputs, 
such as fertilisers and crop pesticides, on 
loan (production financing). Farmers weed, 
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harvest and transport the crops to the factory. 
Farmers plant sugar cane once every four 
or five years and harvest once a year in this 
period. Some of the bigger farmers have left 
the MOA but continue to sell sugar cane to the 
factory. Sugar cane with high levels of sucrose 
achieves higher prices and world market prices 
are influential. A number of farmers related 
problems they had experienced as sugar 
outgrowers, such as the high costs (and risks) of 
production, for low incomes. Only 4 households 
in our sample had produced sugar cane in the 
past season (Appendix 3, Table 3A).
Our survey looked at yields for the primary 
crops being produced (grains and legumes). 
Vegetables and fruit are the other main areas 
of production but they are difficult to quantify 
accurately. Horticultural crops are produced 
in different units and households harvest at 
will, rather than in one go, so it is impossible to 
assess accurately the amounts being produced. 
For commercial producers it makes sense to 
quantify and measure output, but it may not 
be necessary to monitor each vegetable picked 
when it is for household use. Once you enter 
the market, then quantification is essential 
because profitability (and general resource-
use efficiency) cannot be measured without 
quantification. There are definitely commercial 
markets in maize and rice (see the section on 
markets), heavily supported by Nafaka, AGRA 
and others. Nafaka also has a programme 
focusing on fresh produce in the area. Nafaka, 
through the Tanzania Agricultural Productivity 
Partnership (TAPP), is also working on building 
production and markets for horticulture in 
Mvomero.
Table 6: Average yields of key crops (only 
those who harvested these crops)
Crop # 
harvesting
Average yield of 
those harvesting 
(kg)
Hybrid 
maize
7 1,641.7
Improved 
OPV maize
5 3,075.2
Local maize 42 991.4
Rice 22 1,972
Beans 25 106.3
Pigeon pea 17 62
Cow pea 16 175.1
There is significant difference in maize yields 
depending on source materials (Table 6). The 
majority of respondents are using local maize 
and 70% of the sample reported harvesting 
local maize. Among those using hybrids and 
improved OPVs, 8–12% of respondents reported 
harvesting and that yield gains are significant. 
An average of 991 tons of local maize was 
harvested but our data does not indicate 
the per acre yield. Although we could cross-
tabulate with land cultivated, we do not know 
what area of cultivated land is under maize, 
so we cannot make accurate statements. 
It would be useful to delve deeper but that 
must develop organically over time and in 
partnership with farmers.
Considering only the overall yields for now, it 
is clear from an absolute point of view that 
those using hybrid maize and improved OPVs 
are producing higher yields. Because this is 
not a per acre yield, it suggests a few larger 
producers using these seed types and hence a 
commercial layer of small-scale maize farmers. 
Hybrid maize users achieved a two-thirds 
higher yield (65.6%) than those using local 
maize. The gap is even wider for those using 
improved OPVs: the 5 farmers using improved 
OPV produced over 2 tons on average more 
than farmers using local maize—this is 210% 
higher. We have taken a closer look at the seeds 
in use and improved OPVs in Appendix 5.
Rice yields averaged 1,972 kg ( just under 2 tons) 
and rice is sold mainly into local markets, with 
potential new markets through Nafaka- and 
AGRA-sponsored channels (see the section on 
markets below). Cow pea, bean and pigeon pea 
yields are very low, at between 60–175 kg for 
those who harvested. It may have to do with 
how the crops are perceived and their historical 
use in these places, e.g. pigeon pea was 
historically used to demarcate borders. Pigeon 
pea is widely planted in the Mvomero sites. 
AGRA has sponsored pigeon pea development 
but results are mixed (see the case study on 
Tanseed). Details of the seed issues related to 
these yields are found in the seed section below.
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The Green Revolution in 
Tanzania
Overview
Tanzania was colonised by the Germans and 
British and won independence in 1961 and the 
United Republic of Tanzania and Zanzibar was 
formed in 1964. After 1967 the state asserted 
control over the economy, including the 
agricultural sector which formed the backbone 
of the financial system. In the 1980s Tanzania 
was forced into structural adjustment under 
the name of the Economic Recovery Program, 
leading to privatisation, deregulation and 
liberalisation of the economy, especially after 
1992 when multiparty liberal democracy was 
introduced. This was followed by the Economic 
and Social Action Program in 1998 which 
reinforced and entrenched these processes 
(OECD, 2013). During this period multinational 
input companies (seed and fertiliser) entered 
Tanzania. The state withdrew from various 
economic roles, leading to a collapse of some 
services and sectors but growth in others. The 
activities of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
were bolstered in the 2000s as investment in 
African agriculture rose up the global agenda, 
and this was reinforced with the introduction 
of the national input subsidy scheme in 2008.
A series of policy initiatives and partnerships 
were developed over the past five years, 
starting with Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) 
which was launched in 2009. Kilimo Kwanza 
is a framework for public private partnerships 
and investment in the commercialisation of 
agriculture through: the expansion of Green 
Revolution technologies; the launch of SAGCOT 
in 2010; the Grow Africa Forum in 2011; the 
launch of the Tanzanian Agriculture and Food 
Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP), Tanzania’s 
national investment plan under CAADP, in 2011; 
the launch of the G8’s NAFSN in Tanzania and 
Figure 2: Green Revolution organogram
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elsewhere in 2012; Big Results Now (BRN) in 
2013; and the operationalisation of the SAGCOT 
Catalytic Fund in 2014. These initiatives are all 
linked to one another and are aligned with the 
embedding of CAADP at a national level. They 
are based on creating the conditions for private 
sector investment and the commercialisation 
and modernisation of agriculture in Tanzania.
Kilimo Kwanza is a Tanzanian government 
policy initiative with the objective of “fostering 
a Green Revolution and transforming 
agriculture into a modern sector” (OECD, 
2013:29). It forms the framework for further 
initiatives. SAGCOT arose as a priority 
investment area in the Southern Highlands 
and is dealt with in more detail below, since 
our research sites are located in the corridor. 
Grow Africa essentially seeks to integrate 
African government interventions with 
global GR interventions, with CAADP as the 
overarching structure. As such it has laid 
the groundwork for global PPPs through the 
G8’s NAFSN.11 TAFSIP is an expanded version 
of Tanzania’s previous Agricultural Sector 
Development Programme (ASDP) (ASDP, 
2006–13), incorporating issues of climate 
change, nutrition and a greater role for the 
private sector. The development of Phase 2 of 
the ASDP is considered to be critical for the 
implementation of TAFSIP as well as binding 
government to NAFSN commitments.
Tanzania is one of 10 countries10 that have 
entered into partnerships under NAFSN. The 
initiative was launched in Tanzania in 2012 as 
a partnership between the government, the 
G8 countries and 19 private organisations. 
A country level lead group consists of the 
government, USAID, the UK’s Department 
for International Development (DFID), the 
SAGCOT Centre, the Agricultural Council of 
Tanzania (ACT) (the private sector agricultural 
association) and the Agriculture Non-State 
Actors’ Forum (ANSAF) representing civil society 
(NAFSN, 2014).
USAID has played a constant role in the 
background in Tanzanian agriculture, focusing 
on large-scale agricultural projects and 
export production. USAID helped to establish 
Sokoine University of Agriculture (originally 
known as Morogoro Agricultural College) 
and played an important role in enforcing 
structural adjustment in the 1980s.13 Currently 
USAID is working through the Feed the Future 
Initiative (FtF) launched in May 2010 by the 
US government as the umbrella programme 
for the US Global Hunger and Food Security 
Initiative, itself a product of the June 2009 
L’Aquila Summit in Italy (Ho and Hanrahan, 
2011). The FtF Initiative is described as the 
United States’ public sector contribution to the 
NAFSN and Grow Africa partnerships. 
FtF has a presence in 12 African countries 
including Tanzania.14 USAID leads FtF but 
the initiative also draws on the resources 
of numerous other public bodies in the US, 
including the Departments of Agriculture, 
Commerce, State and Treasury, the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the US 
Geological Survey. Two major projects under 
FtF are currently underway in Morogoro: the 
Nafaka food grain value chain project, working 
on rice and maize; and TAPP which focuses 
on horticulture. Nafaka is a five year, US$30 
million project scheduled for completion in 
2016. Morogoro and Zanzibar are the two 
areas where Nafaka focuses on irrigated 
rice production. By developing smallholder 
irrigation schemes in these areas, FtF aims to 
increase the overall irrigated area in Tanzania 
by 15%, from 306,000 ha to 353,000 ha (FtF, 
2011). As of September 2014 more than 80,000 
farmers were applying ‘new technologies’ 
in rice and maize production. FtF’s activities 
in Tanzania are carried out by its main 
implementing partner, ACDI/VOCA,15  a non-
profit development organisation based in 
Washington, D.C, and nine other subcontracting 
partners, both local and international. Farm 
Input Promotions (FIPS) Africa and MVIWATA 
11.  https://www.growafrica.com
12.  Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania.
13.  http://www.usaid.gov/tanzania/history—accessed 16/01/15.
14.  Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia.
15.  http://www.acdivoca.org/
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are among Nafaka’s local subcontractors. 
International subcontractors include the 
International Fertiliser Development Centre 
(IFDC), Kimetrica and Catholic Relief Services.16 
Other local Nafaka partners include the 
SAGCOT Centre, Kilombero rice planters and 
SUA. 
The BRN initiative was launched in 2013 with 
agriculture as one of six national key result 
areas. Three value chains are prioritised: maize, 
rice and sugar, focusing on the promotion 
of 25 commercial farming deals; enhancing 
78 smallholder rice irrigation and marketing 
schemes using private service providers; 
and developing 275 collective warehouse-
based marketing schemes in rice and maize. 
Horticulture, oilseeds, potatoes and tea have 
been earmarked for future work. The initiative 
is also fast-tracking the land acquisition 
process, with 80,000 ha having been entrusted 
to the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) as of 
June 2014 for fielding expressions of interest 
from investors for land grants (NAFSN, 2014:5).
It is apparent from these initiatives over 
the past five years that there is a high level 
of coordination between the Tanzanian 
government, donors (especially including 
the G8 governments), and domestic and 
multinational private interests.17 There 
is a concerted effort focusing on the 
commercialisation of agriculture and the 
‘crowding in’ of investment in some key 
geographical areas, among which SAGCOT 
is a current priority. Nevertheless, the role of 
the farmer in each differs in so far as TAFSIP 
focuses on enhancing smallholder production, 
while Kilimo Kwanza and BRN emphasise 
economies of scale in production, with 
Tanzania’s farmers largely relegated to the 
role of contracted outgrowers. These inherent 
tensions have been attributed in part to 
wider political considerations, with the ruling 
party caught between trying to secure the 
rural vote through ‘farmer-friendly’ policies 
and securing the continuing loyalty of local 
elites, who stand to gain from the proposed 
large-scale investments under Kilimo Kwanza 
and BRN. This is further exacerbated by the 
policy ‘homes’: the TAFSIP coordination team 
is located in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
Security and Cooperatives (MAFC), while Kilimo 
Kwanza is housed within the Prime Minister’s 
Office and BRN falls under State House. It 
has been observed that due to these issues, 
TAFSIP has played second fiddle in Tanzania’s 
agricultural policy processes to both Kilimo 
Kwanza and BRN (Cooksey, 2013). Government 
spending on agriculture stands at around 6.8% 
of the total budget, which is below the CAADP 
target of 10% (NAFSN, 2014:6). Approximately 
25% of NAFSN funds committed had been 
disbursed by the end of 2013 (NAFSN, 2014:13–
15).
The Southern Agricultural Growth 
Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT)
SAGCOT is “an international public-private 
partnership (PPP) aiming to catalyse large 
volumes of private investment to increase 
productivity and develop commercial 
agriculture in the southern corridor” (OECD, 
2013:29). The corridor covers about one-third 
of the land area of Tanzania and is structured 
along the infrastructural spine connecting 
the port at Dar es Salaam with Mbeya and the 
border with Zambia at Tunduma (Figure 2).
The concept of agricultural corridors fits firmly 
into the GR model of agriculture, structured 
along transport routes to reach markets. 
The concept was first proposed at the UN 
General Assembly in 2008 by Norwegian 
fertiliser multinational Yara, before being 
subsequently presented (again by Yara) at the 
World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2009 and 
2010. Under the agricultural corridor approach, 
initiatives and investments are to be carried 
out in areas perceived to have high agronomic 
potential and an existing infrastructure 
‘backbone’. SAGCOT and the Beira Agricultural 
Growth Corridor in neighbouring Mozambique 
are being managed by UK consultancy 
Prorustica, together with its commercial 
agricultural and infrastructure development 
arms, AgDevCo and InfraCo.
16.  http://www.acdivoca.org/site/ID/tanzania-staples-value-chain-Nafaka
17.  Including Diageo, Monsanto, SABMiller, Syngenta, Unilever, United Phosphorus (UPL)/Advanta and Yara.
Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil  fertility in Tanzania    19
The SAGCOT investment blueprint was 
presented at the WEF in 2011 by then Tanzanian 
president Jakaya Kikwete. Comparing the 
SAGCOT area (which covers approximately 
one-third of Tanzania’s land area) with the 
Brazilian cerrado (which has seen huge 
increases in mono-cropped maize and soya 
production) and noting Tanzania’s proximity 
to lucrative Asian markets, the investment 
blueprint envisions putting 350,000 ha under 
production, the creation of 420,000 jobs and 
potential farming revenues of US$1.2 billion by 
2030. The government of Tanzania is expected 
to provide up to US$650 million in funding for 
the project’s first 20 years. This, together with 
a multi-donor US$50 million catalytic fund 
and proposed changes to tax, investment and 
intellectual property laws, are expected to 
stimulate US$2.1 billion in private investment 
over the same period (SAGCOT, 2011).
As of May 2014, SAGCOT’s partners included 
AGCO (a seller of tractors and other agricultural 
machinery), Bayer CropScience, Monsanto, 
Nestle, Olam (a large multinational grain 
trader), SABMiller, Unilever and Yara (SAGCOT, 
2014). As part of NAFSN, Monsanto has 
committed to strengthening agro-dealer 
networks and distributing high-yielding maize 
varieties in SAGCOT, including making 3–5 new 
maize varieties available, royalty-free, to seed 
companies (NAFSN, 2014:19). Yara, which has 
been involved in SAGCOT since its inception, is 
in the process of constructing a US$20 million 
fertiliser terminal at Dar es Salaam’s harbour as 
well as providing other support in the corridor 
(Paul and Steinbrecher, 2013). In the Morogoro 
region SAGCOT has been collaborating with 
the Kilombero Sugar (KSCL) and Mtibwa 
Sugar Estates. SAGCOT seeks to coordinate 
investments both for large-scale production, 
as in the case of sugar estates, as well as the 
integration of SSFs into commercial value 
chains. During our research we encountered 
mainly the latter since we partnered with 
MVIWATA, the SSF association.
Overview of AGRA in Tanzania
AGRA has identified Tanzania as one of 
four priority countries for its breadbasket 
strategy, with the Southern Highlands and 
Kilombero region as AGRA’s focus area, linked 
to SAGCOT (AGRA, 2012). The strategy focuses 
on “increasing yields and expanding cultivated 
land in fertile areas already endowed with a 
minimum of essential infrastructure” (AGRA, 
2010:5). Over 90% of AGRA’s initial investments 
in Tanzania are in the SAGCOT breadbasket area 
(AGRA, 2010:15). AGRA is part of a coordinated 
‘pincer’ movement (Figure 3) along what the 
World Bank (2009) refers to as the Guinea 
Savannah agro-ecological zone, a fertile swathe 
stretching from southern Mozambique to 
Mali. Tanzania a key part of this plan, including 
Dar es Salaam as a port of entry into the 
interior via SAGCOT. In 2010–2011 the Ministry 
Figure 3: The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
Source: http://www.sagcot.com/who-we-are/what-is-sagcot/ - accessed 15/01/15
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of Agriculture was granted US$640,000 to 
develop the breadbasket concept and to create 
‘investment grade’ proposals (Appendix 4, Table 
4C).
Figure 4: AGRA countries of operation and 
the occupation of the Guinea Savannah 
Source: AGRA, 2012
Total AGRA grants to Tanzania from 2007 
to 2012 amounted to US$54.6m, with the 
Soil Health Programme (SHP) allocated 
60.2% of this amount (Appendix 4). This is 
somewhat skewed by US$25m in grants for 
the establishment of the African Fertiliser 
and Agribusiness Partnership (AFAP), based 
in Tanzania but with an operational area 
in Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania (see 
ACB, 2014a). We cannot entirely exclude this 
grant from our analysis of AGRA’s activities 
in Tanzania because a significant portion of 
these resources were allocated to Tanzanian 
activities. The Programme for Africa’s Seed 
Systems (PASS) received 22.8% of total grants, 
and 42% of grants if we exclude AFAP. About 
17% of total grants went to markets, policy 
and the development of AGRA’s breadbasket 
strategy in Tanzania. In 2014 a new series 
of three year projects worth US$4.3m was 
announced but no details were given and none 
appeared on the AGRA website at the time of 
writing.18 More details are given on AGRA’s role 
in seed and soil health in the sections below. 
18.  http://agra-alliance.org/media-centre/news/us-4-million-in-new-grants-to-strengthen-tanzanias-agriculture-/
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Soil Fertility, Agro-
Ecology and Synthetic 
Fertiliser
Agro-ecological practices in the research 
sites
Participating farmers in our research sites were 
asked what agricultural practices they had 
carried out during the last season. The results 
(Table 7) suggest that farmers are engaged in 
a number of agro-ecological type practices, 
with potential for expansion of these and 
other techniques. The most common practices 
carried out were seed saving (80%), leaving 
crop residues (77%), intercropping and planting 
food trees (both 72%) and applying animal 
manure (62%). Maize, beans and pumpkin were 
the main crops intercropped (Appendix 3, Table 
3A). Sixty-five per cent of respondents were 
growing maize intercropped with legumes and 
the most commonly intercropped legumes 
were pigeon pea (30%), beans (27%) and cow 
pea (25%).
Some practices appear universal regardless 
of the gender of household head. Major 
practices for both men- and women-headed 
households included seed saving, leaving 
crop residues on the land, intercropping, fruit 
trees and perennial cultivation. Significantly 
more male- than female-headed households 
practiced mulching, permanent beds, leaving 
crop residues and intercropping, while more 
female-headed households engaged with small 
scale irrigation and crop rotation. However, 
the sample consisted of 22% female-headed 
households only, so the results should not 
be overanalysed. This is something we can 
monitor in the future.
A large number of respondents (62%) applied 
animal manure to their fields in the past 
season, with an average application of 394.5 
kg. According to Moses Temi, principal at the 
Mkindo training centre, “For rice, farmers 
are likely to get more productivity by using 
manure and increasing organic content.” The 
average cost of acquiring animal manure 
by those farmers who used it was Sh1,647 
[US$1.00] which is significantly lower than the 
average cost of synthetic fertiliser—see below). 
Table 7: Percentage of farmers implementing agricultural practices in the last season
Practice % yes % Female HH % male HH
Making and using compost 38.3 38.5 38.3
Nitrogen-fixing trees 26.7 30.8 25.5
Animal manures 61.7 61.5 61.7
Mulching 50 38.5 53.2
Permanent beds 36.7 23.1 40.4
No burning (leaving crop residues) 76.7 61.5 80.6
Small scale irrigation 53.3 61.5 51.1
Seed saving 80 76.9 80.9
Crop rotation 43.3 53.8 40.4
Intercropping in main field 71.7 64.3 72.3
Cultivation during all seasons 65 61.5 66
No till or minimum tillage 30 30.8 29.8
Planting food trees 71.7 69.2 72.3
Contour planting 40 46.2 38.3
Rainwater catchment 31.7 23.1 34
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Nevertheless, limited livestock ownership 
mitigates against the increased use of animal 
manure, and small farm sizes pose a challenge 
for integrated or mixed farming systems 
at the individual farm level. A third of the 
farmers surveyed sourced animal manure from 
neighbours or other farmers, including from 
Masai pastoralists in the surrounding areas, 
usually free of charge, with farmers having 
to cover transport costs only. This indicates 
another, cooperative, aspect to the relationship 
between villagers and the Masai, suggesting it 
is not only a confrontational relationship.
A majority of respondents (78%) reported 
owning poultry (mostly chickens with some 
ducks) and an average of approximately 16 
birds were owned by those who reported 
ownership (Table 8). Some farmers raised 
poultry as part of a group. One such group (26 
members) said they owned 150 chickens while 
another group (5 farmers) owned 50 chickens. 
Goats were the next most commonly held farm 
animal, with 23% of respondents indicating 
ownership of dairy and meat goats. A small 
number of farmers reported owning cattle 
(5%) and pigs (7%), with mean ownership at 4.5 
pigs and 3.3 head of cattle. Animal ownership 
is generally higher across the board for male-
headed households, with small but mixed 
variations in ownership between the sites in 
the two districts.
Farmers expressed interest in learning more 
about Conservation Agriculture (CA) which 
they mentioned by name without being 
prompted. One farmer indicated already having 
received training on CA from Simlesa. When 
offered a menu of courses by SAT, farmers 
overwhelmingly chose a course on No Tillage 
Agriculture, with 18 of 20 farmers selecting 
it as their first choice. CA is rooted in three 
inter-related practices: no till or minimum till; 
cover cropping/permanent ground cover; and 
intercropping, especially of maize and legumes. 
While these practices may be accompanied by 
the increased use of herbicides, this is not a 
necessary component of CA. It should be noted 
that SAT’s course offers an agro-ecological 
approach that does not include the use of 
herbicides. Farmer interest in CA suggests 
an interest in agro-ecological methods of 
enhancing soil fertility. ACB will identify ways 
of interacting with farmers and organisations 
to facilitate expansion of knowledge about 
these and related agro-ecological practices.
The introduction of synthetic fertilisers 
in Tanzania
Much of Africa has soils of low inherent 
fertility (Montpellier, 2014:5). Traditional 
farming practices such as ‘slash and burn’ 
(which allows bush to regrow after a few 
seasons of cultivation, followed by burning 
of the bush to produce nutrient-rich ashes, to 
remove weed seed and to produce a friable 
soil) and fallowing, are unable to keep up with 
increasing populations and are becoming less 
common without being replaced by more 
appropriate techniques (AGRA, 2007:5). These 
practices may exacerbate low nutrient content 
in soil. Add to these the long-term lack of 
attention to and investment in soils and the 
Table 8: Livestock ownership
Livestock 
type
% who 
own, in 
Mvomero
% who 
own, in 
Morogoro
% who 
own total
% female 
HH who 
own
% male 
HH who 
own
Mean # 
owned by 
those who 
own
Range
Poultry 90 66.7 78.3 61.5 83 16.4 2–60
Dairy goats 10 23.3 16.7 0 21.3 2.6 1–4
Meat goats 13.3 36.7 25 15.4 27.6 5.4 2–13
Pigs 13.3 — 6.7 0 8.5 4.5 3–6
Cattle 10 — 5 7.7 4.2 3.3 1–5
Rabbits - 6.7 3.3 7.7 2.1 3.5 3–4
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result is soil degradation that makes it more 
difficult for farmers to generate sufficient food 
for themselves and others.
Concepts such as sustainable land and water 
management (used by CAADP, 2009) and 
ISFM have emerged in response to declining 
soil fertility across the continent. These 
concepts recognise the importance of agro-
ecological soil conservation and nutrient 
enhancing practices including no till, cover 
cropping and permanent ground cover, 
agroforestry, increasing organic matter of the 
soil, intercropping with legumes for nitrogen 
fixation, and the use of animal manures for 
long term soil health. At the same time, their 
proponents suggest that on their own these 
techniques are insufficient to replace nutrients 
exported from farmers’ fields following 
harvest, and that these techniques must be 
used in conjunction with the increased use of 
synthetic fertilisers (e.g. AGRA, 2007). Very low 
fertiliser use in Africa compared with other 
parts of the world is identified as the major 
reason why African yields are stagnating and 
even declining, compared with growth in 
yields elsewhere. Approaches by AGRA and 
others seek to integrate soil health with water 
management (mostly through irrigation) 
and with the use of improved seed varieties. 
AGRA (2007:3) says that about half of yield 
improvements from the GR come from seed 
and the other half come from improved soils.
Farmers face numerous challenges in adopting 
these integrated approaches. For AGRA (2007) 
the three primary challenges are: the lack 
of physical and economic access to inputs 
(synthetic fertilisers and improved seeds); low 
levels of inputs and crop management skills; 
and poor market linkages that make it difficult 
for farmers to justify the additional expense 
of synthetic fertiliser purchases. AGRA’s SHP is 
designed to respond to these challenges (see 
below for more detail on the SHP in Tanzania). 
Farmers also mentioned difficulties concerning 
the lack of political and financial support, lack 
of technical knowledge on soil science, lack of 
information and data, and insecure land rights 
(Montpellier, 2014).
The use of synthetic fertilisers in Tanzania 
is low, estimated at 12% of farmers (6% for 
maize and 1% for rice) (IFDC, 2012:17), with 
an average of about 10% of farmers using 
synthetic fertiliser in Morogoro (IFDC, 2012:19). 
The average use nationally, from 2002 to 2009, 
was 5.5 kg/ha,19 which is far below the Abuja 
Declaration target of 50 kg/ha. There is some 
indication of a rise in 2009 and 2010, following 
the implementation of NAIVS, a scheme that 
provided subsidies to farmers for a package 
of fertilisers and improved seed, supplied 
through agro-dealers who then redeemed the 
vouchers at the National Microfinance Bank 
(NMB), which in turn received grants from the 
MAFC, World Bank, AGRA and other donors. As 
mentioned earlier, NAIVS was suspended in 
2014 following widespread corruption, and was 
replaced with a straightforward loan system 
through financial institutions and cooperatives.
Under NAIVS, vulnerable farmers were selected 
by the head of the local village council and 
given a voucher entitling them to a 50% 
discount for one 50 kg bag of urea or NPK 
fertiliser (one 50 kg bag costs approximately 
Sh70,000 [US$42.68]). NAIVS accounted for 
about 57% of fertiliser consumption in 2010 
(IFDC, 2012:30). Urea (high nitrogen content) 
and diammonium phosphate (DAP) accounted 
for about half of all fertiliser use in Tanzania 
in 2010, with NPK responsible for another 21% 
(IFDC, 2012:18). Over 75% of Tanzania’s fertiliser 
consumption takes place in four provinces in 
19.  World Bank, African Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/data—accessed 16/01/15.
Rice drying, Mvomero
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the southern highlands—Iringa, Mbeya, Rukwa 
and Ruvuma—and the adjacent provinces of 
Morogoro and Tabora (IFDC, 2012).
In the fertiliser trade Yara and Export Trading 
Group (ETG) are currently the two dominant 
players, accounting for approximately 61% of 
imports and exports between June 2012 and 
December 2013 (ACB, 2014b). Tanzania has large 
deposits of high grade rock phosphate east of 
Lake Manara, which is mined and processed by 
a local private company, Minjungu Mines and 
Fertiliser Ltd, for domestic and regional markets 
(AGRA and IIRR, 2014:53). However, the majority 
of fertiliser is imported, mainly from the Middle 
East and Commonwealth of Independent 
States, with smaller amounts from North Africa 
and China (IFDC, 2012:29). An estimated 311,000 
tons of additional fertilisers are required to 
meet TAFSIP targets for priority crops (IFDC, 
2012:31).
The major emphasis at present is on increasing 
fertiliser use through a combination of 
ramping up domestic production where 
possible (see Mtulya, 2015), and increasing 
imports and distribution through agro-dealer 
networks. AGRA plays an important role in 
supporting these efforts, as indicated below. As 
part of its NAFSN commitments, the Tanzanian 
government has agreed to review the time 
required to register imported agrochemicals 
and benchmark against international ‘best 
practices’. MAFC has initiated a process 
of reviewing legislation and has hired a 
consultant to work on a draft bill, but there are 
no tangible results to date (NAFSN, 2014:11).
AGRA’s Soil Health Programme (SHP) in 
Tanzania
Despite a seeming balance between synthetic 
fertiliser use and agro-ecological techniques 
for soil health in ISFM as a concept, in practice 
AGRA emphasises the synthetic fertiliser side 
of the equation. Around 55% of the value of 
grants in the SHP went to increasing access 
to synthetic fertiliser (Appendix 4, Table 4A). 
AFAP received US$25 million in grants, or 48% 
of total grants received in Tanzania. AFAP 
is initially focusing on AGRA’s breadbasket 
countries of Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania 
(with additional work in Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Nigeria and South Africa). It aims to 
double fertiliser consumption in these three 
countries and increase the number of fertiliser 
users by 15%, by extending credit guarantees 
and grants to actors in the fertiliser value 
chain (ACB, 2014a). In Tanzania AFAP has signed 
agribusiness partnership contracts with the 
Minjingu Fertiliser Company and International 
Raw Materials, a US based marketer and 
distributor of fertilisers with offices in 
Australia, Canada, Madagascar, Mauritius and 
Singapore. Finance is to be supplied via Stanbic 
Bank, part of South Africa’s Standard Bank 
Group, and the NMB, 35% of which is owned by 
the Dutch financial corporation Rabobank (ACB, 
2014a).
The US-based NGO named CNFA (formerly 
the Citizen’s Network for Foreign Affairs but 
now just CNFA) was granted US$1.5 million to 
develop an input distribution system. This is 
in addition to a grant of US$4.3 million that 
CNFA received to set up agro-dealer networks 
nationally under PASS, the seed programme. 
MAFC received a grant of US$967,000 to 
increase access to improved seed, fertiliser and 
markets in the southern highlands.
By contrast, grants to support maize-legume 
integration came to just 4% of the total 
grant value in Tanzania, and these projects 
also include provision of synthetic fertiliser 
as part of the intervention in line with ISFM. 
Another 4% went to capacity building on ISFM. 
According to Messrs Makenge and Rupindo at 
the Ilonga ARI,20 AGRA is training more than 
3,000 farmers, using demonstration plots and 
trials, to micro-dose phosphorus fertiliser in 
pigeon pea. They buy the fertiliser from agro-
dealers and have tested DAP, urea, minjingu 
grande and minjingu mazao. It started as a 
three-year project in 2009 but was renewed. 
It is being conducted in Arusha, Manyara and 
Kilimanjaro in the northern zone; and in Gairo 
and Kilosa in the eastern zone. AGRA sponsors 
a programme to reach other farmers, targeting 
farmers who have 3—10 acres of land under 
cultivation.
20. Interview, 24/10/14.
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In Mvomero there are currently two projects 
with which farmers in the survey are involved. 
These have direct links to GR initiatives, to 
increase the use of fertiliser. One of these is a 
new agricultural credit scheme being run in 
three rice irrigation schemes by Opportunity 
Tanzania (OT); the other is a project in which 
selected lead farmers run demonstration plots 
organised by Farm Input Promotion Services 
(FIPS) and Nafaka. FIPS had previously received 
a grant under the AGRA seed programme, PASS, 
in Tanzania for the dissemination of improved 
crop varieties and ISFM (Appendix 4, Table 4B).
Morogoro and Mvomero were among the 
sites selected for participation in an AGRA-
sponsored US$424,000 project led by SUA 
(Appendix 4, Table 4A), to scale up Minjingu 
Table 9: Fertiliser use in the research sites in the past year 
Type of 
fertiliser (# of 
users)
% yes
(N=60)
Mvomero 
% yes
(N=30)
Morogoro 
% yes
(N=30)
Mean kg 
applied by 
respondents 
using fertiliser
Mean 
amount paid 
by those 
using (Sh)
Mean paid 
US$
Urea (10) 15 26.7 3.3 60.7 60,611 36.96
NPK (1) 1.7 3.3 — 50 — —
DAP (6) 10 16.7 3.3 35 33,500 20.43
Minjingu 
Mazao (2)
3.3 6.7 — 75 105,000 64.02
YaraMila (3) 5 10 — 175 194,000 118.29
Compost (20) 35 6.7 63.3 334 — —
Animal 
manure (33)
56.7 36.7 76.7 394.5 1,674 1.02
Green Manure 
(2)
5 — 10 2 — —
Liquid organic 
fertiliser (2)
21.7 13.3 30 104.9 (litres) 5,538 3.38
Other 6.7 13.3 — — — —
Figure 5: Sources of fertiliser 
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phosphate utilisation in Tanzania. The project 
also involved Minjingu Phosphate Company, 
MAFC and the African Soil Health Consortium, 
and targeted 100 extension workers, 10,000 
smallholder farmers and agro-dealers (AGRA 
and IIRR, 2014:53–58). The project found that 
yields increased dramatically in some areas, 
but that in others the response to the fertiliser 
was minimal. This indicates that locally specific 
conditions must be considered when applying 
fertiliser. The research areas are also targeted 
for other interventions, especially building 
agro-dealer networks to distribute GR inputs to 
farmers.
As a result of these interventions, the use 
of synthetic fertiliser in the study areas 
was relatively high compared with national 
averages, with 37% of respondents using some 
kind of synthetic fertiliser in 2014 (Table 9). 
Urea was the most commonly used type, with 
15% of respondents using it in the past season, 
followed by DAP (10%) and YaraMila (5%). Those 
applying urea to their fields were using 60.7kg 
Pesticide use in the research area
In addition to the introduction of synthetic fertiliser, many farmers said they were given 
training or exposure to pesticides,21 including 2,4-D and Roundup. Pesticides have been largely 
absent from the GR discourse in Africa and were not intended as a focus of research by ACB. 
However, experiences on the ground indicated it would be remiss to completely overlook the 
pesticide issue. A list of some of the pesticides encountered, with some of the known health and 
environmental risks, is given below in Table 10. 
Table 10: Pesticides in use and known effects
Brand Company Active ingredient Effects
2,4-D 2,4-D Classified as ‘possibly carcinogenic’ by the World 
Health Organisation; linked with non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma, a cancer of the white blood cells; 
suspected endocrine disruptor (disrupts hormone 
activity); completely banned in Norway, Sweden 
and Denmark; heavily restricted in several 
provinces in Canada.
Actellic Syngenta Pirimiphos-Methyl Cholinesterase inhibitor: Exposure to 
cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticides has been 
linked to impaired neurological development 
in the fetus and in infants, chronic fatigue 
syndrome, and Parkinson’s disease; listed as a 
Bad Actor by the Pesticide Action Network (PAN); 
highly toxic to bees
Karate Syngenta Lambdacyhalothrin Suspected endocrine disruptor; ‘highly toxic 
when inhaled’; highly toxic for bees; suspected of 
influencing the hormone system 
Roundup Monsanto Glyphosate Disruption of hormonal systems and beneficial 
gut bacteria; damage to DNA; developmental 
and reproductive toxicity; birth defects
Solito Syngenta Pretilachlor & 
Pyribenzoxim
Source: ACB, 2012; Government of Tanzania; Pesticide Action Network
21.  The term pesticides as used here refers to insecticides, herbicides and fungicides.
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on average, again much higher than national 
averages. The average application of YaraMila, 
on the other hand, was 175 kg, but with only 
3 users no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
Despite these high comparative figures, there 
is still a contrast with the results from earlier 
fieldwork carried out in Malawi, where, for 
example, urea topdressing was used by 81% of 
respondents, and the average amount applied 
by all users of synthetic fertilisers was 341.5kg.
There is a noticeable difference in fertiliser 
between the two research sites in Morogoro 
and Mvomero. Only one farmer in the 
Morogoro site was using urea or DAP and there 
was no reported usage of NPK, Minjingu mazao 
or YaraMila. This is not surprising, given that 
the Morogoro farmers are involved with SAT’s 
work on organic agriculture. There is also a big 
difference in fertiliser use by crop. Individual 
farmers as well as those participating in FGDs 
said they did not need to use fertiliser as their 
soils were fertile enough without it. Rice is a 
different story and the standard application 
rate is 150 kg per acre (50 kg of either urea or 
DAP as basal and another 100 kg of urea for top 
dressing).
The average spend on synthetic fertilisers 
ranged from Sh33,500 [US$20.43] for DAP to 
Sh194,000 [US$118.29] for YaraMila, with a 
Sh60,611 [US$36.96] average spend on urea, 
the most commonly applied fertiliser. Just over 
half (51%) of respondents cited high fertiliser 
prices as a serious problem, though it would be 
premature to conclude that high prices are the 
cause of low adoption. In Malawi, 89 out of 90 
farmers surveyed said high fertiliser price was a 
serious problem, yet 81% also reported applying 
urea in the previous season, and another 68% 
reported using NPK.
The majority of fertiliser used was purchased 
from agro-dealers; this accounted for all the 
NPK and Minjingu mazao, 67% for urea, 50% 
for DAP and 33% for YaraMila (Figure 4). Only 4 
respondents (7%) in the survey had accessed 
fertilisers through NAIVS in the past season. 
In one case, a farmer explained how they had 
to re-sell the bag obtained using a voucher, 
as they could not afford to purchase a second 
bag for the full retail price. Another farmer 
shared urea and DAP with a neighbour who 
had received a voucher in the past season. As 
in Malawi, there was a feeling among those to 
whom we spoke that the fertiliser subsidies 
were problematic: the targeted vouchers did 
not necessarily reach those most in need, and 
late deliveries were a commonly reported 
problem.
Case study: Farm Input Promotions 
Africa Limited (FIPS) and village-based 
agricultural advisors (VBAAs)
Farm Input Promotions Africa (FIPS) is a Kenyan 
not-for-profit organisation. It has its roots 
in an earlier NGO project initiated in 1990 
called the Sustainable Community Orientated 
Development Programme (SCODP), which 
provided small quantities of fertiliser and 
seed with which farmers could experiment 
and select for further use if they chose. This 
is seen as a low-risk means of assessing new 
technologies (Blackie and Albright, 2005). 
FIPS was established out of SCODP in 2003, to 
expand this model to include other agricultural 
inputs (seed and herbicides) with funding from 
Rockefeller Foundation, DFID (as part of its Crop 
Protection Programme) and later USAID and 
AGRA (Partnership Africa, n.d.). FIPS Africa had 
received an earlier AGRA grant (2008–2010) to 
support its work in Kenya. 
FIPS received a US$1.9 million grant from AGRA 
to work in Tanzania and Mozambique over the 
period 2012 to 2015 (Appendix 4, Table 4A). Its 
partners include DFID, USAID, Norad, Monsanto, 
Yara, Dow, Pioneer and CNFA. FIPS is also a local 
subcontractor of the Nafaka programme, in 
Rice paddies, Dihombo irrigation scheme, Mvomero
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its fourth year. FIPS is the implementing agent 
for the Small Input Package Demonstration 
component of the Tanzania Agricultural 
Partnership (TAP) which arises in turn from the 
ASDP. The other two TAP components are the 
AGRA-sponsored CNFA agro-dealer programme, 
and the input finance pilot implemented 
by the NMB (MAFC and ACT, 2007). Private 
sector fertiliser companies include ARM from 
Kenya and Minjingu Mines and Fertiliser Ltd in 
Tanzania. Chapa Meli, a Yara subsidiary,22 is also 
involved in the partnership.
Extension methodologies are based on 
farmer experimentation and the selection of 
technologies, through farmer field schools and 
demonstrations with farmers, and work with 
national, regional and district extension staff 
(Blackie and Albright, 2005). FIPS has operated 
in Mvomero to train farmers as village-based 
agricultural advisors (VBAAs), to provide 
outreach and extension to farmer networks 
and to disseminate improved seeds and 
fertiliser. The VBAAs organise demonstration 
plots in their respective villages. VBAAs are 
nominated by existing village farmer groups, 
which typically comprise 10–30 farmers and 
have their own constitution. MVIWATA and 
Nafaka play a key role in establishing village 
based groups which historically existed in 
small numbers but have mushroomed since 
the interventions by AGRA, FIPS, MVIWATA and 
Nafaka. 
Once a VBAA has been nominated he or she 
receives training from FIPS and Nafaka on 
a variety of agronomic practices (such as 
land preparation), the use of organic and 
synthetic fertilisers and using and selecting 
improved seeds. VBAAs then establish and 
maintain demonstration plots on land they 
own or have rented, and are given a variety of 
different improved seeds and fertilisers to test. 
In a FGD, VBAAs revealed that the fertilisers 
given by FIPS were from Yara (DAP, urea and 
YaraMila) and Minjingu mazao, a local product. 
Different types of fertiliser are provided to 
demonstration plots to allow for comparisons. 
Each demonstration plot has one type of 
fertiliser on show, but there are also control 
plots.
Most of the seed is hybrid and FIPS buys from 
the research institutes (Dakawa, Katrin, Ilonga) 
and seed companies (ASA and Tanseed, as well 
as Pioneer Hi-Bred hybrid maize PHB 30D79, 
PHB 3253 via Bytrade Tanzania Ltd as part of 
FIPS packages in southern Tanzania) (Pioneer 
and FIPS, 2010). FIPS is looking for farms to 
produce Quality Declared Seed (QDS) in the 
coming season. Farmers rate the seed quality 
as good, although there are some challenges 
of weevil damage in maize seed (FGD, 21/10/14). 
As part of the programme VBAAs also receive 
training in the use of pesticides, which some 
VBAAs have started using as a result, including 
Monsanto’s Roundup, 2,4-D, Solito and Carat 
(See Box Pesticide use in the research area).
The land is owned by the VBAAs as farmers and 
the produce is owned by the VBAA. Essentially 
the aim is to show farmers the results and 
encourage them to purchase inputs if they 
see something they like. So it builds a market 
for the fertiliser companies and while it offers 
farmers a choice of technologies, this choice 
itself is narrowed into the GR toolkit. It is not 
clear what kind of environmental monitoring 
takes place. Some farmers said initial soil 
tests done were conducted to tailor the type 
of fertiliser, but others indicated that no soil 
tests had been done. In irrigated schemes, 
negative environmental impacts may be felt 
downstream of fertiliser use and there is no 
evidence that this is being monitored. Since the 
better-off farmers tend to occupy the upstream 
plots, this may have longer-term implications 
for the less well-off farmers downstream.
The overall goal of the FIPS programme 
is to create a class of full-time, profitable 
agro-dealers from the VBAAs with whom 
it works, which will also complement other 
GR initiatives already underway in the area. 
The aim is to make the venture financially 
sustainable after the exit of donors (Hall, 
et al., 2010). For example, one VBAA said he 
had already organised his farmers group to 
approach OT for a (Yara) fertiliser loan this 
season. OT had paid the VBAA an allowance for 
doing this. According to the VBAAs, adoption 
rates for the technologies and practices have 
been generally high, with between 25 and 
22.  http://www.yara.com/products_services/fertilisers/index.aspx
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30 farmers in Mkindo adopting the package. 
Some practices, such as new planting and 
spacing techniques, have been taken up more 
rapidly than others. Fertiliser and pesticide 
adoption is currently being held in check by 
high prices; hence the linkages between FIPS’ 
demonstration plots and the micro-finance 
being offered by OT, with MVIWATA and Nafaka 
acting as intermediaries. Farmers reported 
demonstration plots applying the equivalent of 
100 kg per ha of synthetic fertiliser for rice and 
maize (Sh140,000 [US$85.37] at the going rate). 
No soil testing was done prior to setting up the 
demonstration plots.
Farmers to whom we spoke reacted positively 
to these GR interventions. While a number of 
farmers indicated they did not need to use 
synthetic fertilisers because the soils are fertile, 
others—especially farmers who are oriented 
towards producing surpluses for markets—do 
want increased access to synthetic fertilisers. 
Farmers participating in the programme with 
Nafaka and OT, who provided production 
loans for a package including improved rice 
seed and synthetic fertilisers, were happy 
with the intervention. An important part of 
the approach is to combine input provision 
with market access. A key challenge for GR 
interventions remains the high cost of inputs, 
especially where farmers cannot find profitable 
markets for additional output. Participating 
farmers indicated that while they were able 
to apply some of the techniques, they lack 
resources to apply others, in particular fertiliser 
and pesticides. Farmers were advised to use 50 
kg/ha of fertiliser but could not afford to do 
so (Farmer FGD, 21/10/14). This is why the GR 
emphasises reduction of the price of synthetic 
fertiliser especially—which primarily means 
improving supply chain efficiencies—and 
boosting demand through input subsidies.
Fertiliser application rates in the demonstration 
plots being organised through FIPS are very 
high. Although farmers may be swayed into 
adopting synthetic fertiliser from what they 
see, will they realistically be able to apply these 
ideal doses? Further, we saw little evidence of 
alternative soil health methodologies being 
compared side-by-side with synthetic fertiliser, 
though some farmers we spoke to did express 
an interest in this.
Farmers received training on Good Agricultural 
Practice (GAP) which is interpreted to include 
timely land preparation, use of improved seed, 
correct spacing of plants, timely weeding and 
harvesting, regular field visits to check on the 
development of crops, post-harvest storage, 
the use of water berms and many others (VBAA 
FGD, 21/10/14). GAP from a GR perspective 
often incorporates use of synthetic fertilisers 
and pesticides while from an agro-ecological 
perspective these would not be included. There 
are also various opinions regarding tilling, with 
some arguing that GAP involves the use of 
tractors and hand hoes, with tilling to a depth 
of 15–16 cm while others argue for a no till or 
minimum till approach, to reduce disturbance 
of the soil structure. This really indicates that 
GAP can be interpreted in widely divergent 
ways. Accordingly, we must look for the specific 
content of what is being proposed, rather than 
just accepting that if someone mentions GAP 
this automatically means ecologically and 
socially sustainable methods of production.
We can acknowledge a participatory element 
in these interventions. Nowhere did we get 
the sense that farmers were being compelled 
to adopt the technologies on offer. We can 
even say that some of the demonstration plots 
were quite impressive, with farmers owning 
the plots and the process and being very clear 
about what the purpose of the demonstration 
was. The demonstrations are not only about 
increasing GR inputs; for example, we also 
came across demonstrations that were testing 
variations in spacing for rice. However, even 
SAT demo plot, Morogoro
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these demonstrations of GAP incorporate 
the use of synthetic fertilisers as a matter 
of course. We did not see demonstrations 
comparing production using synthetic fertiliser 
with those using organic sources of fertility. 
It is not clear that the longer-term impacts of 
increased use of GR inputs on biodiversity, soil 
life, water systems and social equality are well 
understood, since they are longer-term and it 
is quite possible to overlook the links between 
new technologies and their socio-ecological 
consequences. These aspects of the GR must 
be monitored closely, together with farmers, 
so that the connection between growing 
landlessness, the necessity of precarious labour, 
ecological damage and the acceptance of 
these technologies is apparent. This requires 
ongoing, longitudinal studies, especially since 
the introduction of these inputs is still at an 
early stage.
Agro-ecological methods will need to take into 
account limited access to sufficient animal 
manure and crop residues for effective nutrient 
replenishment. Agro-ecological approaches 
to soil health are knowledge intensive and 
it will be necessary to work closely with 
research institutes and others to develop 
contextually appropriate means of improving 
soils over time, together with farmers and their 
organisations.
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Seed
This section starts with an overview of the 
seed sector structure and the legal and policy 
framework in Tanzania, including the role of 
seed R&D and in particular the changing roles 
of the public and private sectors. It then looks 
at AGRA’s seed interventions in Tanzania and in 
the research area, including the links between 
AGRA and other GR seed interventions in 
the research area, particularly by USAID/FtF/
Nafaka. We then turn to a consideration of 
the seed being used by farmers in our survey, 
including main types, quality, price and access. 
Appendix 5 provides more detail on various 
seed varieties in common use together 
with their pros and cons. We include a case 
study of Tanseed International, a domestic 
commercial seed company privatised from 
the state monopoly company that operated 
before liberalisation, and an AGRA grantee and 
partner. The section ends with a reflection on 
key issues, policy recommendations and further 
areas for research.
Background to the commercial seed 
sector
Tanzania did not have a commercial seed sector 
until the 1970s when USAID provided support 
to establish a project for commercial seed 
production. This included research into new 
varieties, the establishment of seed farms, the 
formation of Tanzania National Seed Company 
(Tanseed) as a state-owned enterprise, and 
the launch of the Tanzania Official Seed 
Certification Agency (TOSCA) with three 
laboratories.23
Improved maize was introduced into Tanzania 
through the National Maize Research 
Programme (NMRP) in 1974, a partnership 
between the Tanzanian government and 
USAID. We can understand USAID’s role here 
as part of the US objectives during the ‘second 
food regime’—building national agricultural 
research systems (NARS) that replicate the 
US model (Friedmann, 1993), and linking 
them to the CGIAR institutional network. The 
Rockefeller Foundation established the CGIAR 
network and was also a co-founder of AGRA 
with the Gates Foundation. Therefore AGRA 
is an update of the older strategy and the 
formative involvement of USAID at the start, as 
well as its present involvement, highlights the 
philanthropic-business-state connections, in 
this case based in the US. There has been some 
Atlantic partnership support more recently, 
e.g. from DFID in the UK and from AGRA as an 
extension of US foreign policy.
From 1976 the NMRP released a number of 
improved OPV varieties: Tuxpeno (released 
1976); Kitimo, Kilima and Staha (1983); TMV1 
and TMV2 (1987); the maize streak virus (MSV) 
resistant varieties, Kilima, UCA, Kito and 
Katumani (1994); as well as two hybrids for the 
highlands (H6302 and H614) in 1977–1978 and 
another two hybrids (CH-1 and CH-3) in 1992 
(Kaliba, et al., 2000; Lyimo et al., 2014). TXD, the 
favoured improved rice variety, was developed 
through public sector R&D in the early 1980s 
using local and IRRI germplasm, although it 
was officially released only in 2010.
Deregulation and liberalisation of seed 
production and distribution in Tanzania 
consisted of policy and legislative change, 
especially in plant variety protection (PVP). 
This opened the door to private sector 
involvement, the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises and the establishment of new 
quasi-government agencies. These agencies 
facilitated private sector entry, public sector 
input subsidies to support the development 
of a commercial seed market, and a role for 
SSFs through the QDS system. These are 
considered in turn before we scrutinise AGRA’s 
interventions and the picture on the ground.
As part of the processes of deregulation, the 
Tanzanian government launched the National 
Seed Industry Development Programme in 
1989, with the aim of shifting from a state-
controlled to a private sector economy. Private 
seed companies were allowed to operate in the 
country, and the Plant Protection Act (1997), 
the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act (2003) and the 
23.  “Tanzania seed sector status”—http://q.datakultur.se/~svalofco/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Tanzania-Seed-
Sector-Status-Paper.pdf—accessed 5 December 2014.
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Seed Act (2003) were passed to ‘modernise’ 
the seed system. TOSCA was transformed from 
an agency into an institute, becoming the 
Tanzania Official Seed Certification Institute 
(TOSCI), and was empowered to licence private 
laboratories and encourage international 
collaboration on plant breeding.24
Private sector involvement and privatisation
Following liberalisation and structural 
adjustment, from 1993 multinational seed 
companies entered the market, targeting 
profitable seed (mainly maize hybrid and 
some rice), mostly based on imported seed 
and germplasm. Private companies released 
17 hybrid maize varieties from then until 
2000, notably Pannar 7, Cargill 4, Ciba-Geigy 2, 
Pioneer 2, DeKalb 1, and Kenya Seed 1 (Kaliba, 
et al., 2000:36–37; Lyimo et al., 2014:646–647). 
Pannar is now owned by Pioneer Hi-Bred (a 
subsidiary of Du Pont), Cargill Seed and DeKalb 
are now owned by Monsanto and Ciba-
Geigy is now owned by Syngenta, indicating 
an extensive multinational presence and 
concentration in the hybrid maize seed market 
in Tanzania. 
Tanseed was privatised in 2002. According 
to Dr Mizambwa, the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of ASA (interview, 11/02/14), the enforced 
privatisation of Tanseed as part of structural 
adjustment led to a collapse of the seed 
sector for most crops. The private sector focus 
on maize hybrids is a typical story in Africa, 
where MNCs concentrate their resources and 
attention on a few crops with a high potential 
for profit. Given that the private sector 
becomes the primary source of investment as 
states undergo funding cuts and structural 
adjustment, R&D in the so-called ‘orphan’ crops 
(i.e. those crops considered not to have high 
potential for private profit) declines. Mizambwa 
says MNCs produce only for national markets 
where they can sell a uniform product. The 
result is that niche markets of indigenous and 
locally adapted seed are not served. However, 
in a clear example of the contradictions of the 
corporatisation of state entities, Dr Mizambwa 
says that ASA “needs a return on investment 
to invest, and therefore will target the more 
profitable crops”. So, although its mandate is to 
expand investment beyond the most profitable 
crops, its structural position as a commercial 
enterprise forces it to pursue a path similar to 
that taken by other private entities.
According to MAFC, certified maize seed 
availability in 2012/13 had almost reached the 
target. Other crops were far behind (e.g. rice 
8% and beans 3% of target) (Saidia and Mkiga, 
2014:4). Most commercial seed is imported. 
Since 2007 certified seed, as a share of total 
seed used, rose from less than 10% to over a 
quarter in 2013/14 (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014). 
From 2003 to 2010 the private sector accounted 
for 84% to 99% of certified seed of all varieties 
produced in Tanzania. This dropped to below 
80% in 2010 (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014:7–8) 
although the reasons for this are not known. 
In 2013 there were 27 active seed companies 
operating in Tanzania to produce or import 
seeds, although altogether there were 65 
registered seed companies (40 local, 25 
foreign) (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014:6). Imports 
are mainly from the US, Uganda, Zambia, 
Malawi, Kenya, South Africa and the United 
Arab Emirates (USAID 2013:19). Most of the 
local companies are headquartered in Arusha, 
while Tanseed and ASA are based in Morogoro. 
Major multinational seed companies currently 
operating in Tanzania include Monsanto 
(US), Pannar (Pioneer Hi-Bred, US), Seed Co 
(Zimbabwe), East Africa Seed Co (Kenya), Kibo, 
Brac, Bytrade and Kisimbaguru Estates (Saidia 
and Mkiga, 2014:7). Seed Co was recently 
acquired by Groupe Limagraine with portions 
going to Monsanto (AFSA, 2014). The major 
maize seed producers are Pannar (28% of the 
certified seed market in 2010/11), SeedCo (26%), 
Suba Agro (a local company, 9%), Kibo Seed 
(7%), Highland Seed and Monsanto (6% each) 
(Saidia and Mkiga, 2014:8).
After 2012 the government started a 
programme to license basic or foundation 
seed to private seed companies to produce 
basic and certified seed (Saidia and Mkiga, 
2014). Licensing may be on an exclusive basis. 
According to NAFSN (2014:11) the system to 
authorise qualified private seed companies 
24.  “Tanzania seed sector status”, op cit.
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to produce basic (foundation) seed from 
publicly bred varieties is in place and has been 
operational since January 2013. Two private 
companies—Highland Seed Growers and 
Kipato Seed Company (the latter an AGRA 
grantee)—have been licensed to produce 
basic seeds for maize and sesame in 2013. 
However, it is unclear if the companies have 
made use of the licences. Eighty per cent of 
government-released varieties were made 
available to private sector seed companies but 
the associated conditions and requirements 
were stringent and, according to NAFSN, very 
few companies have taken up the offer to date. 
USAID (2013) indicates ongoing institutional 
weaknesses in seed certification and variety 
release procedures, in particular, and also in 
data management as obstacles to greater 
private sector involvement within Tanzania.
Public sector facilitation of private sector 
entry – ASA, the ARIs and NAIVS
The ASA was established as a semi-
autonomous entity under MAFC in 2006 to 
produce and sell high quality basic seed to 
private companies to multiply and sell on to 
farmers. ASA took over the responsibilities 
previously performed by the Ministry’s Seed 
Unit (ASA, 2014). ASA is the only government 
agency involved in commercial seed 
production. Its main objectives are to support 
the development of a commercial seed sector 
in Tanzania, and to facilitate investment in seed 
beyond hybrid maize, with a mandate to work 
in partnership with the private sector through 
PPPs. According to Mr Kunde, ASA’s Production 
Manager (interview 23/10/2014), ASA can 
enter into agreements with other companies 
to develop seed. He says the law now is that 
private companies can produce basic seed from 
foundation seed from research stations, on the 
basis of a written expression of interest—but 
they have not received any so far. According 
to USAID (2013) weak licensing regulations 
and competition from ASA remain obstacles 
to private sector involvement. Mr Kunde says 
the private sector will eventually take up 
the challenge because there is a large gap 
between supply and demand. ASA has set aside 
a budget to send private sector enterprises 
to network internationally (see a similar role 
played by AGRA with Tanseed—Box). In 2013/14 
ASA worked with two local companies, Suba 
Agro and Meru Agro Tour and Consultancy 
(both AGRA grantees, Appendix 4, Table 4B), to 
produce certified maize seed on one of ASA’s 
farms (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014:9). The law is 
now opening up for private companies to 
produce basic seed from their own foundation 
seed. Most companies are looking at maize, 
sunflower and legumes. According to Mr 
Kunde, ASA is considering acquiring its own 
breeding capacity. They will have more power 
to shape the breeding agenda when they have 
their own internal system, but currently ASA 
buys from available released varieties. 
ASA has farms in Arusha, Kigoma, Msimba and 
Kilangali, seed farms in Morogoro, Dabaga farm 
in Iringa (now leased to the Clinton Foundation, 
an AGRA grant recipient in Malawi), Mwele 
farm in Tanga and two in Kilosa. The 4,000 ha 
Mbozi farm in Mbeya is earmarked for private 
sector use to produce seed, paying a small 
land rent to government. Vegetable seed is 
multiplied at Tengeru and Dabaga (Kunde 
interview 23/10/2014; Saidia and Mkiga, 2014). 
Research stations are strategically placed in 
agro-ecological zones, with personnel tasked 
to develop new seed varieties. ASA buys 
foundation seed from the research stations. 
They then produce basic seed and some 
certified seed for maize, paddy, sorghum, 
sunflower, pigeon pea, cow pea, beans, wheat 
and some vegetables (tomato, onion, eggplant). 
They sell the basic seed to companies to 
produce seed for farmers.
ASA is open to SSF interaction, including 
contracting of certified seed production, on 
a commercial basis. Size is a limit to seed 
production on a small scale—the seeds must 
Monsanto WEMA experimental plot, Ilonga ARI.
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be able to enter into diverse ecologies, because 
on a small scale seeds will cross-fertilise 
with neighbouring species in the specific 
socio-ecological context. This is a problem for 
commercial, certified seed production.
Private companies may brand the seed they 
have multiplied and sell it for a profit. The 
essence of this arrangement is that the private 
sector provides bulking up capacity that is in 
short supply, and their brand offers a quality 
guarantee. In theory, if they do not produce 
good quality, farmers as consumers will reject 
their brand and acquire seed elsewhere. 
However, this depends crucially on the ready 
availability of alternative seed varieties. This 
may become a problem after many years of 
R&D focusing on a few uniform varieties only, 
thereby limiting farmers’ choice and forcing 
them to use available seed even if this is not 
of good quality. This argument is usually used 
against farmers own seed varieties, but can 
apply equally to poor quality certified seed. 
A big difference is that poor quality farmer 
varieties are usually restricted to local areas 
whereas poor quality certified seed may be 
distributed nationally, thereby threatening 
agricultural biodiversity.
According to Andrew Kunde, the main 
challenges to a market in improved seed are 
the lack of awareness of the available seed 
and the costs of seed. Most SSFs rely on rain-
fed agriculture so investments in seed may be 
lost and farmers will not be willing to invest 
again. ASA currently supplies less than 20% of 
certified seed, and the rest is from the private 
sector (mostly imports). Mr Kunde identifies 
markets for produce as another key issue. 
Once a market is secured, farmers will adopt 
new seed varieties. ASA’s approach is to work 
throughout value chains, not just with farmers 
(see similarities with Tanseed in the case 
study). The focus is on paddy and sunflower. 
Rice millers want a standardised brand. ASA 
hosts farmer field days with farmers and 
millers, conducts field trials and the selection 
of varieties, and secures markets. In this way 
farmers benefit, says Mr Kunde, and so do 
seed producers and millers. ASA deals with 
officially released seed only, tested for disease 
resistance, adaptability, yield, etc. It must start 
from the breeding ground. ASA has no special 
agreement or partnership with Nafaka and 
others, just a “normal business arrangement”.
Liberalisation has also forced the research 
stations to orient their work towards 
partnerships with the private sector, like ASA. 
Although they do receive core funds from 
the public purse, researchers and institutes 
must supplement these funds with private 
sector funding to make ends meet. The private 
sector will sponsor only those activities that 
further their private interests. According to Mr 
Okhunda, Dakawa provides basic seed like ASA 
does, but is also contracted to produce seed 
for private companies (e.g. ASA and Tanseed, 
for TXD306). The same goes for other research 
stations such as Ilonga. Okhunda says “PPPs 
are good. We can do the research and share 
the costs.” Breeders do research on behalf of 
donors, whether public or private, and funds 
cover all or part of the costs of travel, logistics, 
irrigation and fertiliser. At Ilonga we saw an 
example of private funding in the form of a 
Monsanto water efficient maize trial under 
irrigation, where the infrastructure was 
sectioned off behind a fence. The infrastructure 
is not available for wider use by others at the 
research station. According to Okhunda, the 
major constraint on developing varieties is lack 
of funds. He says, “The contribution from the 
private sector on R&D is low, so far. They want 
cheap things. The private sector want to make 
money. They are not ready to take the risks. But 
I would like the private sector to get involved.”
NAIVS was established in 2009 to boost the 
market in certified seed through public sector 
subsidisation. The scheme constituted between 
37% and 44% of the annual MAFC budget 
between 2009 and 2012. The main target crops 
are hybrid and improved OPV maize and rice. 
In this system, the government distributes 
vouchers that subsidise about half the price 
of a package of improved seeds and fertilisers, 
which farmers obtain with the vouchers from 
private dealers. Households that cultivate 
approximately one hectare of maize and/or 
rice, and can afford the top-up payment for the 
input package, are eligible for participation. 
In essence this means better-off farmers are 
targeted, although female-headed households 
and those households that have not used 
improved seeds and fertilisers for target crops 
in the past five years are given first priority 
(Saidia and Mkiga, 2014). It is reasonable to 
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view NAIVS as a subsidy for market creation for 
multinational seed and fertiliser companies. 
While some farmers do benefit, this is not 
evenly spread and these scarce public resources 
might be channelled more equitably, through 
R&D and farmer support focusing on practices 
carried out by a wider layer of producers, 
especially agro-ecological techniques that 
have additional long-term ecological benefits. 
We did not encounter widespread access to 
the NAIVS in our research sites, even though 
Morogoro and Mvomero are both target areas.
An overview of the certification process
Mr Okhunda at Dakawa Research Station uses 
rice as an example of the formal process of 
variety selection, approval and certification. 
It starts with on-station research, where the 
breeder selects the variety, for use only at 
the research station. This takes a few years 
of testing for standards. The second stage 
is multi-location trials for other conditions 
and agro-ecological systems, which take a 
minimum of two years. The breeder conducts 
these trials. Participatory variety selection (PVS) 
is part of the process and other stakeholders 
are involved. The objective is to test whether 
the variety performs as indicated. At this stage 
the seed is still under the breeder’s custody. It 
must be tested successfully in at least three of 
Tanzania’s seven agro-ecological zones or any 
other country which is in agreement or has 
harmonised its seeds policy and legislations 
with Tanzania. The third stage is the National 
Performance Trial (NPT) with independent 
testing by TOSCI for distinct, uniform, stable 
(DUS) compliance. This stage takes one year/
one season. If successful, the variety can then 
be registered and officially released. This 
covers breeders seed and foundation seed. The 
breeder maintains the germplasm. Breeders 
are not allowed to release unless the variety is 
officially recognised. There are normally two 
DUS tests which lengthen the variety release 
process, but recommendations on the review 
of the Seed Act is that there should be only 
one, to shorten the process. The Tropical Pest 
Research Institute (TPRI, Arusha) grants permits 
for imported varieties in collaboration with 
the Ministry of Agriculture on phytosanitary 
and import control issues. The TPRI goes to the 
research centres for evaluation.
What can we make of the certification process 
and criteria? We can recognise the value of 
rigorous quality controls, especially when 
farmers are actively involved in shaping the 
processes, but there are fundamental problems 
with the DUS criteria in particular. The first 
thing is that the precise specification of points 
of difference in two seed varieties (distinct) 
is of interest mainly to those who want to 
benefit from ownership, and therefore have to 
specify a distinct product over which they have 
claim. That one variety is distinct from another 
may be less important to a farmer than that 
it performs as stated, and that it can adapt to 
the local ecological context. The requirement 
for uniformity actually runs counter to the 
importance of contextual diversity, which 
certainly is an underlying principle of food 
sovereignty and agro-ecological production. 
Small-scale farmers who recycle seed, 
including local varieties that have never been 
commercialised (but which may contain traits 
that are of interest to private companies), 
are impeded because their varieties are not 
recognised by the official system. Small-scale 
farmers will struggle to meet the prohibitive 
costs involved in the processes of developing 
or breeding a variety to meet formal DUS 
standards. The emphasis on commercialisation 
of public sector varieties places small-scale, 
resource-poor farmers at a disadvantage when 
seeking access to public sector germplasm, 
because they will find it more difficult to 
commercialise if they first must go through 
the full certification process. Farmers may not 
be interested in selling seed at a national level 
but will still have to go through multi-location 
trials as part of the certification process. This is 
where the QDS system comes in.
Quality Declared Seed (QDS)
Within the context of a strong orientation 
towards the private sector, the QDS system is 
something of an outlier, because it actually 
facilitates farmer involvement in the seed 
sector without necessarily forcing farmers 
into direct competition with MNCs. QDS was 
adopted in Tanzania based on FAO’s 2000 
framework and is governed by the 2003 Seed 
Act, along with the rules, regulations and 
procedures of 2007 and the Guidelines for 
Control for Quality Declared Seed Production of 
2007. It is a seed system which involves farmers 
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in the production and supply of good quality 
seeds in their own areas under the supervision 
of trained and authorised inspectors at district 
level. QDS allows local production and sales of 
seed with the focus on non-commercial crops 
and relatively light regulation. A registered QDS 
producer normally purchases basic seed from 
ASA and produces certified seed grade one (C1), 
known as QDS1, which can be distributed to 
other smallholder farmers within the ward. The 
QDS1 can be recycled by the same registered 
farmer to produce certified seed grade two 
(C2), known as QDS2, after inspection and 
conformity to regulations by TOSCI. Inspections 
are limited to 10% of the total amount of 
seed to reduce costs, assuming that the QDS 
farmer has already conducted 90% inspection 
of the seeds, according to an official from 
the Ministry. QDS produces relatively small 
amounts of maize, paddy, beans and sorghum 
seed (e.g. 112 tons of maize seed compared 
with 19,000 tons of certified maize seed in 
2011/12) (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014). Despite 
the low amounts, the QDS process engages 
farmers in the technicalities of seed production 
(thus building capacity), and makes available a 
wider pool of quality seed in local areas (thus 
improving access to better quality seed).
We encountered different opinions on QDS. 
In FGDs farmers indicated they did not know 
of anyone producing seed through the QDS 
system. Farmers are recycling seed, sometimes 
for local sale, and being involved in certified 
seed production was not top of their agenda. 
However, farmers did express interest in 
learning more about seed production and 
said they were sure they could produce seed 
themselves if they could get the technical 
knowledge. Farmers were not necessarily 
referring to commercial production of certified 
seed, although they did not explicitly exclude 
this option either. They said they come from 
groups of farmers and there is a demand for 
quality seed. Individual farmers commented 
that training is required on seed selection, 
preparation and control, as well as broader 
issues of basic agricultural practices including 
seed quality and seed health issues.
According to Makenge and Rupindo, Ilonga ARI 
works on QDS with SSFs who are authorised to 
sell locally. They say QDS is good, because it can 
reduce supply constraints/availability issues. 
QDS is mainly for maize, sorghum and rice, and 
there is not much pigeon pea or cow pea. 
Seed companies were less positive about 
QDS. According to Kunda at ASA, “QDS must 
not be the basis of the seed system. It is local 
production and distribution, but volumes are 
low. There is a challenge with certification 
because it is hard to certify when producers are 
so far apart and are producing low amounts. 
QDS is in the seed law, but it is not a system to 
depend on if you want to solve the availability 
and affordability of seed. It is a short term 
solution in a limited area and limited 
distribution. We should rather encourage the 
strengthening of the existing system.”
Mr Mushauri, CEO of Tanseed agrees. He says, 
“Some extension officers are producing bulk 
seed and competing on the market. QDS is 
not allowed to be packaged, and it would 
be wasting resources to support packaging. 
Rather support the private sector”. We should 
note here that farmers could also be organised 
as private sector actors, as ESAFF suggests 
(below). Mushauri continues, “So QDS is not 
attracting farmers. The seed is not treated 
because that is too high tech, so it encourages 
the continuation of diseases. QDS is the lowest 
system of production, designed for a country 
starting independence. There have been lots 
of QDS projects here, but there are marketing 
problems. Marketing is a profession and 
farmers can’t be expected to do that.”
Terraced plot, Uluguru Mountains, Morogoro
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ESAFF’s position is that government should 
promote QDS as a source of good quality 
improved seed varieties as an alternative to 
imports, as well as support for community-
based seed production. ESAFF’s emphasis is 
on recognising that SSFs can also form private 
entities to sell certified seed and should be 
supported to realise this goal. ESAFF identifies 
a limit to the QDS system, in that producers 
cannot sell the seed beyond ward level, 
and argues that the area of sale should be 
expanded to allow QDS producers to compete 
alongside other commercial enterprises (ESAFF, 
2014:4).
ACB agrees that farmers should not be 
discriminated against if they want to form 
private seed enterprises in their own right 
when it comes to seed sales. But we prefer 
to emphasise collective ownership based on 
shared technologies and cooperation between 
economic agents. ESAFF’s focus on the role 
of farmers in private enterprise perhaps 
unwittingly places emphasis on competition 
between individuals as the basis for economic 
activity. The formation of proprietary 
enterprises is the seedbed for corporate cherry-
picking of the most successful commercial 
enterprises in future, as we can witness 
from MNC acquisitions of any sizeable seed 
company in Africa.
Recommendations made by different 
stakeholders during review workshops of the 
Seed Act mentioned that the seed law needs 
to be reviewed to address issues within the 
QDS, including that limitations to the QDS 
system be extended beyond the ward level 
to agro-ecological zones, increased land area 
for the production of QDS seeds, capacity 
building and increased investment in the 
system. However, discussions with officials at 
the Ministry revealed their concern that the 
extension for sale of QDS seeds outside the 
ward level will result in competition with the 
certified seeds produced by the private seed 
companies, and the government still feels that 
certified seeds need to dominate the market 
and meet the demand for the smallholder 
farmers. Nevertheless the demand for seeds 
cannot be met only by the private sector, 
especially in areas where there are no certified 
seeds or seed dealers who sell the certified 
seeds. While the Ministry does recognise the 
need to further train and build capacity for 
QDS farmers, officials say that they lack the 
necessary financial and human resources to 
do this. None of the recommendations raised 
under QDS have been addressed in the draft 
bills so far, with no further mention of QDS in 
the amendments.
Plant variety protection (PVP)
The harmonisation of PVP laws, based on 
agreements through the African Regional 
Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO), 
aims to provide secure rights for private 
investment, including and especially through 
the protection of private ownership over 
seed in the form of intellectual property (IP) 
protection, based on the provisions of the 
Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties 
(UPOV) 1991. Tanzania’s 2003 laws were already 
compliant with UPOV 1991 in many respects, 
and this is reinforced in recent proposals. 
As ACB has pointed out elsewhere, earlier 
versions of UPOV where the rights of breeders 
were more evenly balanced with the rights of 
farmers, are no longer available for signing. 
The baseline is the 1991 version, with a decay 
in farmers’ rights in favour of private breeders’ 
rights (ACB, 2012a). Tanzania is in the process of 
joining UPOV and already has in place the Plant 
Breeders’ Rights Act 2012, which is UPOV 1991 
compliant, for mainland Tanzania. Zanzibar has 
adopted the Plant Breeders’ Rights Bill, which 
is awaiting parliamentary assent. Tanzania 
is in the process of finalising the Instrument 
of Ratification. Once Tanzania ratifies the 
UPOV 91 convention it will be the only Least 
Developed Country (LDC) in the world to have 
done so. Tanzania has also signed the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Seed 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which 
allows registration of a plant variety released 
by any two of the SADC Member states 
without further testing (NAFSN, 2014:10–11). 
The content of recent changes to breeders’ 
rights disregards the contribution of SSFs, 
marginalises their varieties through DUS 
requirements, inadequately protects genetic 
material held by farmers and has adverse 
impacts on their interests and livelihoods as 
it severely restricts farmers from engaging in 
their customary practices of freely sharing, 
exchanging and selling seed/propagating 
material (AFSA, 2013). Private ownership 
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of knowledge and material resources (for 
example, seed and genetic materials) means 
the flow of royalties out of Africa into the 
hands of MNCs.
The 2013 National Agricultural Policy (NAP) 
identifies plant breeders’ rights (PBRs) as a 
priority area. It argues that in order to avert 
challenges facing plant breeding, including 
inadequate knowledge of the intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) and low participation 
of local and foreign enterprises in seed 
production and breeding, there are a number 
of things that must be undertaken to rectify 
the situation. These include the promotion 
of public awareness on PBRs and other IPRs, 
facilitating and protecting IPRs and research 
initiatives, and facilitating the participation of 
local and international companies in breeding 
and seed production (United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2013).
The main purpose of PVP laws are theoretically 
to protect private owners from others who 
might seek to benefit from the investment 
they have sunk into R&D. Currently these are 
the lifeblood of Tanzania’s farming systems, as 
shown in the survey results below. A blanket 
PVP law, whose main purpose is to protect 
the investments of corporations against 
other corporations who might be able to take 
advantage of the products without incurring 
any development costs, may well destroy the 
ability of SSFs to save and exchange seed. 
Changes to the Seed Law potentially open the 
way for the criminalisation of the distribution 
of recycled genetic materials circulating in 
farming systems. The continued circulation of 
farmers’ own varieties could also be outlawed 
by prohibiting or constraining the sale or 
exchange of non-certified materials. Any seed 
“not registered in the national variety catalog” 
is considered by some as falling within the 
category of ‘fake’ seed requiring “the need 
for a stiffer system of penalties and fines 
sufficient to deter fraudulent individuals” 
(USAID 2013:5). Current proposals to amend 
the Seed Act criminalise any person who sells 
or intends to sell or distribute any seed that 
does not conform to prescribed standards, 
with the offending person liable to a fine and 
the destruction of the seed (URP 2014:41).25 
We cannot support a regulatory and quality 
control system where small-scale, resource-
poor farmers are ‘collateral damage’ in global 
corporate wars for profit and supremacy. It is 
necessary to work out alternatives that start 
from protecting and expanding contextual 
diversity, participatory R&D and shared 
ownership. QDS is a good starting point and 
should be supported and expanded with 
farmer involvement.
The current situation (which is liable to rapid 
change given the laws and policies on the 
table) is that the Tanzanian government 
owns and controls the national germplasm 
supply. According to Mr Okhunda at Dakawa, 
the research stations may not sell (rights to 
own) breeders’ seed. There are no exclusivity 
agreements for multiplication, i.e. anyone 
can approach the station for access to the 
germplasm for commercial use, subject 
to agreement. Final variety ownership is 
determined by an initial agreement between 
government and the private companies. 
The research stations do not negotiate this 
aspect directly with companies, but follow 
the instructions of national government 
via the MAFC. This can result in a process of 
germplasm ownership transfer from the public 
to the private sector.
The Tanzanian government also is in the 
process of developing the Plant and Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture Bill, 
currently at the Cabinet’s Secretariat. According 
to a lawyer in the legal unit at the Ministry, 
the bill will protect farmers’ rights to benefit 
sharing when it comes to genetic resources, 
while plant breeders’ rights protect the 
rights of breeders. Benefit sharing is required 
where breeders use germplasm or genetic 
material developed by farmers over the 
years. Experience however, indicates limited 
implementation of laws.
ACB’s position is that all products deriving from 
a shared resource pool should be replaced in 
that resource pool for further use by anyone 
25.  Thanks to Michael Farrelly of Tanzania Organic Agriculture Movement (TOAM) for bringing this to our attention.
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who chooses, on condition that they agree 
to these terms (i.e. a General Public Licence, 
already well in operation in the computer 
sphere through the open source movement).
AGRA and seed in Tanzania
What role does AGRA play in this whole 
picture? It is clear that AGRA is in favour 
of the extension of certified seed through 
private sector production and distribution. 
AGRA spent US$12.4 million on 33 grants on 
seed to 19 recipients in Tanzania from 2007–
2012 (Appendix 4, Table 4B). The Agrodealer 
Development Programme (ADP) is the major 
seed sub-programme sponsored by AGRA 
in Tanzania over the period 2007–2012, 
comprising 45% of the value of grants in 
PASS. ADP grants were provided to establish a 
national agro-dealer network (CNFA), provide 
a credit facility (NMB) and develop an official 
agro-dealer strategy (MAFC). The Tanzania 
Agro-dealer Strengthening Programme (TASP), 
managed by CNFA, operated in 13 districts 
including Mvomero and Morogoro between 
2007 and 2010. The agro-dealers are a conduit 
for the dissemination of improved seed and 
synthetic fertiliser, and the size of the grants 
directed to the sub-programme suggests 
that access and distribution is identified as a 
key issue. Our research sites found a sporadic 
presence of agro-dealers, but they were not 
a major presence. Nevertheless, the VBAAs 
(discussed in more detail in the section on soil 
fertility)—also sponsored by AGRA through 
the SHP—play a similar role to agro-dealers 
by providing farmers with information and 
by connecting farmers and commercial input 
suppliers. As indicated earlier, CNFA received 
an additional US$1.6m under SHP (2009–2011) 
for the expansion of the commercial input 
distribution system (Appendix 4, Table 4B).
According to AGRA (2012a) the CNFA 
project trained and certified a total of 1,729 
agro-dealers from 53 districts in business 
management and safety in use. Also it 
demonstrated activities by establishing 663 
plots in 17 districts, involving 259 agro-dealers 
and reaching an estimated 23,068 farmers. 
Financial support was extended to 233 certified 
agro-dealers who received overdrafts worth 
US$2m from NMB under the AGRA credit 
facility. The programme included training, 
certification, financing, and sales adoption. 
AGRA says 71% of agro-dealers were involved in 
the supply and distribution of agro-inputs, and 
all certified agro-dealers participated in the 
NAIVS. Agro-dealers received 2.22m vouchers 
at approximately US$53m for 141,050 tons of 
fertiliser and 7,250 tons of seed, targeting an 
estimated 762,000 farmers.
The Fund for the Improvement and Adoption 
of African Crops (FIAAC), which focuses on 
R&D and the commercialisation of new seed 
varieties, is the second biggest seed sub-
programme and received 32% of the total 
value of seed grants up to 2012. Half the value 
of FIAAC grants went to MAFC and covered a 
range of crops, including maize (hybrid and 
improved OPV), beans, cassava, sweet potato, 
soybean and rice. The areas of operation 
generally are not specified in the grant 
summaries, but two MAFC grants, on beans 
and hybrid maize, were specifically located 
in the Southern Highlands. Ilonga scientists 
reported receiving AGRA grants for pigeon 
pea and cow pea since 2009, although this 
is not indicated in the PASS grants. It may be 
part of the SHP on maize-legume integration. 
The relatively large proportion of R&D grants 
going to MAFC and the ARIs suggests existing 
capacity in the public sector. As far as we can 
tell, unless there is a private sector partner, the 
improved germplasm remains in the public 
sector. In the first five years, four maize hybrid 
varieties, five paddy improved varieties and 
twelve improved varieties of roots and tuber 
crops were released through FIAAC activities in 
Tanzania (AGRA, 2012a).
Seed Production for Africa (SEPA), the enterprise 
development programme, received one-fifth 
of the total value of seed grants. These were 
mostly similar sized grants (US$150–230k) 
to a number of private seed companies. Two 
of these, Itente and Tanseed, also received 
additional support from outside experts paid 
through AGRA grants (see Appendix 4, Table 
4B). SEPA grants identified for activities in 
the Southern Highlands went to Kipato Seed 
(US$150k, for improved maize, rice and beans), 
Suba Agro-Trading and Engineering (US$187k, 
for improved maize, sorghum and sesame in 
Morogoro, Dodoma and Singida as part of 
breadbasket areas) and Agriseed Technologies 
(US$200k, for quality seed in Tabora, Singida 
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and Dodoma). Of the AGRA-sponsored seed 
enterprises, we encountered only Tanseed in 
our research sites (see case study on Tanseed).
Education for African Crop Improvement (EACI) 
received just 3% of total seed grants, held by 
SUA for MSc training in plant breeding, to the 
value of US$402k.
AGRA has some clear links to other GR 
initiatives on seed in Tanzania, in particular the 
G8 NAFSN. The government of Tanzania’s key 
commitments on seed under NAFSN are:
• Taxes (cess, VAT) on seeds and seed 
packaging to be reduced or lifted.
• To revise the Seed Act that aligns PBRs with 
the UPOV system.
• To review and benchmark the time required 
to release new varieties of imported seeds 
from outside the region with international 
best practices.
• To authorise qualified private sector 
companies to produce foundation seed 
under proper supervision and testing.
• To acquire seed testing accreditations from 
the International Seed Trade Association 
(ISTA) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), to 
enable regional and international seed sales.
These are very broad policy level interventions 
and AGRA plays a more detailed technical 
support role within this framework. An area 
of direct partnership is the Scaling Seeds 
and Technologies Partnership (SSTP) which is 
part of NAFSN and operates in a number of 
countries (including Mozambique and Malawi) 
with funding channelled via AGRA from USAID. 
The SSTP in Tanzania targets improved varieties 
of beans, cassava, Irish potatoes, maize, pigeon 
pea, sorghum, and soybeans in 21 SAGCOT 
districts, including Mvomero and Morogoro, 
and 7 districts in northern Tanzania (USAID, 
2014). Five grant areas were identified in a 
call issued in May 2014, with projects to be 
completed by April 2017:
• Production and marketing of breeder, 
foundation and certified/QDS seed—
maximum individual grants of US$300k;
• Scaling up of blended fertilisers for any of 
these crops and/or rhizobium inoculation 
(beans and soybeans), with links to 
commercial suppliers favoured and a 
focus on awareness creation, training and 
demonstration—maximum grants of 
US$250k;
• Scaling up of commercial input and output 
marketing systems involving agro-dealers 
seeking expansion, taking a business 
approach and defined links to public or 
private institutions favoured—maximum 
grants of US$500k;
• Integration of information and 
communication technology (ICT) platforms 
into value chains—maximum grants of 
US$250k; and
• Establishment of a seed business incubation 
centre providing technical support and 
business development services to seed 
entrepreneurs, and providing a range of 
services on a full cost recovery basis in 
foundation seed production, seed quality 
control, seed processing and packaging—
maximum grants of US$500k with matching 
resources favoured.
It is apparent from these that there is a focus 
on facilitating private sector involvement in 
breeder and foundation seed production. There 
is mention of QDS and it will be interesting 
to track any grantees receiving funds for QDS 
work.
Farmer seed use in research sites
Interventions aimed at expanding access to 
improved OPV and hybrid seed varieties are 
still in their infancy in the areas of study. An 
estimated three-quarters to 90% of seed in 
Tanzania as a whole is non-certified, farmer-
managed seed, even for maize (Saidia and 
Mkiga, 2014). In our small survey we found 
that over 80% of local maize, legume and rice 
seed in use was non-certified, and 43–75% of 
improved OPV and hybrid maize in use was 
non-certified. Eighty per cent of respondents 
indicated they recycled at least some seed 
from one year to the next. Table 11, which 
shows these results, is limited to the crops 
many farmers were planting, mainly grains and 
legumes. While many farmers plant vegetables, 
there is wide diversity and the information is 
too scattered to be of use. Most respondents 
used recycled seed for legumes, but there were 
also quite significant local purchases of pigeon 
pea (40% of those using pigeon pea seed), and 
free seed for cow pea from NGOs, charities, and 
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neighbours (27% of those using cow pea seed) 
(Appendix 3, Table 3D).
According to Mr Mvukeya Okhunda of Dakawa 
research station,26 official advice is to recycle 
rice for at least four seasons. Farmers usually 
mix varieties so by the fourth season it is a 
different variety and the recommendation 
is to buy fresh seed. There is no compulsion 
for farmers to acquire new certified seed, 
but it is recommended as a good agricultural 
practice (GAP). In this context, the sharp 
distinction between a certified seed and an 
uncertified seed is blurred, especially where 
recycling is part of good practice. A similar 
situation applies to maize, especially improved 
OPVs. These OPVs are closely related to local 
varieties, because they are mostly a mixture of 
external germplasm from the CGIAR institutes 
with local varieties. Therefore they already 
contain within them germplasm adapted for 
local conditions, and this produces plasticity, 
the ability to adapt to different ecological 
contexts. It would be a travesty if this beneficial 
process was disrupted by demands for private 
ownership of germplasm, preventing farmers 
from allowing beneficial traits to diffuse into 
the environment. This is not on the agenda 
at present (with regard to varieties based on 
public sector germplasm), but PVP and IP laws 
pose that threat in future. Once a seed enters 
into circulation it should be considered part of 
the farmers’ asset base to nurture and grow, 
with support from public sector institutions 
and expertise to maintain and improve on that 
variety, for local use and even commercially, if 
acceptable standards are met.
Improved OPVs deserve closer attention 
because they are potentially a key point 
of intersection between commercial and 
farmer-managed seed systems, along the 
lines of farmer-based Integrated Seed Sector 
Development (ISSD) (Louwaars and de Boef, 
2012). ACB has a critique of the ISSD in that it 
offers platitudes only to farmer-managed seed 
systems while its practical work is oriented 
towards building the commercial sector, by 
taking advantage of the positive features of 
farmer-managed systems (e.g. diversity, local 
germplasm, organisational capacity). The 
Gates Foundation’s recent embrace of ISSD 
projects through ISSD Africa27 is an indicator 
of this orientation towards the commercial 
sector. Nevertheless, if we turn the ISSD 
concept around and look at the question 
from the perspective of a farmer-managed 
seed system, we can see the possibilities of 
connecting the two systems to the benefit 
of farmers—e.g. public sector germplasm 
and R&D, and seed enterprises that can be 
profitable without being profit maximising. 
ESAFF (2014) has gone on record as saying 
that the environment should be made more 
conducive to private seed enterprises and 
oriented towards supporting individual or 
Table 11: Seed types used for main crops in the past season (%)
Certified (% of 
all respondents)
Non-certified 
(% of all 
respondents)
Non-certified as 
% of those using 
this seed type
Total (% 
of all 
respondents)
Hybrid maize 5 6.7 57.1 11.7
Improved OPV maize 6.7 5 42.9 11.7
Local maize 3.3 65 95.1 68.3
Rice 5 31.7 86.4 36.7
Beans 1.7 45 96.4 46.7
Pigeon pea 1.7 40 96 41.7
Cow pea 6.7 30 81.9 36.7
26.  Interview, Dakawa, 24/10/2014.
27.  www.issdseed.org
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collective farmer seed entrepreneurs. There is 
a role for a stringent certification process for 
good quality seed that can be developed and 
shared with farmers, and adapted by them to 
local conditions, without fear of penalty. This 
is where QDS could play a critical role, because 
it allows for local adaptation of standards 
for locally circulated products, with some 
formal verification and occasional injections 
of certified seed to maintain quality. The main 
question to be asked here is how are these 
standards measured?
Appendix 5 shows the main seed varieties 
currently in use in the research sites, including 
TMV1, Staha and Situka for maize, TXD306 
and various Supa varieties for rice, as well 
as legume and vegetable varieties in use. 
The Appendix provides some reflection from 
farmers on the pros and cons of the different 
varieties and indicates their reliance on local 
varieties and improved OPVs as the basis for 
seed in these sites.
Seed quality, price and access
Table 12: How serious are the following as a 
challenge to your farm?
Challenge % 
serious
% 
moderate
% not 
serious
High seed 
price
44.1 37.3 18.6
Poor quality 
seed
34.5 29.3 36.2
About one-third of respondents indicated 
that poor quality of seed is a serious concern, 
with the rest divided between not serious 
and moderately serious (Table 12). Seed price 
was slightly more of a concern and 44% of 
respondents indicated that it is a serious 
issue. This indicates an active commercial seed 
market where people are buying seed. When 
looking at specific seed types, respondents 
were generally satisfied with the quality of 
the seed they were using (Table 13). Hybrid 
maize, beans and local maize seed was highly 
rated by respondents—at 86%, 82% and 76% 
respectively. Surprisingly, given the yields 
from improved OPV maize (see production 
section above), most users of the seed ranked 
it only ‘acceptable’. Rice and pigeon pea were 
balanced between good and acceptable.
Table 13: Seed quality, percentage
Good Acceptable Poor
Hybrid maize 85.7 14.3 —
Improved OPV 
maize
16.7 83.3 —
Local maize 76.2 16.7 7.1
Rice 47.6 52.4 —
Beans 82.1 14.3 3.6
Pigeon pea 54.2 45.8 —
Cow pea 68.2 31.8 —
Certified/non-certified combined; those who reported 
using this seed in the past season
Farmers indicated that seed quality varies 
and one farmer said, “Local seed is better 
than purchased seed”. A number of people 
said seed sometimes does not germinate. 
Individual farmers mentioned specific cases 
of poor quality seed including from Seed 
Co, Pioneer, ASA and the research stations. 
Farmers in the survey generally were not 
using Tanseed products although there was 
mention of TAN250. One farmer complained 
about expired seed from agro-dealers: he took 
the seed back and the agro-dealer agreed to 
give him new seed. The farmer said the agro-
dealers always change the dates on the packs. 
Farmers felt that the mixing of seed on the 
farm by neighbours, during pollination, reduces 
quality because you can’t see which seed has 
produced which crops—the different seeds are 
not planted separately. However, where farms 
are close together it is a challenge to keep one 
variety firmly distinct from other varieties due 
to cross-pollination across farm borders. The 
issue of ‘fake seed’ came up a few times, in 
particular in the commercial sector. According 
to Mr Kunde at ASA: “Fake seed means there 
is no quality control. We need to strengthen 
TOSCI’s capacity. In the formal system, if you 
keep seed for more than 6 months, it must 
be retested. Agro-dealers are much more 
focused on income than quality. Their storage 
conditions are not reliable or dependable. 
We need reliable, trained agro-dealers with 
appropriate facilities and business discipline. 
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ASA has trained their own agro-dealers and 
others.” According to farmers in a seed FGD, 
access to seed is a big problem: the wrong 
varieties are provided, there is low germination, 
or the seed germinates but does not produce 
anything. They are buying from the agro-
dealers. The seeds may have expired—new 
packs are purchased by agro-dealers for seed 
and fertiliser and old products are then put into 
the new packs. Farmers felt that the problem 
lay with the agro-dealers, not the companies, 
although they were uncertain.
Seed prices ranged from Sh1,286/kg [US$0.78] 
for improved OPV maize, to Sh121.95/kg 
[US$0.07] for local maize (Table 14). This forms a 
baseline to track seed prices in these localities. 
Hybrid maize and beans had the largest 
average expenditure although users of hybrid 
maize seed are few in number. This again 
reinforces the idea that there is a commercial 
layer of producers in the sample. The high price 
of hybrid maize seed was given as a reason for 
recycling seed and respondents also indicated 
that prices fluctuate, that vegetable seeds are 
pricier than maize seeds, and that it is hard it 
tell the difference in quality between seeds.
Case study: Tanseed International Ltd, 
AGRA and the Green Revolution
The Tanzania Seed Company was set up by 
the government in the early 1970s as part 
of its formal seed sector development and 
enjoyed a monopoly on seed production and 
distribution. As indicated, following structural 
adjustment in the early 1990s, including 
the liberalisation of agricultural inputs, the 
seed sector was opened to the private sector. 
MNCs entered the maize seed market with 
hybrid varieties. The state-owned company 
performed poorly and collapsed (Lyimo, et 
al., 2014:652). It was privatised in 2002 and 
Tanseed International Ltd (Tanseed) emerged 
as a private entity in control of the assets and 
qualified staff. Tanseed CEO, Isako Mushauri, 
had been an employee and has an MSc in seed 
science and technology from Mercy University 
in New Zealand. Mushauri started Tanseed 
International as a private business, using 
publicly bred varieties with germplasm from 
CGIAR, farmers and the public sector.
Mr Mushauri (interview, 22/10/2014) told us 
that Tanseed had approached CIMMYT to 
release five maize varieties, and was the first 
local private company to produce its own 
seed. Tanseed uses three distinct technologies 
(drought resistance, strigaway and quality 
protein) and has five maize varieties: TAN250, 
TAN254 and H600 (all drought-tolerant 
maize), TAN222 (a strigaway maize to control 
striga weed—over 600,000 ha in Tanzania 
are affected by striga) and H611 (a quality 
protein maize). Tanseed is testing hybrids, 
including ProVitamin A and emaleni (maize 
necrosis) resistance—Kenya has an emaleni 
screening facility that can be used. Artificial 
inoculation is being used but has not yet been 
commercialised. Tanseed is also testing other 
products, including work on hybrid rice with 
the African Agricultural Technology Fund (AATF) 
based in Nairobi, together with SUA and IRRI 
and funded by the Gates Foundation, and a PPP 
Table 14: Average paid for seed
Average paid  in 
past season (Sh)
Average paid  in 
past season US$
Average cost/
kg (Sh)
Average cost/kg 
US$
Hybrid maize 13,928.57 8.49 857.14 0.52
Improved OPV maize 7,357.14 4.49 1,285.71 0.78
Local maize 731.71 0.45 121.95 0.07
Rice 3,476.19 2.12 233.33 0.14
Beans 9,571.43 5.84 739.29 0.45
Pigeon pea 2,338.00 1.43 726.00 0.44
Cow pea 990.91 0.60 468.18 0.29
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with USAID to reduce seed rates (the amount 
sown) and to improve seed quality.
Tanseed has five commercial rice varieties—
TXD306, Supa, Nerica1, 4 and 7—which are 
based on public and farmer germplasm. 
According to Mushauri vegetable seed will be 
the next step. He says vegetable seed is high 
tech and complicated to produce and that is 
why farmers are complaining about quality. If it 
is not produced properly there will be diseases. 
Mushauri says some businesses practice 
‘double-selling’: first they sell diseased seed 
and then they sell agrochemicals to combat the 
diseases. He argues, “This produces poisonous 
crops and is exploiting Africa. They are killing 
the industry because they want quick money.”
Mushauri says there are problems of ‘fake’ 
seed, agrochemicals and fertiliser. “We advise 
farmers but then they use and the effect is low 
productivity. This is a result of the lack of GAP 
skills, low adoption of improved genetics, low 
farmer education, and poor market prices. We 
are also faced with climate change, and African 
governments don’t have the resources to invest 
in R&D. The question is how to optimise the 
genetic potential. Most production is rain-
fed. Fertiliser has to be applied for the seed to 
perform to potential but if there is no rain, it 
is ineffective. We need both OPVs and hybrids. 
There are different products for different 
markets. Some areas are low potential so there 
is no point sending high potential products. 
Some genetics can perform well if they are 
used with fertiliser, etc., but farmers can’t 
afford this package so we must give them 
suitable seed.”
“There is expansion of the seed market”, 
continues Mushauri. “Farmers need 
information that is properly explained. Tanseed 
is using our experience with farmers. You must 
study the market first, not just send seed. 
Effective demand is not yet known. We are just 
producing blindly and many companies have 
high carry-over stocks. Quality declines. Last 
year Tanseed had 102 agro-dealers registered. 
They want Tanseed products. They are 
expensive but the quality is high and there are 
no questions from farmers. Quality must be the 
bottom line: genetic, physiological, sanitary and 
germination.”
Tanseed is also active in seed promotion and 
dissemination. According to Mushauri, hybrid 
genetics are not being optimised because 
of the lack of extension. Tanzania Private 
Extension Services (TANPES) with its team of 
eight production officers is addressing this 
issue and Mushauri says they know how to 
approach farmers. TANPES works with Yara 
to sell products in a package of seed and 
soil health extension, seed and fertiliser. 
Tanseed is given money from Morogoro local 
government to support this “private-private” 
partnership. According to Mushauri, “We are 
happy to release our innovations because 
we are using public funds.” Mushauri says 
extension in Africa is collapsing and without 
extension farmers will not continue buying 
seed. Tanseed had advertised phone numbers 
which farmers could use to receive extension 
advice but cancelled this service because 
demand was too high. Their activities include 
demonstrations and field days, with a mobile 
demonstration plot on top of a vehicle, with 
demonstration crops planted on different dates 
to target national agricultural shows at which 
all the stages of growth can be displayed at 
the same time. In 2014 Tanseed participated 
in 4 agricultural shows (Mbeya, Mwanza, 
Morogoro and Lindi). Like ASA, Tanseed hosts 
what it calls ‘field days plus’ at which millers 
also are involved and can eat the product 
then and there, to get a sense of it. Tanseed 
attends congresses and workshops, including 
in Burundi and Cameroon in 2014, and the 
company participates in the African Green 
Revolution Forum (AGRF) organised annually by 
AGRA.
Tanseed has sub-stations in Kigoma/Mpanda, 
Iringa and Mbeya, situated for regional 
expansion. Kigoma shares a border with the 
DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, and in the south 
there are plans for expansion into Mozambique 
and Madagascar.
Germplasm and seed ownership
Tanseed’s maize varieties are now proprietary, 
based on an exclusivity agreement with 
CIMMYT, with whom it has been working 
since 2006. According to Mushauri, “The 
private sector needs permanent exclusivity in 
varieties.”
Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil  fertility in Tanzania    45
Tanseed’s rice varieties are public but branded 
by Tanseed. Tanseed buys the foundation seed 
and produces certified seed, contracting SSFs 
to produce. This is Tanseed’s target market 
and the company invests in training and 
monitoring. Farmers get to know the company 
or product, and Tanseed assists them with 
agronomic aspects which they can also use on 
their own crops. In 2012 Tanseed trained about 
300 farmers although only 56 qualified. There 
are issues of the history of the land, distance 
(isolation), etc. “We have created a demand we 
can’t even meet. Tanseed is a popular brand 
name, 30 years public and 12 years private,” says 
Mushauri.
Tanseed has an MoU with SUA to 
commercialise rice and bean varieties on an 
exclusive basis and another on rice with IRRI, 
which is based on non-exclusive access to 
germplasm. Tanseed and IRRI collaborate on 
research. Says Mushauri, “Tanseed looks with 
private business eyes and there is plenty of 
time. We can indicate which products will 
be accepted by farmers even before they are 
registered. Most research stations just do what 
they want to do and just involve farmers using 
PVS, but this is not enough. Then the product 
fails. Business eyes are important. Farmers 
are interested in high yields, but business also 
considers consumer needs. Therefore we must 
not only involve farmers, but also other value 
chain actors.” 
AGRA, the G8 and the Green Revolution
Tanseed received one direct AGRA grant worth 
US$167k on improved maize, pigeon pea and 
sesame, active in 2007–2009. Duncan Kirubi 
(Kenya) received US$30k in 2010 to support 
Tanseed on seed production and processing. 
This is all we could find in the AGRA database, 
up until 2012. But Mushauri says AGRA still 
sponsors Tanseed directly with grants to 
increase production, processing, storage, 
promotion and dissemination in order to make 
seed available. They have targeted maize and 
pigeon pea as a cheap source of protein.
But AGRA’s support goes well beyond the 
grants. According to Mushauri, “AGRA provides 
unique support across seed production, 
processing, storage, marketing, financing. It is 
an excellent concept and AGRA shares world 
class consultants who provide consulting and 
training support for different needs at different 
stages. To stay with those guys for one day, 
you will solve most of your challenges. We 
are not paying for this. AGRA is serious about 
growing business in Africa, AGRA is great.” In 
addition, Tanseed staff have received training 
in technology and marketing skills training at 
the University of Nairobi, and were sponsored 
to attend continental gatherings, both through 
AGRA.
Beyond AGRA, Tanseed is linked also into a 
number of other GR initiatives. The company 
has an NAFSN commitment to produce 
nutrition-rich maize seed (to increase protein 
and Vitamin A content to 80%, up from 45%), 
as well as bean and soya as low cost sources 
of protein, and is currently using conventional 
breeding. Tanseed’s five-year commitments as 
part of NAFSN are:
• To produce 12,000 tons of certified maize 
and rice seed in 5 years (part of the Global 
Nutrition for Growth project);
• To achieve a US$700k increase in sales of rice 
and maize foundation seed by breeders and 
researchers;
• To ensure that US$12m of certified seed is 
procured from contract growers (but not 
necessarily SSFs);
• To realise a US$1.5m profit for agro-dealers 
and seed stockists distributing and selling 
Tanseed certified seed to SSFs; and 
• To achieve a target of 600,000 ha of small-
scale land under certified maize and rice 
seed (NAFSN, n.d.).
Mushauri says Nafaka supported TXD306, 
the first Tanseed certified rice seed to have 
been produced by SSFs—56 of whom were 
involved. In 2013 Tanseed became the first 
private company to produce certified rice seed 
in Tanzania, with a target of 250 tons. Farmers 
produced about 95% of the target although 
the actual seed accepted was about 80%, with 
some rejection based on quality standards. This 
contract may be renewed in 2015. Most tasks 
are manual: harvesting, processing, handling 
and drying, and Tanseed has asked Nafaka 
to support a mobile mini combine harvester, 
threshers, cleaners and driers.
Tanseed is also working with Yara to train 
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Tanseed staff to provide soil health extension 
along with seed extension. Tanseed will use 
Yara products in seed production and bundle 
these into a package for sale to farmers. In 
this way they share the costs of developing 
markets. Mushauri has justified his partnership 
with Yara: “Farmers are using DAP and urea but 
have no science. Urea is a single nutrient but 
a plant needs multi-nutrients, and Yara have 
developed these products.”
Regarding the commercial seed market, 
Mushauri says: “The objective is to develop a 
bigger cake. Then it can become an issue of 
market strategy, but for now we are just trying 
to grow the market. Foreign companies are not 
helping farmers to increase production. They 
are selling seed registered in their countries 
but not suited to the ecology (here). They will 
increase the size of the cake if they do local 
trials, but they don’t. We welcome others 
to come and share the challenges. They are 
looking for short-term gains but not long-
term benefit. For example they are using dent 
varieties of maize, which are prolific but are 
low density and soft and so are attacked by 
insects. Then farmers lose and they don’t buy 
again. In milling the coat of dent varieties must 
be removed, reducing the amount available for 
meal. The product must also be designed for 
high milling yield, and there are taste issues. A 
good producer should address farmer needs as 
well as processors, traders and consumers.”
The Tanseed case highlights the centrality of 
private seed enterprises in GR interventions 
in seed. These companies are being supported 
to play an integrated role of production, 
contracting of SSFs, dissemination, extension 
and training and advocacy. The case sheds 
light on AGRA’s holistic support to private seed 
companies and also indicates an important role 
for AGRA in cementing together different GR 
interventions by other actors, including USAID 
and NAFSN. It highlights the coordinated 
character of these interventions and provides a 
good example of the emphasis on commercial 
seed enterprises. Tanseed’s regional aspirations 
also suggest that successful expansion is likely 
to result in an acquisition by one of the big 
multinationals in the not too distant future.
Key issues, recommendations and areas 
for further research
AGRA’s role in Tanzania’s seed systems should 
be placed in the context of a longer-term 
process of liberalisation and deregulation in the 
early 1990s. This opened the door for private 
sector involvement in seed production and 
distribution. Based on its investment profile, 
AGRA has prioritised distribution, followed by 
work on developing new seed varieties, mainly 
with public sector institutions. AGRA has a 
clear position on combining improved seed 
varieties with synthetic fertiliser in a package 
of interventions.
AGRA’s interventions raise a number of 
issues for the food sovereignty movement, in 
particular they impel us to clarify our positions 
on public and private sector R&D, germplasm 
improvement, and the role of farmers in seed 
production and distribution.
The first question is whether improvements in 
genetic materials are required. There may be an 
argument that local germplasm and varieties 
are well suited to local ecological conditions 
and do not need to be supplemented with 
materials from outside Tanzania’s borders. 
However, external genetics are usually brought 
in to improve selected traits in local materials, 
including yield enhancement, pest and disease 
resistance, drought or salinity tolerance, etc. 
These genetic improvements may be beneficial 
and evidence of this is farmer adoption. The 
improvements do not necessarily have to be 
damaging to the ecology, especially when 
they are recycled for a number of years. ACB 
is not in favour of hybrids for a number of 
reasons including proprietary ownership, their 
production is radically separated from farmers, 
and because they reduce farmers’ ability to 
recycle seed if they choose. Also, hybrids are 
generally heavily reliant on synthetic fertiliser 
and irrigation. This means that hybrids favour 
relatively wealthier farmers, and thus increase 
inequality over time. If improvements are based 
on OPVs, seed can be recycled for a number of 
years without major loss of (original) traits. 
Open pollination can increase biodiversity and 
the germplasm remains more adaptable to the 
ecological context than hybrid seed. While it 
is true that even improved OPVs may perform 
closer to their potential with the increased use 
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of synthetic fertiliser, they are generally less 
sensitive to a lack of concentrated nutrients 
than hybrids.
The second key issue is access to germplasm. 
If the underlying germplasm pool were 
classified as ‘open source’ access to it could 
operate on the lines of the General Public 
Licence (GPL) pioneered by the open source 
computer software movement. The GPL “allows 
modifications and distribution only when the 
source code to these modifications is made 
available under the same licence” (Boldrin and 
Levine, 2008:20). For germplasm, this means 
that if a breeder wants to make changes, they 
can do so only with free germplasm if their 
alterations are available to others under GPL. 
But open source germplasm does not mean 
that companies are not allowed to sell the 
seeds they have developed, or that they will not 
be able to do so. ‘First mover advantage’ means 
a company can still profit from innovations 
even if others know what they have done. First, 
“it takes time and money to reverse engineer 
a product” and “when the innovator begins 
production with a very large capacity, the size 
of the residual competitive rent left for even 
the first imitator becomes very small, so small 
that, in general, it will not be profitable to 
imitate” (both quotes from Boldrin and Levine, 
2008:139). Farmers who access the seed will be 
free to recycle it if they wish. But we know that 
commercial farmers are not going to recycle 
seed unless the quality is maintained—they 
are more likely to purchase fresh seed anew 
every year to ensure quality. So commercial 
seed producers will retain profitable markets 
even if there is some leakage, especially to 
small, resource-poor farmers. In the long run, 
this leakage could also produce new markets 
for companies if the seed produces well and 
farmers decide they want to buy fresh seed.
The GPL approach would rule out PPPs based 
on privately owned germplasm unless the 
private owner would be willing to share the 
product freely. The logic of PVP laws is to 
secure the private rights of the owners of 
germplasm. ACB has an in principle opposition 
to the private ownership of germplasm: we 
consider all germplasm to be the product of 
a combination of natural resources that are 
part of the common resources available to 
humanity, as well as the human innovation and 
ingenuity that should be considered part of the 
pool of common knowledge that is far older 
than corporate and other private owners. To 
the extent that the public sector manages and 
maintains germplasm in the public interest, 
it might be considered the legal ‘owner’ of 
the germplasm, but only to the extent that it 
secures these resources for the common good.
This brings us to the question of farmer 
varieties. Improved varieties are based 
generally on a combination of local genetic 
resources and external genetics. The local 
resources, which root improvements in an 
ecological context and thus enable external 
germplasm to be adapted to local conditions, 
were developed over many years primarily by 
farmers themselves. There was no certified 
seed sector in Tanzania before the 1970s so 
farmers generated and managed all varieties. If 
local germplasm is used in improvements, what 
rights should farmers have over the product? 
In line with an open source approach, farmers 
would contribute their varieties to the common 
pool for use by all. This obviously means 
private companies could come in and use local 
germplasm freely. But if this use was based on 
GPL it would not result in the privatisation of 
farmer varieties, since the source materials for 
any product would be made available on the 
same terms.
QDS is an important niche in the Tanzanian 
seed system. Comments made by people 
we interviewed suggest it is coming under 
pressure from private enterprises that see it 
as a potential threat and a diversion of public 
resources away from supporting the private 
sector. ACB believes that QDS provides a 
basis for public-farmer partnerships and we 
will look for ways of interacting with these 
processes to strengthen and support them. 
However, there may be weaknesses in the 
way QDS is implemented in practice, as well 
as some possible conceptual weaknesses. For 
example, QDS is treated as a way of integrating 
farmers into the formal certification system, 
and it might serve better as a mechanism 
to enable farmers to identify, select and 
improve varieties, together with public sector 
R&D based on quality criteria they define 
collectively, and which are appropriate for 
their differing contexts. In this regard, farmer-
managed certification systems based on a trust 
48   A F R I C A N  C E N T R E  F O R  B I O S A F E T Y
relationship between producers and users of 
seed may be more useful than a standardised 
certification system at national level. More 
work can be done to explore the possibilities of 
developing such context-specific, trust-based 
certifications systems rooted in farmer practice.
Further research may focus on QDS in practice, 
working with farmer associations and public 
sector R&D institutions to develop context-
specific farmer-managed certification systems, 
and tracking of ISSD and SSTP projects in 
Tanzania. We will also engage with our partners 
and farmers to identify possible areas of 
cooperation that support farmer involvement 
in seed production and distribution, especially 
of locally valuable farmer varieties. We will also 
be interested to track the differential impact 
on farmers of private seed company expansion 
into local areas over time.
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Markets
Market access is a central aspect of GR 
interventions, since farmers will be able to 
afford costly inputs (especially fertiliser and 
irrigation) only if they can increase their 
incomes from production sales to pay for 
the inputs—and still be in a better position 
after paying these costs. A key reason for GR 
interventions in the first place is to increase 
productivity and overall production, but 
farmers must have outlets for their produce. 
There is a big infrastructure element to this—
roads and communications, as well as adequate 
water supplies and sources of energy—that 
enables farmers and processors to produce 
goods that meet buyers’ requirements. Market 
access is therefore an integral component of 
the GR orientation. Farmers are under pressure 
to produce and sell surpluses in a context of 
low producer prices, weak storage systems and 
challenges of product quality, standardisation 
and the physical distance to markets. Market 
access proved to be the biggest single 
challenge identified by farmers in the survey 
(nearly 68%). This is consistent both with 
the experience from field work carried out in 
Malawi and general literature on agriculture in 
Tanzania.
In the research sites improved OPV maize 
and rice were the two crops with the highest 
volume traded (Table 15). Most improved 
OPV maize produced was being sold, but we 
must remember this was a small number 
of producers. However, this does provide 
evidence that the users of improved OPVs in 
these sites are larger commercial producers 
with higher yields and a larger proportion for 
sale. This is consistent with a growing body of 
scholarship which recognises heterogeneity 
and differentiation among SSFs, with Wiggins 
(2009) suggesting that the “bulk of marketed 
output from small farms comes from those 
that are towards the upper part of the range” 
and that “most of the increased production, 
and hence increased earnings will accrue to 
only a minority of small farms”, and that “it is 
likely that it will be a minority of small farms 
that see the bulk of added production and 
sales”.
Sugar cane is an important crop in the 
Morogoro region and is grown individually 
by SSFs as part of outgrower schemes. But a 
number of the people surveyed have stopped 
growing sugar cane as production costs are 
high but prices low. Sugar cane production is 
highly prominent in the agendas of SAGCOT, 
NAFSN and the BRN. Though the sample from 
the present study is too small to draw any firm 
conclusions, this is something that will need 
further monitoring.
Some survey participants were selling 
vegetables and while tomatoes were very 
popular large seasonal surpluses were in 
evidence throughout the areas of the survey, 
resulting in low prices. Sesame was also touted 
as a potentially lucrative crop, as one tin can 
fetch Sh25,000–Sh30,000 [US$15.24–US$18.29] 
on the local market (equal to one bag of maize). 
But the plant is highly susceptible to pests and 
diseases and this raises issues of post-harvest 
storage.
Table 15: Production for sale
Crop # harvesting Average sales of 
those harvesting (kg)
Average sales as % 
of harvest
Hybrid maize 7 867.1 52.8
Improved OPV maize 5 2,905.6 94.5
Local maize 40 488.9 49.3
Rice 21 1,358.6 68.9
Beans 25 59.6 56.1
Pigeon pea 17 42.9 69.2
Cow pea 16 88.0 45.7
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A FGD was organised to probe further 
the issue of markets and explored both 
general marketing challenges and potential 
opportunities, as well as a specific focus on 
a newly established scheme under AGRA’s 
Market Access Programme (MAP). Poor output 
prices were the main grievance and the major 
reason why many farmers had joined MVIWATA 
in the first place. There are few opportunities 
for marketing beyond local vendors, who 
were universally derided for the poor prices 
they offered. Prices are generally better in the 
initiative to sell to the National Food Reserve 
Agency (NFRA) (see below) but this comes with 
its own challenges and is restricted to a narrow 
range of crops.
FGD interactions revealed the clear desire to 
engage in more processing and other value 
adding activities. For example some farmers 
were paying to have surplus rice processed 
at a local mill to sell on but, as with other 
value-adding activities, the lack of capital 
hampers further expansion. Another potential 
marketing opportunity is in cooking oil, which 
83% of survey respondents said they had 
purchased within the previous 24 hours. Some 
activities around processing oilseeds (pumpkin 
and sunflower) were reported to be taking 
place, predominantly for home consumption, 
with some oil being sold locally. There was a 
desire among some to expand production, but 
the cost of equipment and lack of information 
on potential markets is holding farmers back in 
this regard.
Table 16: Average key crops retained for HH 
use
Crop # 
harvesting
Average 
retained for HH 
consumption of 
those harvesting
Hybrid maize 7 774.6
OPV maize 5 1,393.6
Local maize 41 526.4
Rice 21 645.4
Beans 25 46.7
Pigeon pea 17 19.1
Cow pea 15 25.7
Despite most improved OPV maize being sold, 
this category still produces higher volumes 
for household use than either hybrid or local 
maize, at almost 1.4 tons on average per 
household. Local maize is half a ton and hybrid 
maize is just over three-quarters of a ton (Table 
16). Nearly 650 kg of rice is kept on average for 
household use. Just less than 1 kg of beans per 
week is retained for household use. For cow 
peas and pigeon peas, the average amount 
retained for household use for those who 
produced is just 1.5–2 kg/month. This presents 
a picture of food being produced mainly for 
household consumption, with surpluses in 
maize and rice being sold, but at low product 
prices that make it difficult for farmers to 
embrace expensive technologies.
AGRA’s Market Access Programme (MAP) 
in Tanzania
MAP was established in 2008 to complement 
the work on seed systems, soil health and 
policy. AGRA cites a number of reasons for 
marketing problems in sub-Saharan Africa, 
including narrow markets (e.g. few buyers), 
low farm-gate prices, high end-user prices 
(long value chains inflate prices to the 
detriment of consumers, without benefiting 
producers), weak farmers’ organisations, lack 
of market information, and lack of affordable 
finance. To overcome these AGRA argues for 
more organisation and coordination among 
SSFs, the reduction of systemic barriers (e.g. 
improvements in infrastructure, market 
information, etc.) and strengthening staple 
food value chains (AGRA, 2014a).
The major AGRA grant recipients under AGRA’s 
MAP in Tanzania, to date, have been Standard 
Bank of South Africa, TechnoServe (a US-
based development NGO) and Rural Urban 
Development Initiatives (RUDI), a Tanzanian 
NGO (Appendix 4, Table 4C). The grant to 
RUDI is to assist savings and cooperative 
societies in central Tanzania to register legally 
as trading entities, to sell maize to the World 
Food Programme (WFP) and other traders. 
Other investments (up to the end of 2013) 
have resulted in the establishment of 36 
warehouses, 28 of which had been certified 
by the Tanzanian Warehouse Licensing Board 
(TWLB). AGRA has also engaged with the TWLB 
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to increase its inspection and certification 
capacity (AGRA, 2014a).
Some of the survey participants were involved 
in a new AGRA-funded initiative in Mvomero 
for collective marketing of maize to the NFRA in 
Dodoma. AGRA provided funding to MVIWATA 
to organise farmer participation. The plan is to 
expand this initiative to include rice production 
if it proves successful. Aggregation points are 
managed by Savings and Credit Cooperative 
Societies (SACCOS) and funded by Nafaka. 
At harvest time farmers shell and bag their 
maize before taking it to a central collection 
point, usually by hiring a bicycle, motorbike or 
lorry, at a cost ranging from Sh2,500–Sh6,000 
[US$1.52–US$3.66] per bag. A further levy of 
Sh1,000 [US$0.61] is also paid on each bag 
before it leaves the farmer’s district. At the 
collection point the farmer must pay Sh1,000 
per bag to have the maize cleaned (e.g. removal 
of stones and other debris) which is achieved 
by manual labour. A further Sh3,000 [US$1.83] 
is charged per bag for the centre’s overheads 
and the cost of pesticides (acteric), which are 
applied to the maize in storage.
From the local collection point a committee 
representing a farming group organises 
transportation to the NFRA in Dodoma and 
covers the costs; these varied from a quote of 
Sh370 per ton per km to a flat rate of Sh60,000 
[US$36.59] per trip. A group representative 
accompanies the maize and stays in Dodoma 
until completion of the transaction. The farmer 
group is responsible also for covering the costs, 
said to average Sh25,000 [US$15.24] per day, 
of their representative’s stay in Dodoma. It is 
not uncommon for the procedure to take up 
to four days once the maize has arrived at the 
NFRA. The NFRA in Dodoma charges farmers 
Sh20 [US$0.01] per bag in taxes and unloading 
charges.
Initial impressions among those participating 
in the NFRA scheme were tentatively positive, 
as the price they received after deductions of 
Sh490/kg [US$0.30] is substantially more than 
the local market price of Sh250/kg [US$0.15] 
or the Sh218/kg [US$0.13] given by middlemen. 
However there are some challenges and 
farmers are cautious about the scheme. 
Farmers must transport their produce to 
Dodoma and it is a bureaucratic and time-
consuming process. Unexpected costs for 
transport, levies and taxes were deducted, and 
farmers were not clear about why they had 
to pay these (FGD 23/10/14). Larger business 
people received payment while smaller farmers 
were not yet paid. The NFRA initially committed 
to purchase 7,000 tons from SSFs but ended 
up purchasing only 2,000 tons (discussion 
with MVIWATA staff, 20/10/14). Vendors tried 
to insert themselves into the process, buying 
directly from farmers for lower prices and then 
selling to the NFRA. Although the farmers we 
spoke to resisted this, other farmers gave in to 
the pressure for immediate cash. As farmers 
put it, they entered the programme to escape 
the middlemen in the village but ended up 
competing with them at the NFRA, as well.
It is clear that markets are important for 
farmers—they have explicitly stated as much. 
However, we must also understand markets 
as the other side of the coin of increased input 
supply. There are many beneficiaries of such GR 
interventions: input suppliers get guaranteed 
markets; service providers make a comfortable 
living; banks and financial institutions receive 
interest on loans; buyers receive better quality 
products more suited to their requirements—
whether standardisation or volume or 
quality—governments remain in power on 
the basis of spending public resources to 
subsidise inputs. An entire economy is built 
around the Green Revolution and it is little 
wonder that there is widespread support for it. 
But we have yet to understand what benefits 
farmers derive from these billions of dollars 
being spent. Product prices remain extremely 
low and farmers shell out a higher proportion 
of their income on input costs. Farmers who 
are capable of producing at a larger scale to 
meet market requirements can benefit—but 
this is often at the cost of other farmers who 
are forced off the land into wage labour as 
land is consolidated and an increasing scale of 
production is required.
Markets for a few standardised products 
displace diverse production, but it may be too 
late to return to the days of local production 
for food security. All farmers, whether they 
are market-oriented or not, are caught up in 
Agrodealer, Morogoro
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global relations of production which insistently 
enforce a business logic of profitability and 
scale. GR market programmes are explicitly 
designed to produce a differentiation into 
large, successful farmers and a mass of wage 
workers. Commercial agriculture relies on 
wage labour and, in predominantly peasant 
societies, those labourers will come from the 
base of erstwhile producers. Although the 
market linkages programme with NFRA has 
many positive aspects—working with farmer 
associations, public sector procurement, 
offering higher prices for products—over 
time it inevitably will become a conduit for 
larger commercial producers, at the expense 
of smaller producers who are unable to afford 
the necessary inputs, or who do not have the 
knowledge or capacity to produce at scale. And 
while these processes of differentiation are 
occurring, multinationals are entrenching their 
power over agro-food systems.
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Conclusions
Since the early 1990s the Tanzanian 
government has embarked on a structural 
adjustment programme including deregulation 
and liberalisation of the agricultural sector. 
Although the government continues to play 
a role in the agricultural sector, it has opened 
the way for private sector—including MNC—
involvement. In some areas the private sector 
has responded vigorously, for example, in the 
production of hybrid maize seed. But generally 
the response is lukewarm because the 
institutional, legal and economic environment 
is not conducive to adequate returns on private 
investment and profitable markets are not big 
enough to warrant investment.
The GR thrust in Tanzania is essentially about 
identifying points of blockage as well as 
areas of potential opportunity for the private 
sector. The government has reoriented its 
overall framework to encourage private sector 
investment, diverting public resources to 
supporting this through PPPs, and providing 
subsidies for input and output markets, for 
example through NAIVS and the NFRA. Laws 
and policies are under review and are being 
redrafted to favour private sector investment. 
Government is working with the private 
sector in priority geographical areas such as 
SAGCOT to ‘crowd in’ investment. Nevertheless, 
government employees do have a concept of 
social and ecological sustainability and this 
remains the basic starting point for their work. 
Generally it appears that farmers, researchers, 
scientists and others involved in agricultural 
and farmer support consider the judicious use 
of GR inputs as compatible with improving 
livelihoods and with ecologically sustainable 
agricultural practices.
AGRA is playing an important role in these 
processes. Its broad categories of seed, soil 
health, policy financing and market support 
are framed in the context of ‘breadbasket’ 
areas aligned with other GR initiatives such 
as SAGCOT. AGRA’s main focus on seed in 
Tanzania is the development of private sector 
distribution networks and the development 
of new varieties, mostly with the public sector. 
However, support for public sector seed work is 
not an end in itself but is one step towards the 
private commercialisation of seed. Evidence of 
this is found on AGRA’s positions on seed law 
harmonisation and PBRs. Regarding soil fertility 
its focus is on the expansion of synthetic 
fertiliser use, with a small amount of resources 
going to legume integration for nitrogen 
fixation (but also including a component of 
synthetic fertiliser use in line with ISFM). This 
includes a very large grant to AFAP to develop 
systems for the importation and wider use of 
synthetic fertilisers.
GR interventions in the research sites are 
uneven. In Mvomero, MVIWATA is working 
directly with AGRA, USAID and others, on 
private sector distribution of improved seed 
and synthetic fertiliser and on developing 
output markets. Given that 2014 was the first 
year of the market linkages programme, it 
is too early to assess the impact, although 
farmers are encouraged by the possibility of 
higher net prices for their outputs. There is 
evidence of the uptake of improved seed by 
farmers, especially rice and to a lesser extent 
legumes. In these sites, farmers still use mostly 
local maize varieties. The use of synthetic 
fertiliser is significantly higher than the 
national average, both in terms of average per 
hectare applications and numbers of farmers 
using these technologies. This is evidence 
of the impact of GR interventions, including 
the expansion of agro-dealer networks 
and programmes such as Nafaka, that are 
introducing these inputs into farming systems.
Key issues with regard to seed relate to the 
use of DUS criteria in the formal certification 
process and the impacts on farmer seed 
production and distribution; the role of QDS 
in the seed system; the adoption of UPOV91 
compliant PVP laws and their potential impact 
on SSFs in the longer-term; and the channelling 
of public sector resources to aid private and 
corporate gain. 
With regard to DUS and seed certification 
we argue that while these criteria may be 
appropriate to secure the interests of private 
ownership, they are not appropriate for 
the expansion of SSF involvement in seed 
production beyond a commercial scale. We 
propose that quality criteria be developed 
between farmers as producers and farmers as 
users of seed, in cooperation with public sector 
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institutions. In this regard we believe QDS has 
an important role to play in bringing farmers 
into seed production in a systematic way; this 
includes production of their own varieties for 
local use as well as for expanded distribution 
within the agro-ecological zones for which the 
seed is adapted.
In a similar way to the ‘new, distinct, uniform, 
stable’ (NDUS) criteria, a blanket approach to 
PVP laws that prevents farmers from freely 
adapting and using whatever seed they have 
at their disposal threatens the long term 
sustainability and diversity of the seed system. 
In principle we are opposed to the private 
ownership of genetic resources as these are 
the product of social and collective endeavour 
that goes well beyond corporations and 
private individuals. Private companies should 
have a right to sell products with their own 
quality guarantee attached if they wish, but 
this should not prevent others from using the 
genetic resources in ways they choose. Here we 
are also concerned that public resources are 
being channelled into extending private control 
over germplasm and into subsidising and 
guaranteeing markets for private, corporate 
gain.
We do recognise a potential role for private 
enterprises as long as public resources are 
not sequestered to support these sectional 
interests. We are in favour of cooperative, 
collective farmer enterprises based on shared 
technologies and knowledge rather than 
private enterprises, believing that the future 
of humanity depends on cooperation rather 
than competition as the basis of economic 
activity. Everything that has been produced by 
humans is the result of social cooperation but 
the fruits of that collective labour have been 
appropriated by private interests. This is not 
a sustainable model, as the growing gap in 
ownership and command over resources and 
the attendant inequalities reveal.
The GR emphasis on competitive private 
enterprise, economies of scale and the 
standardisation of cultures, consumption 
patterns and agricultural outputs, runs counter 
to the flourishing of diversity that is crucial for 
the survival of humans and the nurturing of 
our ecological habitat.
A complex set of responses is required in the 
face of the GR thrust. First, the technological 
and methodological aspects of the GR must 
be unpacked to see what benefits may accrue 
to farmers if these are managed on the basis 
of democratic control and decision-making, 
cooperation, collectivity and accountability. 
Technological advances may be of great 
value, but we must also have the foresight 
to consider the possible implications in the 
decades ahead, especially if these technologies 
are placed under the control of multinational 
corporations accountable only to their financial 
backers.
Secondly, active lobbying against these 
interventions is required where they pose 
an immediate and direct threat to the 
construction of a society based on the 
principles of democratic control and decision-
making, cooperation and collectivity. A current 
example is efforts to privatise the gene pool 
and criminalise the fundamental right—and 
indeed the fundamental necessity—for farmers 
to save, share and exchange genetic materials 
as they choose.
Thirdly, it is necessary to develop practical 
alternatives in the present to move us towards 
a future based on these principles. This includes 
lobbying and working with governments 
and donors to create a space for the material 
advancement of agro-ecological practices, 
and the materialisation of the principles of 
democratic control and decision-making, 
Uluguru Mountain plots, Morogro
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cooperation, inclusiveness and collectivity, in 
the ways in which we strive for an alternative 
future.
Key recommendations and way forward
The following recommendations are for civil 
society organisations and the food sovereignty 
movement, in conjunction with government 
and public sector R&D institutions:
• Develop methodologies and support 
longitudinal studies that closely monitor the 
long-term social and environmental impacts 
of GR interventions, including land access, 
soil and water health and biodiversity;
• Develop multidisciplinary partnerships and 
methodologies to support these processes, 
cutting across social, organisational and 
technical fields;
• Support farmers and public sector extension 
officers with training in agro-ecological 
techniques, working together with farmers 
and their organisations, public sector 
institutions, universities, and training 
organisations and institutions;
• Support cooperative processes of curriculum 
development for technical training on agro-
ecology;
• Support the construction of open, inclusive 
and democratic farmer-based extension 
networks linked to research and training;
• Investigate the practical operation of 
QDS further, to identify the opportunities 
and limits of the system in supporting 
knowledge for the consolidation and 
expansion of farmer-managed seed 
systems and the incorporation of farmer 
varieties, including building farmer capacity 
using participatory methods to produce 
quality seed of their favoured varieties and 
extending the area under farmer-managed 
production and distribution;
• Work on alternatives to proprietary plant 
variety ownership, starting from protecting 
and expanding contextual diversity, 
participatory R&D and shared ownership;
• Lobby for the application of General 
Public Licencing as the basis of variety 
improvement, where all products deriving 
from a shared germplasm source pool are 
replaced in that resource pool for further use 
by anyone who chooses, with open access for 
responsible use on condition that the users 
agree to these terms;
• Monitor and analyse the implementation 
of SSTP and ISSD interventions, and engage 
with participating farmers if the opportunity 
arises;
• Lobby for the removal of proprietary 
ownership on all seed once it enters into 
circulation so that it becomes part of 
the farmers’ asset base, to nurture and 
grow, with support from public sector 
institutions and expertise to maintain and 
improve genetic resources, for local use and 
commercially if acceptable standards are 
met;
• Pay close attention to improved OPVs under 
public ownership as a potential key point 
of intersection between commercial and 
farmer-managed seed systems from an R&D 
point of view, with a focus on developing 
farmer-managed diversity, local germplasm 
and organisational and technical capacity;
• For the food sovereignty movement, clarify 
positions on improved OPVs, QDS and 
its orientation towards genuine farmer-
managed seed systems, public and private 
sector R&D, germplasm improvement, and 
the role of farmers in seed production and 
distribution;
• Exclude any PPPs based on privately-owned 
germplasm unless the private owner is 
willing to share the product freely; and
• Develop seed quality criteria as an 
alternative to DUS with farmers as producers 
and users of seed, in cooperation with 
their organisations and other public and 
education institutions, building on the 
lessons learned from QDS to date.
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APPENDIX 1: Farmer perceptions of agricultural challenges
Table 1A: How serious are the following as a challenge to your farm?
Challenge % serious % moderate % not 
serious
% women 
serious
% men 
serious
Drought 41.7 28.3 30 45.9 34.8
Flood 29.8 17.5 52.6 32.4 25
Change in rainfall patterns 33.9 18.6 47.5 27.8 43.5
Soil infertility 13.3 41.7 45 16.2 8.7
Soil erosion 15 26.7 58.3 13.5 17.4
High fertiliser price 51 15.7 33.3 58.6 40.9
Late fertiliser delivery 37.8 6.7 55.6 44 30
Poor quality fertiliser 24.4 13.3 62.2 24 25
High seed price 44.1 37.3 18.6 36.1 56.5
Poor quality seed 34.5 29.3 36.2
Lack of markets 67.8 22 10.2 63.9 73.9
Pests and diseases 32.2 49.2 18.6 32.4 31.8
Animal damage 58.3 20 21.7 59.5 56.5
Land access 46.6 19 34.5 40.5 57.1
Availability of labour 11.9 23.7 64.4 18.9 0
Technical knowledge/ 
extension
25 20 55 27 21
Water quality 8.3 21.7 70 10.8 4.3
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APPENDIX 2: Tanzania’s commitments under the G8 NAFSN
Table 2A: Tanzania’s NAFSN commitments
Objective Framework policy actions Timeline
Increased stability 
and transparency in 
trade policy, reduced 
tariff and non-tariff 
barriers
1. Implement policy alternatives to export ban 
identified in the comprehensive food security study 
to strengthen response to food emergencies while 
minimising disruptions in the market.
July 2014
Improved incentives 
for the private sector 
by reducing taxes 
and increasing the 
transparency and 
consistency of the 
agricultural tax and 
incentive system.
2. Pre-profit tax at the farm-gate on crops reduced or 
lifted.
July 2013
3. VAT on spare parts for farm machinery and 
equipment reduced or lifted
July 2013
4. Secure certificate of land rights (granted or 
customary) for small holders and investors:
All village land in Kilombero demarcated.
All village land in SAGCOT region demarcated; and
20% of villages in SAGCOT complete their land use 
plans and are issued certificates of occupancy.
August 2012 
June 2014 
June 2014 and 
additional 20% 
by June 2016
5. Instrument developed that clarifies the roles of 
land implementing agencies (TIC, RUBADA, Ministry 
of Lands and Local Government) in order responsibly 
and transparently to allocate land for investors in 
the SAGCOT region.
December 2012
Develop and 
implement 
domestic and 
regional seed and 
other inputs. Policies 
that encourage 
greater private 
sector participation 
in the production, 
marketing and trade 
in seeds and other 
inputs.
6. Taxes (cess, VAT) on seeds and seed packaging 
reduced or lifted.
July 2013
7. Revised Seed Act that aligns the rights of plant 
breeders with the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) system.
November 2012
8. Time required to release new varieties of imported 
seeds from outside the region to be reviewed and 
benchmarked with international best practices.
December 2013
9. Qualified private sector companies authorised to 
produce foundation seed under proper supervision 
and testing.
December 2013
10. ISTA and OECD seed testing accreditations 
achieved to enable regional and international seed 
sales.
December 2013
11. Time required to register imported agrochemicals 
from outside the region to be reviewed and 
benchmarked with international best practices.
December 2013
12. Update and align the National Food & Nutrition 
Policy with the National Nutrition Strategy. 
June 2013
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APPENDIX 3: Selected data tables
Table 3A: In the past year did you grow any of the following in your main field?
Crop Monocrop 
N
% 
monocrop
Intercrop 
N
% 
intercrop
Total N Total %
Hybrid maize 2 3.3 6 10 8 13.3
Improved OPV maize 2 3.3 5 8.3 7 11.6
Local maize 14 23.3 30 50 44 73.3
Maize total* 17 28.3 39 65 56 93.3
Beans 13 21.7 16 26.7 29 48.3
Groundnut 2 3.3 - - 2 3.3
Pigeon pea 6 10 18 30 24 40
Cow pea 4 6.7 15 25 19 31.7
Sweet potato 3 5 - - 3 5
Irish potato 1 1.7 - - 1 1.7
Soya 1 1.7 - - 1 1.7
Cassava 7 11.7 5 8.3 12 20
Millet 2 3.3 - - 2 3.3
Rice 23 38.3 - - 23 38.3
Any type of veg 47 78.3
Okra 3 5 1 1.7 4 6.7
Pumpkin 3 5 17 28.3 20 33.3
Swiss chard/spinach 4 6.7 - - 4 6.7
Amaranth 2 3.3 1 1.7 3 5
Chinese cabbage 7 11.7 - - 7 11.7
Cabbage 7 11.7 6 10 13 21.7
Tomato 13 21.7 4 6.7 17 28.3
Onion 6 10 - - 6 10
Carrot 6 10 4 6.7 10 16.7
Lemongrass - - 1 1.7 1 1.7
Sugar cane 3 5 1 1.7 4 6.7
Sweet pepper - - 1 1.7 1 1.7
Chilli pepper 1 1.7 - - 1 1.7
Sunflower 4 6.7 1 1.7 5 8.4
Sesame 2 3.3 1 1.7 3 5
Sweet potato leaves 1 1.7 - - 1 1.7
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Crop Monocrop 
N
% 
monocrop
Intercrop 
N
% 
intercrop
Total N Total %
Any fruit 14 23.3
Guava 2 3.3 - - 2 3.3
Mango 5 8.3 1 1.7 6 10
Banana 6 10 1 1.7 7 11.7
Avocado 3 5 1 1.7 4 6.7
Citrus 2 3.3 2 3.3 4 6.6
Papaya 1 1.7 1 1.7 2 3.4
Coconut 2 3.3 1 1.7 3 5
Passion fruit 2 3.3 - - 2 3.3
*For maize total, some may have answered more than one so totals may not add up in the columns
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Table 3B: In the past year did you plant the following on kilimo cha kiangazi land?
All respondents Respondents who 
planted KK (N=40)
Crop N yes % of all % yes
Local maize 3 5 7.5
Maize total 3 5 7.5
Beans 7 11.3 17.5
Pigeon pea 3 5 7.5
Cow pea 1 1.7 2.5
Irish potato 3 5 7.5
Cassava 1 1.7 2.5
Rice 6 10 15
Any type of veg 30 50 75
Okra 3 5 7.5
Pumpkin 4 6.7 10
Swiss chard/spinach 9 15 22.5
Kale 1 1.7 2.5
Amaranth 4 6.7 10
Chinese cabbage 8 13.3 20
Cabbage 9 15 22.5
Tomato 12 20 30
Onion 10 16.7 25
Carrot 11 18.3 27.5
Sweet pepper 3 5 7.5
Chilli pepper 3 5 7.5
Salad leaves 4 6.7 10
Spices and herbs 1 1.7 2.5
Sweet potato leaves 4 6.7 10
Any fruit 2 3.3 5
Banana 2 3.3 5
Passion fruit 1 1.7 2.5
Berries 2 3.3 5
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Table 3C: In the past year did you plant the following around your home?
All respondents Respondents who planted 
around home (N=40)
Crop N yes % of all % yes
Hybrid maize 1 1.7 2.5
Local maize 2 3.3 5
Maize total 2 3.3 5
Beans 1 1.7 2.5
Pigeon pea 2 3.3 5
Cow pea 4 6.7 10
Sweet potato 3 5 7.5
Cassava 2 3.3 5
Any type of veg 25 41.7 62.5
Okra 8 13.3 20
Pumpkin 6 10 15
Swiss chard/spinach 4 6.7 10
Amaranth 4 6.7 10
Chinese cabbage 7 11.7 17.5
Cabbage 2 3.3 5
Hibiscus/roselie 1 1.7 2.5
Lemon grass 11 18.3 27.5
Chilli pepper 4 6.7 10
Sweet potato leaves 11 18.3 27.5
Any fruit 26 43.3 65
Guava 6 10 15
Mango 11 18.3 27.5
Banana 10 16.7 25
Avocado 6 10 15
Citrus 14 23.3 35
Papaya 9 15 22.5
Coconut 7 11.7 17.5
Passion fruit 3 5 7.5
Sugar cane 3 5 7.5
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Table 3D: Source of seed acquired in the last season, percentage (only those who acquired this 
type of seed)
Hybrid 
maize
Improved 
OPV maize
Local 
maize
Rice Beans Pigeon 
pea
Cow 
pea
purchased seed dealer 42.9 50 4.9 9.1 7.7 - 4.5
NGO/charity - 16.7 - 4.5 - - 9.1
own saved seed 57.1 35.2 95.1 68.2 61.5 36 50
gift/exchange within village - - - 9.1 - 16 18.2
gift/exchange from outside village - - - - - - -
purchased from neighbour/other 
farmer
- - - 9.1 23.1 20 9.1
purchased from general dealer/local 
market
- - - - 3.8 20 -
other - - - - 3.8 8 9.1
*Some answered more than one, so totals may add up to more than 100%
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APPENDIX 4: AGRA grants in Tanzania, 2007–2012
Table 4A: AGRA SHP grants, 2007–2012
Sub-
programme
Dates Amount 
(US$’000)
Recipient Description
Fertiliser 
supply (FS)
2009–2011 1,577 CNFA Develop existing input distribution system
FS 2010–2013 397 MAFC Improving fertiliser quality
FS 2010–2011 149 Jason Alan 
Scarpone
Fertiliser market development
FS 2012 2,741 AFAP Start-up grant to operationalise AFAP
FS 2012–2015 22,259 AFAP AFAP (Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania)
Sub-total FS 27,123
SH Extension 
(Ext.)
2010 – 2013 795 MAFC Integration of pigeon-pea into maize 
production systems in central and northern 
zones
SH Ext. 2009–2012
(later 
extended 
to 2014)
424 SUA Increase use of locally available phosphate 
rock
SH Ext. 2010–2012 406 MAFC Increased maize-legume productivity and 
striga weed control
SH Ext. 2010–2013 895 MAFC Integration of legumes in maize-based 
cropping systems (Maruku Agricultural 
research and development institute) 
SH Ext. 2012–2015 967 MAFC Increased access to improved maize and 
bean seed, fertiliser and output markets in 
southern highlands
Sub-total SH 
Ext.
3,487
SH Training 2010–2015 1,867 SUA Capacity building in soil and water 
management
SH Research 2011–2014 389 Faida 
Market 
Link Co.
Capacity building of extension staff in ISFM
Total 32,866
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Table 4B: AGRA PASS grants, 2007–2012
Sub-
programme
Dates Amount 
(US$’000)
Recipient Description
FIAAC 2007–10 185 MAFC, Selian ARI, 
Arusha
hybrid maize
FIAAC 2007–10 184 MAFC, Uyole ARI, 
Mbeya
high yielding maize—disease resistance
FIAAC 2007–10 185 MAFC, Naliendele 
ARI, Mtwara
2 farmer-preferred, high yielding, disease 
resistant bean varieties—conventional 
breeding
FIAAC 2007–10 185 MAFC improvement of farmer-preferred cassava 
varieties and market development for 
surpluses
FIAAC 2009–11 193 MAFC, Uyole ARI, 
Mbeya
improved soybean
FIAAC 2010–13 185 MAFC improved sweet potato—weevils, storage, 
beta-carotene
FIAAC 2011–13 185 MAFC cassava improvement in humid and sub-
humid lowlands
FIAAC 2011–14 165 MAFC disease resistant bean varieties in 
Southern Highlands
FIAAC 2011–14 150 MAFC improved maize varieties in Northern 
zone
FIAAC 2011–14 185 MAFC hybrid maize in Southern Highlands
FIAAC 2011–14 195 MAFC salt tolerant rice
1997 sub-total MAFC
FIAAC 2012–15 1977 Farm Input 
Promotions 
Africa Ltd (FIPS) 
(Kenya)
dissemination of improved crop varieties 
and ISFM
FIAAC 2009–10 18 KH Refrigeration 
(SA)
investigation on cold storage
Sub-total 
FIAAC
3992
EACI 2008–10 402 Sokoine UA Training MScs in Plant Breeding for 
improved crops
Sub-total 
EACI
402
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Sub-
programme
Dates Amount 
(US$’000)
Recipient Description
SEPA 2007–10 158 MAFC Kizimbani 
ARI
participatory multiplication and 
dissemination of cassava using disease-
free materials
SEPA 2011–13 230 MAFC cassava and soil fertility management in 
Zanzibar
SEPA 2007–09 169 Tanseed produce and disseminate improved maize, 
pigeon pea and sesame
SEPA 2010 25 Duncan Kirubi 
(Kenya)
support to Tanseed, especially on seed 
production and processing 
SEPA 2008–10 151 Krishna Seed Co 
Ltd
multiplication and distribution of 
improved seed
SEPA 2008–10 154 Zanobia Seeds 
Ltd
improved varieties of orphan crops
SEPA 2009–14 170 Itente Co Ltd improved seed for staple crops in Kagera 
region
SEPA 2011 30 Temba 
Katambarare 
(Zim)
support to Itente
SEPA 2012 34 Temba 
Katambarare 
(Zim)
support to Itente
SEPA 2010–13 223 Meru Agro-Tours 
and Consultants
production and dissemination of 
improved maize, sorghum and beans
SEPA 2010–13 200 Agriseed 
Technologies Ltd
quality seed in Tabora, Singida and 
Dodoma
SEPA 2010–13 200 Aminata Quality 
Seeds and 
Consultancy Ltd
improved maize, rice, sesame and 
sunflower in north western Tanzania
SEPA 2010–13 197 IFFA Seed Co improved maize, pigeon pea, sunflower 
and tomato in Northern Region
SEPA 2011–14 200 Northern Seed 
Co
high yielding varieties of maize, sorghum, 
beans, pigeon peas, vegetables, cassava 
and sweet potatoes
SEPA 2011–13 150 Kipato Seed Ltd improved maize, rice and beans in 
Southern Highlands
SEPA 2012–13 187 Suba Agro-
Trading and 
Engineering Co 
Ltd
improved maize, sorghum and sesame in 
Morogoro, Dodoma and Singida
Sub-total 
SEPA
2478
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Sub-
programme
Dates Amount 
(US$’000)
Recipient Description
ADP 2007–10 4,311 CNFA national agro-dealer networks for 
agricultural inputs
ADP 2008–11 1,000 National 
Microfinance 
Bank Ltd
credit facilities to agro-dealers
ADP 2010 246 MAFC national agro-dealer strategy
Sub-total 
ADP
5,557
Total PASS 12,429
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Table 4C: AGRA other grants, 2007–2012
Sub- 
Programme
Dates Amount 
(US$ ‘000)
Recipient Description
BBTE 2010–11 640 Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food 
Security and 
Cooperatives
Define, test and refine the breadbasket 
approach, create investment grade 
proposals and transfer knowledge for 
rollout to other breadbasket areas in 
Tanzania
Markets 2009–14 5,000 Standard Bank 
South Africa 
Limited 
Facilitate credit access in small-holder 
value chains in Tanzania, Uganda, 
Mozambique and Ghana
Markets 2009–11 568 Rural Urban 
Development 
Initiatives (RUDI)
Improving rice trading environment and 
providing rice marketing support services
Markets 2010–11 261 RUDI Increase capacity of small-holder 
farmers to engage in WFP procurement 
programmes
Markets 2010–13 1,354 TechnoServe Inc. Storage and warehouse receipt systems 
for small-holder maize and rice farmers 
Markets 2011–13 298 RUDI Building post-harvest handling for small-
holder farmers
Markets 2012–15 413 Center for 
Sustainable 
Development 
Initiatives 
Company Ltd
Business support to small and medium 
size enterprises in the southern highlands
Sub-total 
markets
7,894
Policy 2010 16 Tanzania Bureau 
of Standards
To create an enabling policy, institutional 
and regulatory environment for a 
sustained uptake of Green Revolution 
technologies and improve farm 
productivity and incomes of smallholder 
farmers in Africa
Policy 2011–15 492 Rural Livelihood 
Development 
Company
To create an enabling policy, institutional 
and regulatory environment for staple 
food market development to improve 
farm productivity and incomes of 
smallholder farmers
Policy 2012–16 222 Research 
on Poverty 
Alleviation
To support enhanced crop productivity 
through the implementation of conducive 
agricultural policies in Tanzania
Sub-total 
policy
730
Total other 9,264
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APPENDIX 5: Seed varieties in use and farmer perceptions
Here we provide an overview of maize, rice, vegetables, pigeon pea and cow pea seeds used as the 
main crops produced in the research sites.
Maize seed
The most popular maize varieties among the farmers we spoke to are TMV1 and Staha, while 
Situka—whose origins cannot be traced—is also popular.
Tanzania Maize Variety (TMV1) is now widely found in the drier areas of Tabora, Dodoma and 
Iringa. TMV1 is very popular because it is sweet, so good for green maize, and also heavy, so good 
for business. It has a white, flinty grain and is resistant to white flint streak. It is specially used for 
roast, and matures between 75 to 90 days. Farmers rated the variety good and said they recycled it. 
Farmers described it as an old variety, drought and disease resistant, and sweet, but has a small seed 
so people do not prefer it. Farmers did not specifically mention TMV2.
Situka improved OPV maize matures within a period of 75 days, whereas other varieties require 
at least 90 days. It is expected also to increase yield by 50 % compared to non-drought-tolerant 
varieties. It has a strong ability to grow in the semi-arid areas in the central part of Tanzania and 
in the highlands. Situka is rated as good quality by some, with one farmer saying “Situka is the 
best quality seed, better than the recycled hybrid”. Others felt it was dependent on the weather 
but that Situka produced under any conditions. Another described it as pest and disease resistant. 
Yet another farmer said the seed ranked poor after three seasons of recycling. The agro-dealer 
recommended its use to one farmer, and another got their seed from ASA. Farmers priced the seed 
at Sh2,000–Sh3,000/kg.
Staha is another local variety. According to farmers it was originally a hybrid. Farmers recycle it for 
3–4 seasons before the quality becomes poor and they must repurchase. According to farmers in 
the seed FGD, Staha takes 90 days to harvest and produces high yields, the maize is very white, and 
it has big seeds. Staha was originally bred for tolerance to MSV (Kaliba, et al., 2000:37), but farmers 
said it is not disease resistant, and they don’t buy much because agro-dealers are not providing the 
right seed.
Other varieties mentioned include seed by domestic companies. The Kifaro hybrid by Suba Agro 
was seen in a Nafaka demonstration plot, and the respondent said they would try it next season. 
A drought tolerant TAN250 maize OPV (Tanseed) was mentioned for next season and farmers also 
mentioned other local maize varieties, including Emblidi, Mpingo and Katmbili. Others didn’t know 
the varieties they were using.
Rice seed
Supa is the basic variety for improvement and there are a number of varieties including Supa Mbeya 
and Supa Shinyanga. The improved variety TXD306 (see below) is also based on Supa germplasm. 
According to Moses Temi, principal at Mkindo Training Centre, there is an inverse relationship 
between productivity and aroma. Improved varieties have little aroma while quality is based on 
aroma. Saro (the other name for TXD) stands for semi-aromatic. “We want people to forget about 
aroma”, says Temi, only half joking, explaining that in the hungry season people are forced to eat 
Saro and increasing yields is important.
According to farmers in the seed FGD, farmers use Supa. It is the oldest local variety. It has a good 
aroma and once it is processed it doesn’t break, it is dense, has a high yield (15x110 kg bags/acre 
of processed rice). It has good markets, mainly middlemen purchasing at the farm gate (‘home 
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market’) with a good price—Sh1,200/kg compared with Sh1,000/kg for other varieties. Farmers like 
to try new varieties but as a result have ended up losing the Supa varieties. Other say Supa varieties 
are not being grown widely because middlemen do not want to buy except for low prices. They ask 
for the other varieties. The only issue is of physical appearance.
Supa Mbeya comes from the research station. It is improved seed and has higher yields than the 
original Supa. Supa Shinyanga was introduced in 2002–2005. It has higher productivity, a denser 
seed and higher yields. Both (although Shinyanga less than Mbeya) are easily attacked by diseases, 
are not drought resistant and need lots of fertiliser. One farmer using Supa Shinyanga said they 
would switch to TXD if they had irrigation.
According to Mr Okhunda at Dakawa, “Supa is an aromatic variety. Farmers prefer it, so the 
improvement of Supa is viewed as important. TXD is not so aromatic but has a yield improvement. 
Consumers in town want Supa but the price is not very different, at Sh50,000/bag of TXD for a yield 
of 30–45 bags, compared with Sh55,000 of Supa for a yield of 15 bags. So it makes economic sense to 
use the higher yielding variety. There is a 15 cm height difference between Supa and Saro (TXD). Supa 
can also lodge (fall over) with high water levels. It still comes out if no weeding is done because it is 
tall, but we do not promote no weeding. Some cooking methods lose the aroma even if Supa is used. 
As researchers we don’t try to convince farmers, we just show them and they choose.” Mr Kunde at 
ASA says they produced 100 tons of certified Supa seed in 2014, “But,” says Kunde, “the challenge is 
that you cannot compare the yields with TXD.” Supa did appear in field trials but wasn’t selected.
TXD is built on the Supa germplasm. The most popular variety is TXD306 (Saro 5), bred by the 
Dakawa Research Station. Mr Okhunda explained that Dakawa is a local office of the Ilonga ARI. TXD 
was developed from 1982 to 1985 at Dakawa and is a cross between a Korean variety and Supa. The 
aim is to improve yields. Supa has a good aroma but low responsiveness to fertiliser. There are many 
varieties based on Supa, including TXD varieties 306, 88 and 85, the latter two of which are available 
“but not preferred”. TXD306 was officially released 4 years ago (2010). Official release requires the 
generation of a management package and tests for pests and diseases. Says Okhunda, “TXD was 
being used before the official release; farmers took it from multi-location trials so it did diffuse into 
the environment.” 
Okhunda said that Dakawa conducts non-commercial training to maintain varieties so they can 
keep them longer. Dakawa produces to market and conducts research on rice, maize and vegetables. 
It has expertise in agronomy, soil fertility and pest management and conducts trials on all these 
crops with the private sector. Private companies contract on fertilisers and herbicides and there is 
some collaborative research. Farmers can and do purchase seed directly from the station. 
Moses Temi of Mkindo Training Centre says: “People have accepted the improved seed but many do 
not have irrigation. The benefit is that it can produce 2–3 times a year compared to 1 time for rain-
fed paddy. If local varieties are planted more than once a year, they turn to grass. Local varieties have 
no more than 20 tillers/hill and 6 grains/panicle compared to TXD Saro with 30–120 tillers/hill and 
100–300 grains/panicle. The variations are based on real conditions … ASA wanted to do contract 
production of improved varieties with farmers, but farmers haven’t got the skills yet, especially in 
marketing. The focus is on reducing production costs for farmers. Under the old varieties, income 
was Sh500,000/ha, but are now Sh2.5m/ha income per season from TXD using GAP.” Temi continues: 
“It is hard to convince farmers to adopt something new. Improved varieties need irrigation. Farmers 
know the benefits of local varieties, e.g. drought resistance. The rule is that you should not mix local 
and certified varieties in irrigated areas, and the project is thus based on irrigation and certified 
seed. The seed used is based on government certified seed with breeder specification.” 
According to farmers in the seed FGD, in irrigated areas they plant improved seed and in other areas 
they plant local varieties. Some villages have only one season, so they can plant only one variety 
at a time. Farmers in the seed FGD considered TXD306 to be high yield (15–20 x 95–105kg bags/
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acre). The variety has more tillers and a shorter maturity—120 days compared with 6 months for 
local varieties. It is disease resistant but is still susceptible to pests. It does not necessarily die but 
will take more than 120 days to harvest. Some farmers indicated trying it in rain-fed areas and said 
it performed well. Farmers in the FGD who were not using Saro did not know it could survive in 
drought areas, but were warned by others that it must be a flat area so the water doesn’t flow out 
and is therefore not good in areas with slopes. According to farmers in the FGD, Saro 5 tastes better 
than Mbeya and Shinyanga but not the original Supa. Farmers do not have the voice with which to 
bargain so they accept the switch to Saro. Farmers generally ranked TXD306 as good and indicated 
they recycled it for 2–3 seasons, saying it had better markets than other varieties. Some farmers 
indicated receiving TXD306 from Nafaka demonstration plots or directly.
Other local rice varieties in use that were mentioned are mbawa mbiri (two wings), with general 
agreement that yields are low but markets are better than for Supa, and Nondo which has 
intermediate advantages regarding taste and yield.
According to Mr Okhunda at Dakawa, hybrids are a problem because they don’t maintain their 
vigour. They are now seeing many varieties from China.
Vegetable seed is a very fragmented sector, with a wide selection of vegetables being produced 
but no reliable seed market. Most vegetable seed is imported. Dakawa does contract research on 
vegetable seed but has no breeder seed. Seed prices vary widely with purchase amounts ranging 
from Sh3,500/250g for Chinese cabbage seed to Sh27,000 for carrot seed. NGOs provide some 
vegetable seed free of charge. Seed quality is variable, as indicated above, with problems of seed 
not germinating or underperforming. There are also problems with agro-dealers, similar to those 
concerning maize, with false information being given to farmers. Some unidentified onion seed 
was from South Africa (likely Pannar, which is now owned by Pioneer Hi-Bred). Some farmers have 
recycled Chinese cabbage and salad leaf seed. There are seedlings for sale locally.
According to one farmer the short stalk variety of pigeon pea gives a better yield while the long 
stalk gives a better taste, and she is using both varieties. Farmers received pigeon pea and cow pea 
from Ilonga Research Station in Kilosa, or purchased it from agro-dealers or the village office. One 
person reported buying pigeon pea as food and then planting it.
During an interview on 24/10/2014 with Meshack Makenge and Osmond Rupindo, who are with 
the Ilonga ARI and who are responsible for plant breeding, and agricultural economics and farming 
systems, respectively, the production of improved pigeon pea and cow pea seed at Ilonga started in 
1980. Local varieties were given names from local areas. There are three officially released varieties 
of pigeon pea from Ilonga. The first is Mali (worth), which has a long duration maturity (7–8 months) 
and is suited to the high and medium altitude areas in the northern and central areas of the country. 
Mali has a large seed and is white, which traders prefer. It is exported to India. Wholesalers collect 
the seed in a central area and export it from Dodoma central market. In the past season the price 
was Sh2,000/kg. There is a local market for pigeon pea but the price is low (Sh1,000/kg) so traders 
prefer exporting. Mali is bred for resistance to fusarium wilt because local varieties are not resistant. 
It is based on ICRISAT germplasm and was released in 2003. It is high yielding (8–10 bags/acre, 100kg 
bags) and can be irrigated, but does not need additional water since it is drought resistant. Farmers 
should recycle the seed for three years and then buy more—from ASA, agro-dealers or the research 
station.
The second variety is Tumea, which has a medium duration maturity (6 months) and is best suited 
to medium and low altitudes. It has a yield of 6–8 bags/acre. The short time it spends in the field 
means it escapes fusarium. It is good for areas of low rainfall (semi-arid) and is exported to India. 
The most important consideration for exports is quality. Tumea has a smaller seed and originated 
from Kenya.
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Komboa is a short duration (4 months) variety. Tumea and Mali can be intercropped with maize or 
sorghum, but not Komboa. It requires close planting and matures at the same time as maize so it 
challenges for nutrients. It is preferred in coastal areas. The variety is insensitive to photo period so 
flowers at any time. The other two flower from March–June (i.e. when the days are long). Komboa 
can be planted up to 3 times a year. If you remove the seed coat the seeds are yellow inside, the 
coats are of a different colour. It is used for dhal in India, mixed with rice, and is used locally to 
produce bonko (a dish that requires the seed coat to be retained and the seeds to be soaked, boiled 
and spiced) and to make biscuits. The price is lower than Mali, and it yields 6–8 bags/acre.
Makenge and Rupindo explained that pigeon pea production and price has increased over the past 3 
years, due to the high demand. The local market price rose from Sh600 to Sh1,000/kg without much 
of a seasonal price fluctuation. Ilonga have not organised market training for farmers and while 
NGOs provide support the farmers still lack information. Pigeon pea existed previously but not as a 
commercial crop and was used to demarcate fields. Commercial fields now use up to 20 or 30 acres. 
According to Isako Mushauri, CEO of Tanseed, there is demand for pigeon pea in the northern zone, 
“but to transport it there eats up profitability”. Tanseed received an AGRA grant to support pigeon 
pea commercialisation but according to Mushauri, “After AGRA’s support ended, Tanseed stopped 
producing pigeon pea. The market was still low and farmers recycle seed for most self-pollinating 
crops. There are lots of requirements like spraying practices, etc., which are difficult for farmers to 
get right. As a business, we decided the pigeon pea market was too small so we stopped.”
According to Makenge and Rupindo, Ilonga has released 6 cow pea varieties: Fahari (90 day maturity, 
trailing, indeterminant); Tumahini (80–85 day maturity); Vuli 1 (erect type, matures 60–65 days); Vuli 
2 (69–74 day maturity); and VuliAR1 and AR2 which are alectra28 resistant. Ilonga researchers want to 
combine the traits for alectra resistance, drought resistance and resistance to cow pea aphid. They 
can do this using conventional breeding after molecular marking and are in discussions to establish 
their own microbiology laboratory. Currently, they use facilities at SUA.
Cow pea is a popular crop grown almost everywhere. Its leaves are eaten during the rainy season, 
then the leaf is blanched and dried for off-season use and stored in the house. But there is no 
systematic market and the main market is local. Ilonga are assisting farmers to reach other markets.
There were local cow pea varieties and most improved germplasm is based on IITA germplasm 
crossed with local varieties. There is no payment for IITA germplasm and institutions collaborate 
in the Tropical Legumes Programme (TLP). In January 2015 Phase 3 of the programme will begin, 
continuing until 2018. Phase 2 also worked on pigeon pea. Legumes are a ‘low volume crop’ but 
Ilonga is starting a project with SSF in Iringa, Dodoma and Singida because legumes are used mostly 
in these areas. The TLP has a demonstration plot and a group of farmers who form part of the 
programme. There is a need to develop new varieties to deal with new climatic conditions, especially 
drought. Cow peas need phosphorus at an early stage for the strengthening of roots and then 
later for stabilising flowers. Nitrogen is not needed. Legumes are a protein and are expensive when 
compared with cereals. SSF are starting to grow pigeon pea and cow pea as their commercial crops 
and there are positive benefits in increased income, concluded Makenge and Rupindo. A number of 
farmers to whom we spoke, who planted cow pea, did not know what varieties they were planting.
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